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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
 
AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE GLOBAL AUDIT MARKET: IFRS-RELATED 
CHANGES AND DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE BIG 4 GLOBAL NETWORKS 
by  
William N. Riccardi 
Florida International University, 2014 
Miami, Florida 
Professors Kannan Raghunandan and Dasaratha Rama, Co-Major Professors 
Ongoing debates within the professional and academic communities have raised a 
number of questions specific to the international audit market. This dissertation consists 
of three related essays that address such issues. First, I examine whether the propensity to 
switch between auditors of different sizes (i.e., Big 4 versus non-Big 4) changes as 
adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) becomes a more common 
phenomenon, arguing that smaller auditors have an opportunity to invest in necessary 
skills and training needed to enter this market. Findings suggest that clients are relatively 
less (more) likely to switch to (away from) a Big 4 auditor if the client’s adoption of 
IFRS occurs in more recent years. 
In the second essay, I draw on these inferences and test whether the change in 
audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption changes over time. As the market becomes less 
concentrated, larger auditors becomes less able to demand a premium for their services. 
Consistent with my arguments, results suggest that the change in audit service fees 
declines over time, although this effect seems concentrated among the Big 4. I also find 
that this effect is partially attributable to a differential effect of the auditors’ experience in 
6 
pricing audit services related to IFRS based on the period in which adoption occurs. The 
results of these two essays offer important implications to policy debates on the costs and 
benefits of IFRS adoption. 
In the third essay, I differentiate Big 4 auditors into three classifications—Parent 
firms, Brand Name affiliates, and Local affiliates—and test for differences in audit fee 
premiums (relative to non-Big 4 auditors) and audit quality. Results suggest that there is 
significant heterogeneity between the three classifications based on both of these 
characteristics, which is an important consideration for future research. Overall, this 
dissertation provides additional insights into a variety of aspects of the global audit 
market. 
vii 
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CHAPTER 1: IFRS ADOPTION AND CHANGES IN AUDITOR SWITCHING 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
In this essay, I examine the impact of widespread adoption of International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) on the market for audit services. Motivation for 
this study comes from ongoing policy debates regarding the relative costs and benefits of 
adoption of IFRS. Opponents of IFRS adoption in the United States (U.S.) have voiced 
concerns regarding the potentially adverse and unexpected outcomes following adoption. 
For example, Hail, Leuz, and Wysocki (2010) note that IFRS adoption could lead to an 
even greater gap between large and small auditors, with the “Big 4” auditors (Deloitte, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, and Ernst & Young) taking business away from 
smaller firms. As auditors are likely to play a key role in shaping future reporting 
practices related to IFRS (Ball, 2006), it is important to further our understanding of how 
the global audit market has been impacted as a result of a shift toward accounting 
standard globalization. 
Recent studies have examined the associations between mandatory IFRS adoption 
in the European Union (E.U.) and audit market consequences, including the propensity of 
clients to engage large audit firms (Comprix, Muller, and Sinclair, 2011; Wieczynska, 
2013). I differentiate my study from prior research in this area. First, rather than 
examining only the likelihood of a client to switch auditors in the year of IFRS adoption, 
I hypothesize that such propensities change over time due to smaller auditors’ acquisition 
of skills and experience necessary to provide IFRS-related audit services; such actions by 
smaller auditors should promote a less concentrated market for such services. A change 
of this type would result in a market that is less concentrated among the Big 4. In 
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addition, using newly available data sources, I form a sample that is more comprehensive 
in coverage than prior related research. 
Based on a sample of firms in 26 countries from 2004 through 2011, my primary 
results suggest that non-Big 4 audit clients adopting IFRS in more recent years are less 
likely to switch to a Big 4 auditor relative to firms adopting IFRS in earlier years. I 
similarly find that while Big 4 audit clients are less likely to switch to a non-Big 4 auditor 
in the year of IFRS adoption, they are relatively more likely to do so in more recent 
years. Thus, I find support for my hypotheses that the market for IFRS-related audit 
services has become less concentrated among large, global auditors over time. Similar 
inferences are drawn when I repeat the analysis with global auditors defined as the 
“Global 6,” including BDO and Grant Thornton in addition to the Big 4. 
This study offers a number of contributions to the literature. First, related research 
focuses on the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. While appealing, such a setting 
does not enable researchers to draw broader inferences regarding changes in the global 
audit market over time. Conversely, my study expands on prior research by assessing 
changes in these likelihoods using a more comprehensive sample. These results offer 
timely evidence of one potential audit market outcome associated with IFRS adoption 
and provide potentially policy-relevant evidence regarding how the audit market has been 
impacted by IFRS adoption, and such research has been called for by prior studies (Hail 
et al., 2010). Finally, my results add to the auditing literature in a broader sense by 
examining the effect of widespread and impactful accounting regime changes on an 
important aspect of the global audit market. 
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The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related 
prior research and develops my hypotheses. The third section details the research design. 
Section 4 describes the sample selection procedures and data employed in this study. 
Section five provides explanations of the empirical results and associated inferences. I 
conclude in Section 6 and offer suggestions for future research. 
1.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
1.2.1 Background: IFRS Adoption and Auditor Switching 
 
Numerous papers have examined the accounting consequences and economic 
outcomes following both voluntary and mandatory IFRS adoption (see Soderstrom and 
Sun (2007) and Brüggemann, Hitz, and Sellhorn (2012) for reviews of recent literature 
and Hail et al. (2010) for a discussion of potential economic implications of IFRS adoption 
in the U.S.). While fewer papers have examined how the audit market has been affected 
by IFRS adoption, recent research has made advances in the area of auditor selection 
and auditor switching due to IFRS adoption. As research shifts in focus from an analysis 
of the intended benefits to the potentially unexpected outcomes associated with IFRS 
adoption, a recurring theme is to extrapolate inferences relevant to countries that 
continue to report under local accounting standards. 
More broadly, there has been concern from regulatory bodies regarding the 
concentration of the audit market and the market share of the largest public accounting 
firms (e.g., U.S. Senate, 1976; U.S. House of Representatives, 1985; SOX, 2002; GAO, 
2003; FRC, 2007; U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2008; European Commission, 2011; 
House of Lords, 2011). This problem can only be exacerbated as countries switch 
accounting regimes, as larger and more experienced auditors have the opportunity to 
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capitalize on such changes to dominate the market. Research has therefore examined the 
auditor choice behavior of clients during the transition to IFRS. Comprix et al. (2011) 
examine auditor replacements after firms switch reporting standards following the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005 by the E.U., treating 2007 as the “post IFRS” period 
and 2003 as the “pre IFRS” period. Their findings suggest that larger clients and those 
domiciled in countries with greater differences between their local GAAP and IFRS are 
more likely to engage a Big 4 auditor, leading to supply-side constraints that permit 
smaller auditors to pick up clients not falling into those categories. Since auditor 
replacements over this time period may not necessarily be caused by client firms’ adoption 
of IFRS, Wieczynska (2013) expands on this finding and more precisely examines the 
timing of auditor replacements for firms that adopt IFRS. Her results suggest that 
auditor replacements of IFRS adopting clients are, in general, concentrated in the adoption 
year, and she also finds evidence that the strength of a country’s regulatory quality is 
positively (negatively) associated with the likelihood of switching from a small to a large 
(large to a small) audit firm. 
In summary, recent literature has examined the likelihood of auditor switches 
surrounding IFRS adoption and generally finds that auditor switches are more likely to 
occur due to client firms’ adoption of IFRS. In general, these studies find that clients are 
more likely to engage a larger auditor during the transition to IFRS (Wieczynska, 2013), 
but it is possible that certain types of clients may be dropped by the Big 4 and forced to 
switch to a smaller audit firm (Comprix et al., 2011). Thus, the extent to which the 
auditor switching behavior that is associated with IFRS has changed over time has not yet 
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been examined. I fill this gap in the literature and examine these issues in the current 
study. 
1.2.2 Hypotheses Related to Auditor Switching in the Year of IFRS Adoption 
 
Mandatory IFRS adoption in the E.U. was announced in 2002, with compliance 
required for publicly-listed firms for fiscal years beginning after January 1, 2005.1 Prior 
to this shift in reporting practices, adoption of IFRS was permitted on a voluntary basis in 
many countries. As a result, it should be expected that fewer audit firms possessed the 
necessary skillset to assist clients in their transition to IFRS and, likewise, to audit IFRS 
financial statements prior to the mandatory requirement. Over time, however, this 
knowledge should spread to smaller audit firms, and there are several explanations as to 
why this may occur. First, Comprix et al. (2011) posit that supply-side constraints during 
the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. caused the market share of the Big 4 auditors 
to decrease in quantity and shift to a particular type of clientele (larger companies and 
those in countries with greater differences between their local GAAP and IFRS). In other 
words, smaller clients and those from countries with fewer differences between their 
local GAAP and IFRS may have been forced to switch from a Big 4 to a smaller audit 
firm during this particular time period. This problem was exacerbated due to the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. coinciding with implementation of Section 404 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S., which led to further dismissal of clients by 
 
 
 
 
1 The two exceptions to mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. were for (1) companies with securities 
listed in other countries where other internationally-accepted accounting standards were used for the basis 
of preparing consolidated financial statements (e.g., U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), or 
(2) companies that listed only debt securities. If a company met either of these two criteria, they could defer 
adoption of IFRS until 2007. 
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the Big 4 (Rama and Read, 2006).2  Thus, any clients cross-listed in the U.S. faced a 
greater risk of being dropped by the Big 4. 
Second, there is a plethora of literature suggesting that larger auditors charge a 
premium for their services (Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; 
Ireland and Lennox, 2002) due to higher quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981) or industry 
expertise (Craswell, Francis, and Taylor, 1995; Carson, 2009). Lin and  Yen  (2010) further 
argue that clients adopting IFRS face an additional fee premium due to the auditor’s 
expertise in providing IFRS-related services and because the client has limited means to 
select a different auditor. To avoid higher fees related to adoption of IFRS, clients 
may be more likely to shift to a smaller auditor as it becomes more practical for these 
audit firms to provide services commensurate with client demands. 
Third, smaller auditors with fewer large clients may be able to provide additional 
attention to individual companies that require assistance during the transition to IFRS. In 
earlier years, this trade-off may be outweighed by the inexperience of smaller firms. Over 
time, however, certain clients may find a smaller auditor to be more desirable. Finally, 
Atkinson, Taylor, Flesher, and Stocks (2002) suggest that clients are more likely to 
switch auditors as new individual reporting standards are implemented due to 
disagreements between the client and auditor regarding proper application of the new 
rules. In earlier years, especially before IFRS is mandated in a particular country, it may 
be  expected  that  clients  seek  the  guidance  of  relatively  more  experienced  and 
 
 
 
 
2 This issue became significant enough that the SEC’s chief accountant cautioned the Big 4 not to use SOX 
404 as justification to drop their smaller audit clients (Taub, 2004). 
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knowledgeable auditors. As such information spreads to smaller auditors, however, this 
behavior may become less prudent. 
Admittedly, many of these reasons to explain a change in the auditor switching 
behavior over time is dependent upon improvements by smaller audit firms, making them 
more attractive alternatives to clients. Bonner and Walker (1994) provide evidence to 
suggest that gains in knowledge in the audit industry are dependent on practice and 
experience, which smaller auditors can only obtain as the market shifts in their favor. 
Thus, to the extent that the market for IFRS-related audit services becomes less 
concentrated among large, global auditors, smaller audit firms have the opportunity to 
gain relevant skills and knowledge through an increasing coverage of clients. In addition, 
Libby and Luft (1993) outline that improvements in decision-making and performance in 
accounting environments is a function of ability, knowledge, motivation, and 
environment. As the demand for IFRS-related audit services increases, audit firms of all 
size have an increase in their motivation to invest in improving related skillsets and 
technologies and, as a result, continue to expand their knowledge of and gain experience 
in providing IFRS-related audit services. 
Prior research documents that IFRS adoption is associated with an increase in the 
propensity of clients to switch auditors (Comprix et al., 2011; Wieczynska, 2013). 
Accordingly, I do not state formal hypotheses for the likelihood of an auditor switch in 
the year of IFRS adoption and expect that the results of these prior studies hold for my 
expanded sample. Rather, my primary interest is to determine if these propensities vary 
over time. Due to fluctuations in the market concentration for IFRS-related audit services, 
I predict that clients adopting IFRS in more recent years will be less likely to switch away 
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from a small auditor in favor of a large auditor, with clients of large auditors being more 
likely to switch to a small auditor. Thus, I state my first hypotheses as follows, in the 
alternative form: 
H1A: In more recent years, clients are less likely to switch from a small to 
a large auditor in the year of IFRS adoption. 
H1B: In more recent years, clients are more likely to switch from a large 
to a small auditor in the year of IFRS adoption. 
Taken together, these hypotheses predict that clients adopting IFRS  in  more recent 
years are more (less) likely to engage (switch away from) a small auditor. I define a large 
(small) auditor as a Big 4 (non-Big 4) accounting firm. Note that these predictions are 
made only for “directional” auditor switches (i.e., from a small to a large or from a large 
to a small audit firm). I do not make predictions for changes in the likelihood of 
switching between auditors of similar size (“lateral” switches) because my expectations 
regarding fluctuations in the audit market apply only to switches between audit firms of 
different size. Clients may switch to a different auditor of similar size for reasons unrelated 
to changes in the market for IFRS-related services. For example, a client may switch 
from one Big 4 to another in order to obtain industry-specific expertise during the 
transition to IFRS. I therefore expect that changes in the likelihood of directional switches 
are different from the change in the likelihood of the corresponding lateral auditor 
switch, and state an additional hypothesis accordingly: 
H1C: In more recent years, the relative likelihood of a directional auditor 
switch in the year of IFRS adoption is different from the likelihood of the 
corresponding lateral auditor switch. 
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1.3 Research Design 
 
1.3.1 Development of Multinomial Logistic Regression Model 
 
To examine changes in the likelihood of firms to switch auditors due to IFRS 
adoption, I first divide the full sample into Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit clients, based on the 
auditor engaged prior to IFRS adoption. I then estimate a multinomial logistic regression 
on each subsample to model the likelihood of different types of auditor switches against 
the base condition of not switching auditors. This approach has several benefits. First, 
this allows me to assess how one aspect of the audit market has changed due to client 
firms’ adoption of IFRS over time by examining whether clients are more or less likely to 
switch to a particular type of auditor. Second, this approach mitigates the concern that my 
classification scheme of auditor switches consists of comparisons between heterogeneous 
firms. Prior studies that examine auditor switching surrounding IFRS adoption pool all 
observations into a single model (e.g. Wieczynska, 2013). However, the decision of 
whether or not to switch auditors during the transition to IFRS may be different for 
clients of small auditors compared to clients of large auditors. Third, specifying the 
model in this way permits for statistical comparisons both between treatment and control 
groups and among alternative switching decisions for firms within the same group. 
I collect data for a global sample of firms from 2004 through 2011.3  In order to 
 
draw inferences regarding changes in the likelihood of switching auditors due to IFRS 
adoption, I pool observations such that the sample consists of (a) the year in which firms 
 
 
3 Results for all auditor switching tests are consistent if I use a sample period beginning in 2001. In this 
expanded sample period, I do not code auditor switches of Arthur Andersen clients as equal to one since 
these were involuntary. However, only 2.6% of firms, before eliminating observations with missing data, 
can be included in the treatment sample prior to 2004. 
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 10 i,t 
1
adopt IFRS (treatment group), (b) periods other than the year of IFRS adoption (control 
group, non-adoption years of treatment firms), and (c) firms that adopted IFRS prior to 
the start of the sample period (control group, non-adopting firms). After partitioning my 
sample based on audit firm size as previously described, I estimate the following 
multinomial logistic regression on each subsample to empirically test H1A and H1B: 
AUDSWITCHi,t      = 0 IFRS _ ADOPTi,t   (1) 
 
 
POSTi,t 2 SIZE  i,t  3 NI i,t    
4 GROWTHi,t  5 LOSSi,t 1 
[(IFRS _ ADOPTi,t , NON _ ADOPTi,t ) 6 QUALi,t 1   7 FINANCEi,t      USLIST   VOLUN 
 8 i,t 9 i,t 
 HIGHDIFF 11REGQi,t  
 COUNTRY i,t 
In Equation (1), AUDSWITCH is an index variable coded as zero if firm i does not switch 
auditors in year t, one if firm i switches between auditors of similar size (i.e., a lateral 
switch) in year t, and two if firm i switches to an auditor of a different size (i.e., from a 
small to a large audit firm for non-Big 4 clients, or vice versa for Big 4 clients) in year t.4 
IFRS_ADOPT is an indicator variable coded as one if year t is the IFRS adoption 
year  for  firm  i,  and  zero  otherwise.  I  collect  data  on  accounting  standards  from 
Worldscope and define the adoption period as the first year in which a firm reports under 
4 I obtain auditor data from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, which provides time-series data on the 
auditor engaged in each year, whereas Worldscope provides data only for the most recent fiscal year. The 
data item provided by the database is a code, rather than the name of the auditor, and this code is based on 
the individual, local audit firm. I am very grateful to Thomson Reuters for providing a file linking these 
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individual and numerous audit firm codes to the associated “Parent Auditor.” To perform the analyses in 
this study, I use the parent auditor when coding variables based on audit firm size or other characteristics. 
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IFRS after switching from other reporting standards.5 I eliminate firms that Worldscope 
indicates reported under non-IFRS accounting standards after the initial year of IFRS 
reporting, thus ensuring that treatment firms in my sample fully switched to IFRS in the 
period I code as the adoption year. I expect a positive coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT for all 
types of auditor switches, with the exception being switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 
auditor, since certain clients may be more likely to utilize a larger audit firm (Comprix et 
al., 2011). NON_ADOPT is similarly determined and is an indicator variable equal to one 
if firm i did not adopt IFRS in year t, and zero otherwise. 
The initial increase in IFRS reporting occurred due to the mandatory requirement 
in the E.U. and Australia that publicly-listed firms switch from local reporting standards 
to IFRS for fiscal years beginning on or after January 1, 2005. Although global use of 
IFRS increased dramatically in 2005, a large proportion of firms in my sample have non- 
December 31st fiscal year-ends. Therefore, there are a significant number of adopting 
firms in 2006 is due to these firms’ first fiscal year beginning after 1/1/2005 ending 
during 2006. Additionally, E.U. firms were permitted to delay adoption of IFRS in 
certain circumstances, and other countries began implementing IFRS reporting in later 
years, explaining small but nontrivial numbers of adopting firms in 2007 through 2010. 
The large increase in the number of adopting firms in 2011 is primarily due to adoption 
of IFRS in Canada and Korea. 
 
 
 
 
 
5 I follow the coding described in Table 1-1A, Panel A of Daske, Hail, Leuz, and Verdi (2013) in 
classifying accounting standards based on the numeric code extracted from Worldscope. As a robustness 
test, I follow the stricter coding described by Daske et al. (2013) in coding accounting standards and results 
are consistent. 
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Given this trend of IFRS adoption over time, I define POST as an indicator 
variable equal to one for firm-years ending after 11/30/2006 and zero otherwise.6 The 
interaction term POST*IFRS_ADOPT is the primary variable of interest, capturing the 
likelihood of an auditor switch in the year of IFRS adoption for more recent fiscal years 
after the initial shock to the audit market caused by the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
the E.U. and Australia. In more recent years, I expect that clients of small auditors are 
less likely to switch to a large auditor (negative coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT) and 
that clients of large auditors are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor (positive 
coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT) relative to the base condition of not switching 
auditors. The second variable of interest is POST*NON_ADOPT, capturing any changes 
in the likelihood to switch auditors not driven by IFRS adoption. 
I include a number of variables to control for factors identified in prior research as 
being associated with auditor choice and switching (Simunic, 1980; Francis and Wilson, 
1988; Johnson and Lys, 1990; DeFond, 1992; Chan, Lin, and Mo, 2006; Landsman, 
Nelson, and Rountree, 2009), and I allow the coefficients on these variables to differ for 
treatment and control firm-years since factors influencing the decision to switch auditors 
may have different implications for adopting compared to non-adopting firms.7  SIZE is 
 
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets; in general, larger clients are less likely to 
 
 
 
6 For robustness, I consider the following alternative classifications for the time period variable, POST: (1) 
fiscal years ending after 12/31/2006; (2) fiscal years ending after 3/31/2007, by which time most audits 
following the initial adoption of IFRS would be complete; (3) fiscal years ending after 3/31/2007, eliminating 
firms with fiscal years ending between 11/30/2006 and 3/31/2007. The reported results are robust to all 
of these definitions. 
 
7 Since the expected signs of the control variables may differ depending on the type of auditor switch and 
depending on whether or not the firm adopts IFRS, I do not explicitly denote directional predictions of all 
control variables in this section. 
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switch auditors due to potentially higher fees driven by the new auditor’s effort in 
becoming familiar with the client. NI is measured as net income scaled by total assets, 
controlling for the relative likelihood of more profitable firms to switch auditors. 
GROWTH is measured as the percentage change in sales, since firms may be more likely 
to switch auditors when expanding their operations. LOSS is an indicator variable equal 
to one if the firm reports negative net income in year t-1 and zero otherwise; firms in 
poorer financial condition may undergo restructuring of operations, which could include 
changing to a new auditor. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm receives 
a qualified audit opinion in year t-1 and zero otherwise, controlling for auditor switches 
driven by deterioration in the auditor-client relationship after the client receives a non- 
clean audit opinion. FINANCE is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm raised debt 
or equity capital in year t, and zero otherwise, since clients that expand their business or 
seek additional capital are more likely to be misaligned with their current  auditor. USLIST 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is listed on a U.S. stock exchange 
and zero otherwise, controlling for the exposure of cross-listed firms to the relatively 
higher regulatory oversight in the U.S.8 
Since my sample period spans a number of years and there is a possible 
endogeneity concern given that I do not restrict my analysis to the effects of mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in a specific country or region, I include several additional control 
variables. VOLUN is a control variable equal to one if the firm adopts IFRS before the 
mandatory  requirement  in  its  country  of  origin  and  zero  otherwise,  controlling  for 
8 My inferences are unchanged if I include additional variables to control for the absolute value of total 
accruals, mergers, assets from acquisitions, and book-to-market ratios. Similarly, my results are consistent 
if I include a continuous measure for changes in long-term debt and equity rather than FINANCE. 
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differing incentives between voluntary and mandatory adopters of IFRS (Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000; Leuz, 2003). HIGHDIFF is an indicator variable equal to one if the 
differences between firm i’s previous local accounting standards and IFRS are greater 
than the sample median, based on the measure derived in Bae, Tan, and Welker (2008), 
and zero otherwise. Clients with greater differences between their previous reporting 
standards and IFRS may be more likely to switch auditors (Comprix et al., 2011). REGQ 
is a continuous index variable that captures the regulatory environment in firm i’s country 
of domicile, as reported by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009).9  This measure 
 
quantifies the ability of a government to implement and enforce regulations, which may 
impact the likelihood that a firm will switch auditors, especially during the transition to 
IFRS (Wieczynska, 2013). In addition to HIGHDIFF and REGQ, I also include country 
fixed-effects to capture other time-invariant differences (e.g., legal system) across 
countries in my sample. 
1.3.2 Tests of Differences between Regression Coefficients 
 
My research design allows for useful comparisons of the regression coefficients 
both between treatment and control samples and among alternative auditor switch choices 
for firms within the same group. After estimating Equation (1), I apply a likelihood ratio 
chi-square test for statistically significant differences of regression coefficients. This test 
indicates whether the likelihood of one type of auditor switch is less or greater than 
another, or whether the same type of auditor switch is more or less likely for different 
 
 
 
 
9 The sample period in Kaufmann et al. (2009) ends in 2008. Accordingly, I use the value of REGQ from 
2008 for all subsequent years in my analysis. 
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groups of firms. These tests provide additional support for H1A and H1B and allow me to 
statistically test H1C. 
To that end, I perform the following comparisons. First, for each type of auditor 
switch against the base condition of no auditor switch, I test whether the likelihood of 
switching auditors after the specified time period cutoff is different between observations 
coded as IFRS adoption years and non-adoption firms or years (i.e., I test for statistically 
significant difference between POST*NON_ADOPT and POST*IFRS_ADOPT). I expect 
the two coefficients to be significantly different or that the magnitude of the two 
coefficients, if they are the same sign, will be greater for adopting firms. Second, I 
perform a similar test across types of auditor switches within each subsample. In this 
case, my interest is in determining whether there is a statistically significant difference 
between the coefficients on POST*IFRS_ADOPT for the two possible types of auditor 
switches within each subsample. Again, I expect there to be a significant difference 
between the two and in this case, if both coefficients are signed the same, I expect the 
associated effect of the directional switch to be greater than that of a lateral switch. 
1.4 Data and Sample Selection 
 
I begin by obtaining a sample of publicly-listed firms available in Worldscope 
from 2004 through 2011. The coverage of firms in Worldscope extends to smaller 
companies and those listed in less regulated markets, whereas the alternative of Global 
Vantage contains only the largest and most prominent firms. I form my initial sample 
after coding the year of IFRS adoption for treatment firms based on reported accounting 
standards data, as described in the previous section. I do not include firms in certain East 
Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand), despite the use 
17 
of IFRS, for two reasons. First, for firms in China, adoption of IFRS was a gradual rather 
than immediate process; that is, Chinese accounting standards converged with IFRS over 
time. Similarly, while local GAAP in Hong Kong are nearly identical to IFRS, full 
conversion to IFRS took place over a number of years, so the effective implementation 
dates of individual standards differ from the initial reported year of IFRS adoption. 
Second, the reporting environment in these countries is significantly different from other 
parts of the world. Despite a legal system of common law origin, the incentives of 
managers and auditors diverge from the western world due to differences in enforcement, 
family ownership, and government control (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003). 
I delete observations with missing auditor information and those with SIC codes 
6000-6999 due to the differing operating characteristics of financial institutions. All data 
other than the firm’s auditor are obtained from Worldscope, and I delete observations 
with missing financial data used to construct control variables. Audit firm data is obtained 
from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals. 
Panel A of Table 1-1 summarizes the selection procedure for the sample used in 
the auditor switching tests. In Panel B, I provide sample distributions by country and by 
year. Not unexpectedly, countries with the largest capital markets (Australia, Canada, 
Korea, and the United Kingdom) each contribute more observations to the overall sample 
than other, smaller countries for both treatment and control firms. For the breakdown by 
year, the control sample is distributed evenly with 10-15% of the total observations in 
each year. For adopting firms, there are larger proportions in 2005 and 2006 due to the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. and Australia and in 2011 due to the mandatory 
18 
adoption of IFRS in Canada and Korea.10 The final sample for testing the likelihood of 
auditor switching consists of 6,050 (60,381) firm-year observations included in the 
treatment (control) group. 
In Table 1-2, I provide descriptive statistics for the variables used in my auditor 
switching analysis. For non-Big 4 clients, the frequency of auditor replacements is similar 
across treatment and control firms, though the base condition of no auditor switch is 
significantly (p < 0.05) more common for control observations. Differences in control 
variables between treatment and control firms in the non-Big 4 partition are, in general, 
not statistically significant. For Big 4 clients, the frequency of auditor replacements is 
greater for control observations. As clients of Big 4 auditors may be less likely to switch 
auditors during the transition to IFRS (compared to non-Big 4 clients), coupled with the 
larger number of observations in the control group, this is not unexpected. As with non- 
Big 4 clients, the treatment and control observations for the Big 4 sample partition appear 
to be composed of similar firms, based on the control variables. 
1.5 Empirical Results 
 
1.5.1 Results: Auditor Switching in the Year of IFRS Adoption 
 
I begin by reporting the results to test for changes in the likelihood of clients to 
switch auditors in the year of IFRS adoption. Table 1-3 presents regression results from 
estimating Equation (1) after partitioning audit firm size as Big 4 and non-Big 4. In Table 
1-3, the labels STB, STS, BTS, and BTB denote the following types of auditor 
replacements, respectively: from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor (STB); from a non-Big 4 
 
 
10 Ending the sample period in 2010 and, as a result, excluding Canada and Korea from the treatment 
samples does not impact my results. 
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to a different non-Big 4 auditor (STS); from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor (BTS); 
and from a Big 4 auditor to a different Big 4 auditor (BTB). The likelihoods of all auditor 
switches are tested against the base condition of not switching auditors. 
Panel A of Table 1-3 reports results for auditor switching behavior of non-Big 4 
audit clients in the year of IFRS adoption. For clients switching from a non-Big 4 to a Big 
4 auditor (STB), and consistent with expectations, the coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT is 
positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that clients are more likely to 
switch to a large auditor in the year of IFRS adoption; this is consistent with the findings 
of prior studies. However, the coefficient on the interaction term POST*IFRS_ADOPT is 
significantly negative (p < 0.05). This finding suggests that non-Big 4 client firms 
adopting IFRS in more recent years are relatively less likely to switch to a large auditor. 
On the other hand, the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT is not significant at 
conventional levels (p > 0.10), suggesting that the change in auditor switching behavior is 
restricted to years in which firms adopt IFRS. The finding that, in more recent years, 
firms are relatively less likely to switch from a small to a large auditor in the year of 
IFRS adoption provides empirical support for H1A. 
For clients switching from a non-Big 4 to a different non-Big 4 auditor (STS), 
results are quite different. Again, the coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT is significantly 
positive (p < 0.05), supporting the prediction that auditor switches of all types are more 
likely in the year of IFRS adoption. However, results also suggest that auditor switches of 
this type are more likely in more recent years for both adopting and non-adopting clients, 
as the coefficients on both POST*NON_ADOPT and POST*IFRS_ADOPT are positive 
and significant (p < 0.10 and p < 0.05, respectively). This is contrary to the above results, 
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as only IFRS adopting clients are found to be less likely to switch from a non-Big 4 to a 
Big 4 auditor (STB). Since the above result suggests that switches between small auditors 
is more likely for both treatment and control firms, I cannot attribute this difference to 
changes in the market for IFRS-related audit services. However, as I did not make 
directional predictions regarding lateral auditor switches, this finding does not refute any 
individual hypothesis, and additional analysis is needed. 
The explanatory variables included in the model suggest that the likelihood of 
switching from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor (STB) is negatively associated with client 
size (SIZE*NON_ADOPT and SIZE*IFRS_ADOPT), previously reporting a loss 
(LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT), IFRS adopting clients having previously receive a qualified audit 
opinion (QUAL*IFRS_ADOPT), adopting clients seeking external financing 
(FINANCE*IFRS_ADOPT), and clients being listed in U.S. markets 
(USLIST*NON_ADOPT) and positively associated with client growth 
(GROWTH*IFRS_ADOPT), prior receipt of a qualified audit opinion 
(QUAL*NON_ADOPT), non-adopting clients seeking external financing 
(FINANCE*NON_ADOPT), voluntary adoption of IFRS (VOLUN*IFRS_ADOPT), the 
strength of a country’s regulatory quality (REGQ*NON_ADOPT and 
REGQ*IFRS_ADOPT), and the magnitude of the differences between adopting clients’ 
local reporting standards and IFRS (HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT). 
For switches between non-Big 4 auditors (STS), there are two differences from 
the above results. This type of auditor switch is positively associated with lower 
profitability (LOSS*NON_ADOPT and LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT) and negatively associated 
with     large     differences     between     local     reporting     standards     and     IFRS 
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(HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT). The directional effects of all other explanatory variables 
are consistent across the two types of auditor switches. 
In Panel B of Table 1-3, I report the results of auditor switching for Big 4 clients. 
For switches from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor (BTS), the coefficient on 
IFRS_ADOPT is significantly negative (p < 0.05). This suggests that clients are less 
likely to switch to a smaller auditor in the year of IFRS adoption, which is consistent with 
expectations and prior research. However, the coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT is 
significantly positive (p < 0.001), which suggests that Big 4 clients are more likely to 
switch down to a smaller audit firm in more recent years. As with the switches from a 
non-Big 4 to a Big auditor (STB), this result is restricted to the treatment group, as the 
coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT is significantly negative (p < 0.05). Thus, as these 
results suggest that firms adopting IFRS in more recent years are more likely to switch 
from a large to a small auditor, I find support for H1B. 
Results also suggest that clients are more likely to switch between Big 4 auditors 
(BTB) in the year of IFRS adoption, as the coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT is positive and 
marginally significant (p < 0.10). The coefficients on both POST*IFRS_ADOPT and 
POST*NON_ADOPT are also positive and significant (p < 0.001 and p < 0.05, 
respectively), suggesting that the likelihood of switching between Big 4 auditors  is greater 
in more recent years. As with switches between non-Big 4 auditors (STS), I cannot 
attribute this finding to changes in the market for IFRS-related audit services, since 
non-adopting firms are also affected. 
For switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor (BTS), the control variables 
suggest    that    switching    auditors    is    negatively    associated    with    client    size 
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(POST*NON_ADOPT and POST*IFRS_ADOPT), clients seeking external financing 
(FINANCE*NON_ADOPT), the strength of a country’s regulatory quality 
(REGQ*NON_ADOPT), and the differences between local standards and IFRS, for 
treatment observations (HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT), and positively associated with 
previously reporting a loss (LOSS*NON_ADOPT and LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT), prior 
receipt of a qualified audit opinion (QUAL*NON_ADOPT), and voluntary adoption of 
IFRS (VOLUN*IFRS_ADOPT). 
There are several differences between the above results and the associations 
between control variables and switches between Big 4 auditors (BTB). Lower 
profitability of IFRS-adopting firms is positively associated with this type of auditor 
switch (LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT), as is the prior receipt of a qualified audit opinion 
(QUAL*IFRS_ADOPT). Large differences between local GAAP and IFRS are also 
positively associated with a switch to a different Big 4 auditor for treatment firm-years 
(HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT). 
1.5.2 Results: Differences between Regression Coefficients for the Auditor Switching 
Model 
In this section, I further test for statistically significant differences of the 
regression coefficients derived from estimating Equation (1), as reported in the previous 
section. Specifically, I perform a likelihood ratio chi-square test of the regression 
coefficients for the variables of interest (POST*IFRS_ADOPT and 
POST*NON_ADOPT). Panel A of Table 1-4 reports the tests for statistically significant 
differences of the regression coefficients for the non-Big 4 client sample partition. For 
switches  from  a  non-Big  4  to  a  Big  4  auditor  (STB),  the  coefficient  of  -0.073  on 
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POST*IFRS_ADOPT is significantly different (p < 0.001) from the coefficient of 0.033 
on POST*NON_ADOPT. This confirms my previous inferences that the changing trend 
in auditor switches of this type is restricted to IFRS adopting firms. Both adopting and 
non-adopting firms appear to be more likely to switch between non-Big 4 auditors (STS), 
as the coefficients on both POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT are positive. 
However, the effect is greater for adopting firms, and the difference between the two 
coefficients is marginally significant (p < 0.10). Regarding differences between the two 
types of switches, the coefficient of -0.073 on POST*IFRS_ADOPT for switches from a 
non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor (STB) is significantly different (p < 0.001) from the 
coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT of 0.288 for switches between non-Big 4 auditor 
(STS), which provides support for H1C that changes in the likelihood of directional 
auditor switches is different from the change in the likelihood of lateral auditor switches. 
There is no significant difference between the two types of auditor switches for non- 
adopting firms. 
The tests for differences in the regression coefficients for Big 4 clients are reported 
in Table 1-4, Panel B. Results are similar to the non-Big 4 sample partition. 
Specifically, for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor (BTS), the coefficient on 
POST*IFRS_ADOPT of 0.703 is significantly greater (p < 0.001) than the coefficient on 
POST*NON_ADOPT of -0.082. This reaffirms my finding in support of H1B that IFRS 
adopting clients are more likely to switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor in more 
recent years. Contrary to expectations, although the coefficients on both variables are 
positive for switches between Big 4 auditors (BTB), the effect is greater for firms in the 
control sample, and their difference of 0.125 is marginally significant (p < 0.10). Thus, I 
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fail to find evidence that there is a change in the likelihood of IFRS adopting clients to 
switch between Big 4 auditors. However, consistent with my predictions, the coefficient 
on POST*IFRS_ADOPT is significantly greater (p < 0.001) for switches from Big 4 to 
non-Big 4 auditors (BTS) compared to switches between Big 4 auditors (BTB), which 
supports H1C. For control firms, on the other hand, the likelihood of auditor switches 
between Big 4 auditors (BTB) is greater than the likelihood of switches from a Big 4 to a 
non-Big 4 auditor (BTS), and their difference of 0.642 is statistically significant (p < 
0.001). 
In summary, the above results suggest that the market for IFRS-related audit 
services has become less concentrated over time. My findings indicate that while clients 
of non-Big 4 auditors are more likely to switch to a larger auditor in the year of IFRS 
adoption, this type of switch becomes less likely in more recent years. Similarly, the 
likelihood of Big 4 clients to switch to a small auditor is lower in the year of IFRS 
adoption, but relatively more likely for firms adopting IFRS in more recent years. In 
addition, tests of differences of the regression coefficients suggest that the changes in the 
likelihood of directional switches are significantly different from that of the 
corresponding lateral auditor switches for IFRS adopting firms. I also find that, in most 
cases, the relative likelihood of switching auditors in more recent years is different 
between treatment and control firms. 
Taken together, these results motivate my additional tests regarding changes in 
the IFRS-related fee premium. To the extent that the audit market has become less 
concentrated, smaller audit firms should have obtained the knowledge and experience 
necessary to attract clients during their transition to IFRS. Likewise, a market with lower 
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concentration should promote competition among audit firms. Combined, these two 
factors may play an important role in the fee premium charged by the auditor in relation 
to clients’ adoption of IFRS. 
1.5.3 Sensitivity Tests 
 
I repeat my analysis based on defining large auditors as Global 6 (the Big 4, plus 
BDO and Grant Thornton). This makes my results comparable to prior studies (e.g., 
Wieczynska, 2013), and it is also possible that the second tier global auditors were 
similarly affected over the sample period. I report these adjusted results in Tables 5 and 6 
and discuss the primary implications in this section. In these tables, the abbreviations 
STG and GTS replace STB and BTS, respectively. 
Panel A of Table 1-5 reports results for auditor switching behavior of non-Global 
6 audit clients in the year of IFRS adoption. For clients switching from a non-Global 6 to 
a Global 6 auditor (STG), and consistent with expectations, the coefficient of on 
IFRS_ADOPT is positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10), again suggesting that 
clients are more likely to switch to a large auditor in the year of IFRS adoption. However, 
the coefficient on the interaction term POST*IFRS_ADOPT is significantly negative (p < 
0.05). This finding suggests that, as with non-Big 4 clients, non-Global 6 client firms 
adopting IFRS in more recent years are less likely to switch to a larger auditor. 
Conversely, the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT is positive and  marginally 
significant (p < 0.10), suggesting that this change in auditor switching behavior is 
restricted to IFRS adopting firms. As with the non-Big 4 client partition, these findings 
support H1A. The results of switching between small auditors (STS) are somewhat 
different when defined in this way. The coefficient on IFRS_ADOPT is positive but not 
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significant at conventional levels. However, results suggest that auditor switches between 
non-Global 6 auditors are more likely in more recent years for IFRS adopting clients, as 
the coefficient POST*IFRS_ADOPT is positive and significant (p < 0.05). Firms in the 
control group, on the other hand, appear less likely to switch between non-Global 6 
auditors; the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT for auditor switches of this type is 
negative and marginally significant (p < 0.10). This finding regarding changes in the 
likelihood of switching between non-Global 6 auditors (STS) provides support that the 
change in the likelihood of switching from a non-Global 6 to a Global 6 auditor (STG) is 
not simply caused by an increase in the likelihood of all types of auditor switches for 
non-Global 6 clients. 
Panel B of Table 1-5 reports the results of auditor switching for Global 6 clients. 
For switches from a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 auditor (GTS), the coefficient on 
IFRS_ADOPT is negative and marginally significant (p < 0.10). Consistent with 
expectations, this result suggests that clients are less likely to switch down to a smaller 
auditor in the year of IFRS adoption. The coefficient on POST*IFRS_ADOPT is positive 
and significant (p < 0.001), which suggests that Global 6 clients are more likely to switch 
down to a smaller audit firm in more recent years. This result holds only for IFRS 
adopting firms, as the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT is significantly negative (p < 
0.001) for auditor switches of this type. Again, this provides support for H1B that firms 
adopting IFRS in more recent years are more likely to switch to a smaller auditor in the 
year of IFRS adoption. Results also suggest that clients are more likely to switch between 
Global 6 auditors (GTG) in the year of IFRS adoption, as the coefficient on 
IFRS_ADOPT  is  positive  and  marginally  significant  (p  <  0.10).  The  coefficient  on 
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POST*IFRS_ADOPT is also positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10), suggesting 
that IFRS adopting clients are also more likely to switch between Global 6 auditors in 
more recent years. However, as with switches between Big 4 auditors, the coefficient on 
POST*NON_ADOPT is also positive and significant (p < 0.001), which suggests that the 
change in the likelihood of switching between Global 6 auditors is not restricted to IFRS 
adopting clients. 
Table 1-6 provides the results of executing a chi-square test for the difference in 
the regression coefficients using the adjusted coding scheme. Panel A reports the results 
for the non-Global 6 sample partition, and results are generally consistent with the non- 
Big 4 client sample partition. For switches from a non-Global 6 to a Global 6 auditor 
(STG), the statistically significant difference (p < 0.001) in the coefficients of 0.395 on 
POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT provides support for H1C. Results 
suggest that the increased likelihood of switching between non-Global 6 auditors (STS) 
for treatment firms is significantly different from the corresponding change for control 
firms, as the difference in the coefficients on POST*IFRS_ADOPT and 
POST*NON_ADOPT is statistically significant. For comparisons between the types of 
auditor switches, only the coefficients on POST*IFRS_ADOPT are significantly different 
(p < 0.001). Thus, I find additional support for H1C given that the change in the likelihood 
to switch from non-Global 6 to Global 6 auditors (STG) is restricted to IFRS adopting 
firms. 
Finally, Panel B of Table 1-5 reports the results of testing for statistically 
significant difference of the regression coefficients for the Global 6 sample partition. For 
switches from a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 auditor (GTS) and in support of H1B, the 
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coefficient of 0.597 on POST*IFRS_ADOPT is significantly different (p < 0.001) than 
the coefficient on POST*NON_ADOPT of -0.148. For Global 6 clients, the coefficients 
on both POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT are positive, but their difference 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Thus, as with Big 4 clients, I do not 
find evidence of a change in the likelihood to switch between Global 6 auditors (GTG) 
for IFRS adopting firms. Also similar to the Big 4 client partition, the coefficient on 
POST*IFRS_ADOPT is positive for both switches from a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 
auditor (GTS) and between Global 6 auditors (GTG), and their difference of -0.298 is 
marginally significant (p < 0.10). Thus, as expected, the increased likelihood of IFRS 
adopting firms to switch auditors in more recent years is greater for switches down from 
a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 auditor (GTS) compared to switches between Global 6 
auditors (GTG), providing support for H1C. For non-adopting firms, the likelihood of 
switches between Global 6 auditors (GTG) in more recent years is significantly greater (p 
< 0.05) than the likelihood from a Global 6 to a non-Global 6 auditor (GTS). In summary, 
although some inconsequential differences exist, the primary findings are upheld 
regardless of whether large and small auditors are partitioned on the basis of inclusion 
among the Big 4 or Global 6 auditors. 
1.6 Conclusion 
 
This essay examines how the market for IFRS-related audit services has changed 
over time as a result of a global shift in the accounting regime of individual countries 
from local standards to IFRS. My findings suggest that clients adopting IFRS in more 
recent years are less likely to switch away from a non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor 
and, similarly, more likely to switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor relative to firms 
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that adopt IFRS in more recent years. Taken together, these results suggest that the 
market for IFRS-related audit services has become less concentrated among large, global 
auditors. These results add to the international auditing literature by providing evidence 
on changes in one aspect of the audit market as a result of IFRS adoption over time, 
which has become a popular topic in current research. Additionally, my study offers 
potentially policy-relevant evidence to add to the debate over whether or not the U.S. 
should require IFRS adoption by publicly-listed firms. While the findings of previous 
studies offer evidence that is consistent with these undesirable outcomes, my results 
suggest that gradual changes in the audit market may mitigate concerns regarding the 
concentration of the audit market among large, global auditors. 
It is important to note that I draw these inferences based on a global sample not 
including U.S. firms. These results are therefore suggestive, but not definitive, of how the 
audit market specific to the U.S. may be affected following IFRS adoption, especially 
given the relatively more stringent reporting environment relative to other countries. 
Another important caveat of this study is that I examine auditor switching only in the 
year of IFRS adoption rather than employing a more general auditor choice model in the 
years surrounding the event. Nevertheless, it is important for regulators in the U.S. to 
consider changes in the global audit market, in addition to the consequences surrounding 
more concentrated events (e.g., mandatory IFRS adoption), in order to draw reliable 
inferences regarding both positive and negative outcomes of IFRS adoption in the U.S. 
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Table 1-1: Sample Selection and Description - Auditor Switching 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
  Firm-Year Observations 
Sample 
Initial Sample# 
Treatment Control 
 
10,052 137,542 
Less: 
Missing audit firm data 
 
 
 
 
(240) (24,935) 
Financial firms (SIC Code 6000-6999) (2,609) (35,969) 
Missing financial data     (1,153) (16,257) 
Sample used in auditor switching regression analysis:   6,050 60,381  
Panel B: Sample distribution by country  
Treatment Control 
 
Australia 734 12.1% 8,304 13.8%
Austria 41 0.7% 861 1.4%
Belgium 128 2.1% 1,377 2.3%
Brazil 121 2.0% 915 1.5%
Canada 621 10.3% 9,668 16.0%
Chile 134 2.2% 971 1.6%
Denmark 95 1.6% 808 1.3%
Finland 68 1.1% 592 1.0%
France 396 6.5% 3,900 6.5%
Germany 254 4.2% 3,648 6.0%
Greece 217 3.6% 1,370 2.3%
Ireland 32 0.5% 219 0.4%
Israel 252 4.2% 1,908 3.2%
Italy 49 0.8% 1,333 2.2%
Korea 833 13.8% 7,196 11.9%
Luxembourg 10 0.2% 101 0.2%
Netherlands 89 1.5% 602 1.0%
New Zealand 86 1.4% 595 1.0%
Norway 151 2.5% 1,064 1.8%
Philippines 117 1.9% 768 1.3%
Portugal 38 0.6% 291 0.5%
South Africa 146 2.4% 1,405 2.3%
Spain 97 1.6% 781 1.3%
Sweden 254 4.2% 2,214 3.7%
Switzerland 52 0.9% 1,059 1.8%
United Kingdom 
 
  1,035 17.1% 8,431 14.0% 
 
  6,050 100% 60,381 100% 
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Table 1-1 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Panel C: Sample distribution by year 
 
  Treatment   Control  
2004 144 2.4% 7,280 12.1%
2005 1,357 22.4% 6,225 10.3%
2006 1,093 18.1% 6,012 10.0%
2007 709 11.7% 7,713 12.8%
2008 541 8.9% 8,327 13.8%
2009 125 2.1% 9,044 15.0%
2010 218 3.6% 8,907 14.8%
 
2011  1,863 30.8% 6,873 11.4% 
 
  6,050 100% 60,381 100% 
  
 
 
This table summarizes the procedure to select the sample used in the auditor switching analysis. Panel A 
details the selection criteria for the treatment (IFRS-adopting) and control (non-adopting) firm-year 
observations. Panel B and Panel C  provide details  on the sample distribution by country and year, 
respectively. 
 
# The initial sample consists of all publicly-listed firms available from Worldscope from 2004 through 2011 
located in the countries listed in Panel B. I first identify treatment (IFRS-adopting) firms based  on 
accounting standards data in Worldscope, and delete remaining observations with missing accounting 
standards data. 
  
 
 
 
 
Table 1-2: Descriptive Statistics - Auditor Switching 
Non-Big 4 Clients (n = 29,883) 
 
Big 4 Clients (n = 36,548) 
Treatment Observations Control Observations 
 
Treatment Observations Control Observations 
 Variable M e an  St. De v. M e an St. De v.   M e an  St. De v. M e an St. De v.   
Test Variables (%) Test Variables (%) 
Audswitch = 0 0.6771 0.4677 0.6940 ** 0.4608 Audswitch = 0 0.8451 0.3618 0.7829 *** 0.4123 
Audswitch = STB 0.0948 0.2931 0.0875 0.2826 Audswitch = BTS 0.0577 0.2331 0.0702 *** 0.2555 
Audswitch = STS 0.2281 0.4197 0.2185 0.4132 Audswitch = BTB 0.0972 0.2963 0.1469 *** 0.3540 
POST 0.6134 0.4871 0.6433 *** 0.4790 POST 0.5235 0.4995 0.6636 *** 0.4725 
Control Variables Control Variables 
 
SIZE 18.826 3.8070 18.767 3.9466 SIZE 20.598 3.6161 20.756 3.5900 
NI -0.2898 1.0880 -0.2873 1.9595 NI -0.0493 0.3573 -0.1847 *** 0.6055 
GROWTH 0.6498 5.2697 0.2755 *** 4.2561 GROWTH 0.2921 2.2420 0.2681 2.4296 
LOSS (%) 0.5159 0.4998 0.5218 0.4915 LOSS (%) 0.3315 0.4708 0.3336 0.4886 
QUAL (%) 0.2780 0.4481 0.1197 *** 0.3246 QUAL (%) 0.1010 0.3003 0.0973 0.2923 
FINANCE (%) 0.4625 0.4962 0.4501 0.4975 FINANCE (%) 0.5078 0.5000 0.4177 *** 0.4932 
VOLUN (%) 0.0276 0.1638 0.2849 *** 0.4514 VOLUN (%) 0.0314 0.1743 0.2959 *** 0.4565 
USLIST (%) 0.0361 0.0600 0.0951 *** 0.0771 USLIST (%) 0.0893 0.0941 0.0223 *** 0.1477 
REGQ 1.2929 0.5162 1.3070 0.4968 REGQ 1.4039 0.4460 1.4106 0.4155 
HIGHDIFF (%) 0.2862 0.4521 0.2746 0.4463 HIGHDIFF (%) 0.3864 0.4990 0.3825 0.4860 
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the auditor switching analysis. Treatment observations are years in which firms adopt IFRS. 
Control observations are firm-years for which there is no change in accounting standards. A percentage sign following dichotomous variables denotes that 
that mean is  the proportion  of firms for which  the variable is equal to one. I categorize the AUDSWITCH separately  for each sample partition. 
AUDSWITCH=0 denotes firm-years in which clients did not switch auditors; STB indicates switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor; STS indicates 
switches between non-Big 4 auditors; BTS indicates switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor; and BTB indicates switches between Big 4 auditors. POST 
is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years ending after 11/30/2006 and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. NI is equal 
to net income scaled by total assets. GROWTH is the annual percentage change in sales. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one for firms reporting 
negative income in the prior year. QUAL is equal to one if the firm receives a qualified audit opinion in the previous year. FINANCE is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the firm raised debt or equity capital in the current year and zero otherwise. VOLUN is an indicator variable for firm-years ending before the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of domicile. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. capital markets. 
REGQ is an index variable capturing each country's regulatory quality, as measured by Kaufmann et al. (2009). HIGHDIFF is an indicator variable equal to 
one if the differences between the local reporting standards and IFRS, based on Bae et al. (2008), is greater than the sample median and zero otherwise. 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. 
*, **, *** denote statistically significant differences between treatment and control observations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p- 
value), respectively. 
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Table 1-3: Auditor Switching Model for non-Big 4 and Big 4 Clients 
 
Panel A: Non-Big 4 (n = 29,883) Panel B: Big 4 (n = 36,548) 
 Variable STB (n = 2,467) STS (n = 6,460)  BTS (n = 2,183) BTB (n = 5,183)   
  Estimate Sig Estimate Sig  Estimate Sig Estimate Sig   
 
Intercept -8.5295 *** -0.5488 ** 4.9645 *** -3.6110 ***
IFRS_ADOPT 0.2276 * 0.3209 ** -0.3288 ** 0.4978 * 
POST*NON_ADOPT 0.0331 0.0542 * -0.0823 * 0.5601 ** 
POST*IFRS_ADOPT -0.0734 ** 0.2884 ** 0.7028 *** 0.4355 ***
SIZE*NON_ADOPT -0.2305 *** -0.0644 *** -0.2708 *** -0.0617 ***
SIZE*IFRS_ADOPT -0.0351 * -0.0213 * -0.0416 * -0.0581 ***
NI*NON_ADOPT -0.0003 0.0043 0.0002 -0.0013 
NI*IFRS_ADOPT 0.0146 -0.0002 0.0286 0.0058 
GROWTH*NON_ADOPT -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0004 
GROWTH*IFRS_ADOPT 0.0034 *** 0.0043 *** 0.0002 -0.0001 
LOSS*NON_ADOPT 0.0486 0.0708 ** 0.1582 *** 0.0974 ***
LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT -0.3154 ** 0.1410 * -0.0694 0.3073 ** 
QUAL*NON_ADOPT 0.4165 *** 0.3315 *** 0.6884 *** 0.3844 ***
QUAL*IFRS_ADOPT -0.3582 ** -0.2453 ** 0.0272 0.3223 ** 
FINANCE*NON_ADOPT 0.2995 *** -0.0033 -0.1801 *** -0.1222 ***
FINANCE*IFRS_ADOPT -0.3169 ** -0.0647 0.0996 0.1821 
VOLUN*NON_ADOPT 0.0291 0.0814 0.0380 0.0373 
VOLUN*IFRS_ADOPT 0.1479 *** 0.2462 * 0.5966 * 0.1577 ***
USLIST*NON_ADOPT -0.2642 * -0.2329 * -0.3139 * -0.5101 ***
USLIST*IFRS_ADOPT 0.4217 -0.1512 -0.0916 -0.0534 
REGQ*NON_ADOPT 0.9015 *** 0.0964 *** -0.1584 *** -0.0666 * 
REGQ*IFRS_ADOPT 0.3480 ** -0.0299 0.0278 -0.4011 ***
HIGHDIFF*NON_ADOPT -0.0681 -0.1088 -0.0863 0.0716 
HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT 0.7387 *** -0.1836 * -0.1591 * 0.6478 ***
 
Country Fixed-Effects 
Pseudo-R 2 
Yes 
7.62% 
Yes 
11.99% 
This table presents results of estimating the multinomial logistic regression to model the likelihood of 
various types of auditor switches (Equation 1) for non-Big 4 (Panel A) and Big 4 clients (Panel B). 
 
IFRS_ADOPT is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is the year of IFRS adoption for firm i, and zero 
otherwise. NON_ADOPT is equal to one if firm i does not adopt IFRS in year t, and zero otherwise. POST 
is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 11/30/2006 and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured 
as the natural log of total assets. NI is net income scaled by total assets. GROWTH is measured as the 
annual percentage change in sales. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a net loss in 
year t-1, and zero otherwise. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a qualified audit 
opinion in year t-1, and zero otherwise. FINANCE is equal to one if firm i raised debt or equity capital in 
year t, and zero otherwise. VOLUN is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is before the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of domicile, and zero otherwise. USLIST is equal to one if firm i is 
cross-listed in a U.S. capital market, and zero otherwise. REGQ is a continuous measure of firm i's 
country's regulatory quality, as measured in Kaufmann et al. (2009). HIGHDIFF is equal to one if the 
difference between the local GAAP of firm i and IFRS is greater than the sample median, based on Bae et 
al. (2008), and zero otherwise. 
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Table 1-3 (Continued) 
 
 
The labels STS, STB, BTS, and BTB denote switching between non-Big 4 auditors, switching from a non- 
Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, switching from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor, and switching between Big 
4 auditors, respectively. 
 
All      continuous      variables      are      winsorized      at      the      top      and      bottom      1%      level. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p-value), 
respectively. 
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Table 1-4: Differences in Regression Coefficients - Auditor Switching 
(non-Big 4 and Big 4) 
 
 
POST*IFRS_ADOPT POST*NON_ADOPT Difference  (Across) 
 
Panel A: Non-Big 4 Sample (n = 29,883) 
Switch = STB -0.073 0.033 0.107 ***
Switch = STS 0.288 0.054 -0.234 * 
Difference (Down) 0.362 *** 0.021  
 
 
Panel B: Big 4 Sample (n = 36,548) 
POST*IFRS_ADOPT POST*NON_ADOPT Difference  (Across) 
Switch = BTS 0.703 -0.082 -0.785 *** 
Switch = BTB 0.436 0.560 0.125 * 
Difference (Down) -0.267 *** 0.642 *** 
 
 
This table presents the results of performing a likelihood ratio chi-square test on the regression coefficients 
for the variables of interest (POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT). I test both for differences 
between treatment and control firms for the same type of auditor switch (Difference across) and differences 
between the two coefficients for the different types of auditor switch separately for treatment and control 
firms (Difference Down). 
 
STS, STB, BTS, and BTB denote switching between non-Big 4 auditors, switching from a non-Big 4 to a 
Big 4 auditor, switching from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor, and switching between Big 4 auditors, 
respectively. 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p-values), 
respectively. 
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Table 1-5: Auditor Switching Model for non-Global 6 and Global 6 clients 
 
 
 
Panel A: Non-Global 6 (n = 24,002) Panel B: Global 6 (n = 42,429) 
Variable STG (n = 2,663) STS (n = 4,230) GTS (n = 2,118) GTG (n = 7,282) 
  Estimate Sig Estimate Sig Estimate Sig Estimate Sig 
Intercept -7.8158 *** -0.6611 ** 4.7478 *** -2.1451 ***
IFRS_ADOPT 0.0846 * 0.0493 -0.3585 * 0.6994 * 
POST*NON_ADOPT 0.0887 * -0.0744 * -0.1476 *** 0.1589 ***
POST*IFRS_ADOPT -0.3064 ** 0.3183 ** 0.5971 *** 0.2988 * 
SIZE*NON_ADOPT -0.1806 *** -0.0719 *** -0.2571 *** -0.0029 
SIZE*IFRS_ADOPT -0.0301 * -0.0298 * -0.1245 *** -0.0556 ***
NI*NON_ADOPT -0.0001 0.0005 0.0007 0.0012 * 
NI*IFRS_ADOPT -0.0044 0.0082 0.0423 * 0.0144 
GROWTH*NON_ADOPT -0.0007 -0.0001 -0.0005 -0.0003 
GROWTH*IFRS_ADOPT 0.0024 ** 0.0042 ** 0.0004 0.0001 
LOSS*NON_ADOPT 0.0351 0.1349 *** 0.2235 *** -0.1169 ***
LOSS*IFRS_ADOPT -0.1224 * 0.1283 -0.0752 -0.2819 ** 
QUAL*NON_ADOPT 0.4368 *** 0.3676 *** 0.4146 *** 0.3731 ***
QUAL*IFRS_ADOPT 0.0278 * 0.5044 *** 0.0954 0.2186 * 
FINANCE*NON_ADOPT 0.2583 *** 0.0315 -0.1791 *** -0.0775 ***
FINANCE*IFRS_ADOPT -0.3506 ** -0.0975 0.0294 -0.1103 * 
VOLUN*NON_ADOPT 0.0269 0.0682 0.0329 0.0135 
VOLUN*IFRS_ADOPT 1.4667 *** 0.0842 -0.0554 0.1303 ** 
USLIST*NON_ADOPT -0.0943 -0.1509 -0.6177 *** -0.3927 ***
USLIST*IFRS_ADOPT 0.0696 -1.0252 -0.8356 ** -0.1227 * 
REGQ*NON_ADOPT 0.8873 *** 0.4164 *** -0.7608 *** -0.0455 * 
REGQ*IFRS_ADOPT 0.5658 *** 0.1042 -0.6851 *** -0.0362 ** 
HIGHDIFF*NON_ADOPT -0.1293 -0.0619 -0.0892 0.0447 
HIGHDIFF*IFRS_ADOPT 0.9153 *** 0.1067 -0.1414 *** 0.0595 ***
 
Country Fixed-Effects 
Pseudo-R 2 
Yes 
6.95% 
Yes 
8.92% 
 
 
This table presents results of estimating multinomial logistic regression to model the likelihood of various 
types of auditor switches (Equation 1) for non-Global 6 clients (Panel A) and Global 6 clients (Panel B). 
 
IFRS_ADOPT is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is the year of IFRS adoption for firm i, and zero 
otherwise (i.e., treatment group). NON_ADOPT is equal to one if firm i does not adopt IFRS in year t, and 
zero otherwise (control group). POST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 11/30/2006 
and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. NI is net income scaled by total 
assets. GROWTH is measured as the percentage change in sales. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to 
one if firm i reported a net loss in year t-1, and zero otherwise. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one if 
firm i received a qualified audit opinion in year t-1, and zero otherwise. FINANCE is equal to one if firm i 
raised debt or equity capital in year t, and zero otherwise. VOLUN is an indicator variable equal to one if 
year t is before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of domicile, and zero otherwise. USLIST 
is equal to one if firm i is cross-listed in a U.S. capital market, and zero otherwise. REGQ is a continuous 
measure of firm i's country's regulatory quality, as measured in Kaufmann et al. (2009). HIGHDIFF 
is an indicator variable equal to one if the difference between the local GAAP of firm i and IFRS   is   
greater   than   the   sample   median,   based   on   Bae   et   al.   (2008),   and   zero   otherwise. 
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Table 1-5 (Continued) 
 
 
The labels STS, STG, GTS, and GTG denote, respectively, switching between non-Global 6 auditors, 
switching from a non-Global 6 to a Global 6 auditor, switching from a Global 6 auditor to a non-Global 6 
auditor, and switching between Global 6 auditors. 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. 
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p-value), 
respectively. 
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Table 1-6: Differences in Regression Coefficients - Auditor Switching 
(non-Global 6 and Global 6) 
 
 
POST*IFRS_ADOPT POST*NON_ADOPT Difference  (Across) 
 
Panel A: Non-Global 6 Sample (n = 17,109) 
Switch = STG -0.306 0.089 0.395 ***
Switch = STS 0.318 -0.074 -0.393 ***
Difference (Down) 0.625 *** -0.163  
 
POST*IFRS_ADOPT POST*NON_ADOPT Difference  (Across) 
 
Panel B: Global 6 Sample (n = 42,429) 
Switch = GTS 0.597 -0.148 -0.745 *** 
Switch = GTG 0.299 0.159 -0.140 
Difference (Down) -0.298 * 0.307 **  
 
This table presents the results of performing a likelihood ratio chi-square test on the regression coefficients 
for the variables of interest (POST*IFRS_ADOPT and POST*NON_ADOPT). I test both for differences 
between treatment and control firms for the same type of auditor switch (Difference across) and differences 
between the two coefficients for the different types of auditor switch separately for treatment and control 
firms (Difference Down). 
 
The labels STS, STG, GTS, and GTG denote, respectively, switching between non-Global 6 auditors, 
switching from a non-Global 6 to a Global 6 auditor, switching from a Global 6 auditor to a non-Global 6 
auditor, and switching between Global 6 auditors. 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p-values), 
respectively. 
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CHAPTER 2: CHANGES IN THE IMPACT OF IFRS ADOPTION ON AUDIT FEES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
This essay examines the impact of widespread IFRS adoption on auditor fees. A 
major concern of opponents in the U.S. has been the potentially significant financial 
burden associated with such a substantial shift in the accounting regime. Hail et al. (2010) 
provide a conservative estimate of economy-wide first-time preparation costs in excess of 
US$8 billion based on the results of a survey conducted in the E.U. (see ICAEW, 2007). 
Critics outside of the U.S. and in countries where IFRS adoption has been enacted have 
voiced similar concerns regarding the increased costs associated with preparing financial 
statements following the adoption of IFRS (AICD, 2005). Large, global auditors stand to 
gain additional revenues if IFRS adoption takes place in the U.S. As a direct and 
observable outflow of resources, audit fees are one important aspect of the costs 
associated with IFRS adoption, and current research has found that fees increase 
following mandatory adoption of IFRS (Kim, Liu, and Zheng, 2012; DeGeorge, 
Ferguson, and Spear, 2013). However, as these studies focus only on the fixed period of 
mandatory IFRS adoption, it is difficult to draw inferences regarding how auditor fees 
may be affected by adoption of IFRS in the future. To the extent that the structure of the 
audit market changes over time, as the results of the first essay suggest, this topic is of 
practical importance. 
In the following analyses, I examine whether the change in auditor fees in the 
year of IFRS adoption varies over time. Specifically, I predict that audit firms with the 
greatest exposure to IFRS financial statements (i.e., the Big 4) become less able to 
demand as large a premium for their services, causing an overall decline in any fee 
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premiums associated with IFRS adoption. Based on a sample of firms in 26 countries 
from 2004 through 2011, my primary results uphold this prediction. Further tests reveal 
that this effect is driven at least partially by audit firms with greater experience in 
auditing IFRS statements increasing fees by smaller increments in more recent years, 
consistent with the effect of increased competition. This trend does not seem to be driven 
by macroeconomic conditions, as neither the audit service fees of a control group nor the 
total fees of the treatment group are similarly affected. When I divide the sample into 
clients audited by Big 4 and non-Big 4 firms, I find that the results hold only for the Big 4 
subsample, suggesting that changes to the market for IFRS-related audit services may 
have negatively impacted the Big 4’s ability to extract additional quasi-rents from clients 
in the year of IFRS adoption. 
This study offers several contributions to the international auditing literature. 
First, I show that the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption declines over time, 
which I attribute to a less concentrated market. Second, while prior studies posit that 
IFRS adoption leads to an increase in audit fees due, in part, to a premium charged for the 
auditor’s expertise (Lin and Yen, 2010), I show that such a competitive advantage 
translates into smaller fee increases in more recent years. To the extent that my results are 
generalizable, I offer timely evidence of one of the costs associated with IFRS adoption, 
which is especially important given that the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
in the U.S. has yet to make a decisive ruling regarding adoption of IFRS, and concerns 
about the costs associated with IFRS adoption have attracted a great deal of attention 
from regulators, academics, and practitioners. These results are relevant to future research 
given that audit fees are one of the few direct costs that have been examined in the 
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context of IFRS adoption. In a more general sense, my results also show the importance 
of carefully selecting auditor fee data, as different inferences can be drawn from when 
auditor fees are defined based on various types of services. 
The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related 
prior research and develops my hypotheses. The third section details the research design. 
Section 4 describes the sample selection procedures and data employed in this study. 
Section five provides explanations of the empirical results and associated inferences. I 
conclude in Section 6 and offer suggestions for future research. 
2.2 Hypothesis Development 
 
2.2.1 Background: IFRS Adoption and Audit Fees 
 
A major argument against a shift to IFRS reporting is the significant financial 
burden that would be imposed on adopting firms (SEC Roadmap, 2008; Hail et al., 2010). 
Prior research has identified one such cost, finding that audit fees are higher after IFRS 
adoption, as would be expected from such a dramatic change in the reporting 
environment. Kim et al. (2012) develop an economic model to assess the impact of IFRS 
adoption on audit fees, noting that the change in audit fees is driven by changes in audit 
complexity and financial reporting quality, increases in the auditor’s effort, and the risk 
of legal liability due to misapplication of the new reporting standards. Their findings 
from empirically testing this model suggest that the increase in total fees paid to the 
auditor increase for IFRS adopting firms, compared to firms in countries that did not 
require IFRS adoption, is positively associated with the increase in audit complexity 
(based on the differences between firms’ local GAAP and IFRS) and negatively 
associated  with  improvements  in  financial  reporting  quality  (based  on  changes  in 
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discretionary accruals) and the strength of the country’s legal regime. However, it is 
important to note that Kim et al. (2012) are unable to utilize data specifically for audit 
service fees. 
DeGeorge et al. (2013) similarly examine the change in audit fees for Australian 
firms surrounding mandatory IFRS adoption. Their findings suggest that audit service 
fees are higher in the year of IFRS adoption, firms with greater audit complexity display 
higher increases in audit fees surrounding IFRS adoption, and smaller clients incur 
disproportionately higher costs. Additional tests reveal an economy-wide increase in 
audit fees of 23% in the year of IFRS adoption and an abnormal increase of 8% beyond 
standard yearly increases. 
In summary, while previous studies find audit fees increase after IFRS adoption, 
no existing studies have assessed whether this change in audit fees varies over time. This 
is an especially interesting issue given that such a difference may be dependent on 
changes in competition within the audit market itself. As my first essay examines this 
latter topic and finds that the global audit market shifts in favor of smaller, local audit 
firms, it is a closely related extension to examine a quantifiable cost that could vary with 
changes in the market as a whole. 
2.2.2 Hypotheses Related to the Change in Audit Fees in the Year of IFRS Adoption 
 
In this essay, I assess whether the change in audit service fees in the year of IFRS 
adoption has decreased over time. As a continued argument against IFRS adoption in the 
U.S. is the financial burden imposed on firms as a result of such a change in the reporting 
environment, empirical evidence is needed to determine potential causes and fluctuations 
in audit fee changes during the IFRS transition process. Given that the SEC has yet to 
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make a decisive ruling on IFRS adoption in the U.S., these results based on patterns in 
audit fee changes should be of interest. 
There are a number of reasons why the change in audit service fees surrounding 
IFRS adoption may change over time. First, to the extent that the market concentration 
changes and switching to a smaller auditor becomes a reasonable option for clients during 
the transition to IFRS, increased competition may lead to lower fee increases due to a 
reduction in ability of auditors to charge high premiums. This argument is consistent with 
the consequences of increased audit market competition on audit fees in other, more 
generalized settings (e.g., Maher, Tiessen, Colson, and Broman, 1992). 
Second, audit fees are directly associated with auditor effort; as the amount of 
work required to complete the audit increases, the client is responsible for additional 
billable hours. In the early years of IFRS adoption, few audit firms have advanced 
knowledge of the new accounting standards and, as a result, exert additional effort for 
each engagement. Over time, however, auditors can apply past experience to clients more 
recently adopting IFRS. These arguments are consistent with learning theory (Libby and 
Luft, 1993; Bonner and Walker, 1994). In addition, as the market concentration shifts 
away from larger auditors, smaller firms have the opportunity to gain experience and 
similarly provide more efficient audits during the transition to IFRS. 
Third, there may be an increase in audit risk due to misapplication of the new 
reporting standards, which in turn leads to increased audit fees (Houston, Peters, and 
Pratt, 1999).  Although cross-country variations may persist with respect to the risk 
component of audit fees (e.g., different legal or enforcement environments), 
improvements in knowledge and skills related to the IFRS transition process could cause 
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the risk component of audit fees to decline over time as audit firms become more aware 
of potential problems arising from application of IFRS and increase their scrutiny 
accordingly. My analysis includes a host of variables intended to mitigate the effect of 
audit risk.11 
I state my primary hypothesis related to the  change in audit service  fees as 
 
follows, in the alternative form: 
 
H2: The change in audit service fees in the year of IFRS adoption is lower 
in more recent years. 
The above hypothesis is tested using the full sample of firms with available data without 
distinction to potential differences that may exist between audit firms of different size. 
Prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors charge higher audit fees relative to small 
auditors (Palmrose, 1986; DeFond, Francis, and Wong, 2000; Choi, Kim, Liu, and 
Simunic, 2008). As the concentration of the audit market changes, audit firms with 
greater experience may see the sharpest decline in the IFRS-related fee premium.12 
 
There are several reasons to consider the Big 4 as the firms with the most 
experience in auditing IFRS financial statements. First, global audit firms actively 
compete with other auditors both in attracting talented personnel via recruiting events at 
 
 
11 As an additional test, I also include a future financial restatement as a control variable to effectively 
capture this effect. My inferences are unchanged and I find a marginally significant (p < 0.10) positive 
association between future restatements and the increase in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption, 
suggesting that the fee increase is greater in the year of IFRS adoption to the extent that auditors correctly 
assess client risk. 
 
12 An alternative explanation could be that the additional audit effort required after the client switches to 
IFRS decreases in subsequent years as the auditor’s knowledge of the new reporting system increases, 
resulting in a detected decline in the change in audit service fees over time. My research design inherently 
controls for this possibility, since each treatment firm is included as only one observation (i.e., the first year 
of IFRS reporting). 
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prestigious business schools and in performing high-quality audits (McWilliams, Van 
Fleet, and Cory, 2009). Second, the largest audit firms financially support the 
International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) in the creation of IFRS and related 
knowledge. The IASB readily considers the comments of these large accounting firms 
when issuing new pronouncements. Similarly, these audit firms routinely issue 
handbooks and other forms of guidance to practitioners and academics to assist in 
interpreting individual standards. Third, the Big 4 have the largest presence globally 
(Carson, 2009) and therefore have the greatest potential to capitalize on knowledge- 
sharing with affiliates and local branches as clients switch from local reporting standards 
to IFRS. 
While the above explanations could also apply to BDO and Grant Thornton 
(collectively with the Big 4, the “Global 6”), there may be significant differences between 
the Big 4 and BDO and Grant Thornton, and accounting researchers frequently control 
for differences between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors in various research settings in order 
to capture differences in audit or financial reporting quality, audit fees, going- concern 
reporting accuracy, etc. More specific to their involvement in creating IFRS and 
corresponding knowledge, the Big 4 auditors provide substantially greater financial 
support to the IASB than BDO and Grant Thornton. For example, the Big 4 each 
contributed annually from US$2 million in 2008 and 2009 (IASC Foundation, 2008; 
2009) to US$2.25 million in 2010, 2011, and 2012 (IFRS Foundation, 2010; 2011; 2012), 
while BDO and Grant Thornton contributed only US$150,000 annually in the same years. 
Thus, in partitioning the sample based on the most skilled and experienced audit firms, I 
45 
segregate based on whether or not the auditor is one of the Big 4.13 While I do not 
differentiate separate hypotheses, my research design considers H2 for the full sample 
and, separately, for Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit client sample partitions to assess any 
differential impact based on audit firm size. 
I next examine whether a more specific measurement of the auditor’s expertise in 
auditing IFRS financial statements, as described in more detail later, can explain the 
change in the IFRS-related fee premium. Part of the model employed by Kim et al. 
(2012) to predict changes in audit fees after IFRS adoption includes auditor  effort. Salterio 
(1994) finds that auditor efficiency and effectiveness improve over time, despite the less 
than ideal nature of the audit as a learning environment. As application of IFRS becomes 
more widespread, there is an increase in client demand for IFRS-related audit services. 
If the market is highly concentrated among Big 4 auditors, the IFRS-related fee premium 
may be at least partially attributable to such expertise. I state the following hypothesis, 
in the alternative form, to test this supposition: 
H3A: The auditor’s experience in auditing IFRS financial statements is 
positively associated with the change in audit service fees surrounding 
IFRS adoption. 
On the other hand, as the market becomes less concentrated and smaller auditors acquire 
the skills and knowledge necessary to audit IFRS financial statements, auditors with 
relevant  experience  may  adjust  their  pricing  and  pass  along  the  benefits  of  this 
 
 
13 The sample size of firms that use BDO or Grant Thornton is too small to be included as a separate 
partition. However, untabulated univariate comparisons suggest that the change in audit fees in the year of 
IFRS adoption for clients of these two firms is more closely related to non-Big 4 auditors. In additional 
tests, I examine how my results differ if I partition audit firm size based on the Global 6. 
46 
competitive advantage to the client in the form a more efficient and, therefore, potentially 
less costly audit. Accordingly, I state the next hypothesis in the alternative form: 
H3B: In more recent years, the auditor’s experience in auditing IFRS 
financial statements is negatively associated with the change in audit 
service fees surrounding IFRS adoption. 
2.3 Research Design 
 
2.3.1 Model: The Change in Audit Service Fees 
 
In this analysis, I first test if the change in audit service fees related to IFRS 
adoption changes over time. To draw more reliable inferences, I then separately test for 
the same effect using a control group of firms that did not switch accounting standards 
during the sample period. The treatment group consists of the client firms’ first year of 
IFRS reporting, determined using data from Worldscope. I then form a control sample of 
firms that did not switch accounting standards during the sample period. Since my analysis 
spans a period of time, it is impractical to form such a control sample on condition 
that firms apply non-IFRS accounting standards because nearly all firms will have 
adopted IFRS toward the end of the sample period. However, many countries, 
particularly in the E.U., permitted early adoption of IFRS. Therefore, I form a control 
sample based on firms that previously adopted IFRS.14 
 
As described below, my analysis uses the change in audit service fees as the 
dependent variable. While major changes in accounting regulations are likely to result in 
increased audit fees, the results of previous studies (e.g., Kim et al., 2012; DeGeorge et 
 
 
14  Such an approach has been used in current international accounting research (e.g., Lin, Riccardi, and 
Wang, 2012; Barth, Landsman, Lang, and Williams, 2013). 
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al., 2013) do not provide insights into how many years after IFRS adoption the increased 
audit fees persist. Other literature examines audit fees after the introduction of SOX in 
the United States (e.g., Ettredge, Scholz, and Li, 2007), and the results suggest that audit 
fees are higher for two years after the initial regulation implementation before returning 
to pre-SOX levels. Following this logic, a firm-year qualifies for inclusion in the control 
group in my analysis if the firm has applied IFRS for at least five years.15 By the fourth 
year of application of IFRS (year t+3, where t = the adoption year), audit fees should 
have returned to near normal levels, but the change in audit fees may still be affected by 
higher audit fees in the previous year (t+2). This effect is negated by the fifth year. 
After forming the appropriate treatment and control samples, I follow DeGeorge 
et al. (2013) and estimate the following OLS regression model in a change-specific form 
as a variant of traditional audit fee models, controlling for factors found to be significant 
in prior audit fee research (see meta-analysis by Hay and Knechel, 2006), to empirically 
test H2. 
 
AUDFEESi,t 
 
=  0  1 POSTi,t  2 IFRS _ EXPi,t  3 POST * IFRS _ EXPi,t 
 4 SIZEi,t  5 INVREC i,t  6 QUICKi,t 
 
 
(2) 
 7 ACCRUALi,t  8 DEBTi,t   9 ROAi,t  
10 NUMSEGi,t  11LOSS NEWi,t  12 PROFIT NEWi,t 
 13QUAL NEWi,t 
  14C
LEAN 
NEWi,t  
15 BIG SWITCHi,t 
  16 
SMALL 
SWITCHi,t 
  17USLI
STi,t 
 18VOLUNi,t  19 REGQi,t  COUNTRY i,t 
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15 This approach inherently allows for firms to be included in the treatment group in an earlier year and in 
the control group in later years (e.g., a firm that adopts IFRS in 2004 can be in the control group beginning 
in 2008). Disallowing this has no effect on my results. 
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In Equation (2), the prefix Δ denotes that the variable is measured as the change from 
year t-1 to year t. Audit fee data is obtained from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, 
which provides detailed data on fees paid to the audit firm. Upon inspection of the annual 
reports for IFRS adopting firms, I find that firms disclose audit-related fees as “paid to 
the auditor in relation to the adoption and implementation of IFRS” or else provide 
similar descriptions in the footnotes of the audit fee remuneration in the years 
surrounding IFRS adoption. Thus, AUDFEES is measured as the natural log of the sum of 
audit service fees plus audit-related fees of firm i in year t.16 
 
In Equation (2), the variables of interest are POST, IFRS_EXP, and 
POST*IFRS_EXP. POST is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years ending after 
11/30/2006 and zero otherwise. The coefficient on POST captures any time-varying trend 
in the change in audit service fees related to IFRS adoption. I follow the same logic for 
coding this variable as what is described in the first essay. For treatment firms, I predict a 
negative coefficient on POST. I interpret the difference between the associated effects of 
the parameter estimates of POST between treatment and control firms as the change in 
the IFRS-related fee premium over time. IFRS_EXP is my measure of the auditor’s 
experience in auditing IFRS financial statements used to empirically test H3A and H3B, 
operationalized as the total assets of firm i’s auditor’s clients that report under IFRS 
 
 
 
 
16 I also compare the effect of the change in audit fees with the change in total fees. It is possible that firms 
may classify fees related to IFRS adoption as “consulting” or “other fees.” To alleviate this concern, I form 
a stratified random sample of 200 firms and analyze the annual reports in the year before and the year of 
IFRS adoption. Among firm-years with available disclosures, 68% indicate that fees paid to the auditor 
related to IFRS adoption are classified either separately as “audit-related fees” or are included in “audit 
service fees,” whereas only 7% specifically state that IFRS-related fees are included as “consulting,” 
“nonaudit,” or “other” fees. 
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divided by the total assets of all firms reporting under IFRS.17 A significantly positive 
coefficient on IFRS_EXP would lend support to H3A, while a negative and significant 
coefficient on the interaction term POST*IFRS_EXP supports the prediction of H3B. 
I include SIZE, measured as the natural log of total assets, to control for client 
size. To control for audit complexity, I include INVREC, ACCRUAL, and NUMSEG. 
INVREC is measured as the sum of inventory and receivables scaled by total assets. 
ACCRUAL is the absolute value of total accruals, with accruals measured as net income 
minus cash flows from operations. NUMSEG is the natural log of one plus the number of 
geographic and business segments. I include QUICK and DEBT, measured as the ratio of 
current assets less inventory to current liabilities and total liabilities to total assets, 
respectively, to control for loss exposure. To control for audit risk, I include ROA, 
measured as net income divided by total assets, and change-specific variables for losses 
by the client and qualified audit opinions. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to 
one if firm i reports a net loss in year t and net income in year t-1, and zero otherwise. 
PROFIT_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports net income in year t 
and a net loss in year t-1, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal 
to one if firm i receives a qualified audit opinion in year t and a clean audit opinion in 
year t-1, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i 
receives a clean audit opinion in year t and a qualified audit opinion year t-1, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
 
 
17 There are 26 countries represented in the main sample, whereas I use the data of client firms in 60 
countries to construct this metric in order to effectively capture the auditors’ exposure to IFRS financial 
statements. 
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I also include control variables to capture the change in fees when firms switch 
auditors. BIG_SWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i switched from a 
non-Big 4 auditor to a Big 4 auditor in year t and zero otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is an 
indicator variable equal to one if firm i switched from a Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 
auditor in year t and zero otherwise. I include USLIST to control for exposure to the 
higher regulatory environment in the U.S. I include VOLUN to control for any differences 
between voluntary and mandatory adopters of IFRS. Finally, I include variables for 
regulatory quality, REGQ, and country fixed-effects to control for country-level 
variability. 
I expect positive coefficients on ΔSIZE, ΔINVREC, ΔDEBT, ΔNUMSEG, 
LOSS_NEW, QUAL_NEW, BIG_SWITCH, ΔUSLIST, and REGQ and negative 
coefficients on ΔQUICK, ΔROA, PROFIT_NEW, CLEAN_NEW, and SMALL_SWITCH. I 
do not make directional predictions for ΔACCRUALS or VOLUN. 
As an additional test, I partition the sample into Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit clients. 
Having a global presence and collectively controlling a large share of the public audit 
market (Carson, 2009), Big 4 auditors are most highly qualified to provide clients with 
services necessary to assist in the preparation of IFRS financial statements. In all years in 
my sample period, Big 4 auditors rank in the top decile of IFRS_EXP, whereas there is 
much wider variation in non-Big 4 auditors. Thus, dividing the sample in this way 
separates the audit firms most experienced in auditing IFRS financial statements from 
those with less and varying levels of experience. 
52 
After dividing the sample accordingly,18 I modify Equation (2) and estimate the 
following OLS regression model separately for Big 4 and non-Big 4 audit clients and 
separately for the treatment and control groups in order to further test H2: 
AUDFEESi,t =  0  1 POSTi,t  2 SIZEi,t  3 INVREC i,t  4 QUICKi,t 
 5 ACCRUALi,t  6 DEBTi,t  7 ROAi,t  8 NUMSEGi,t 
(3) 
 9 LOSS 
11QUAL 
NEWi,t  10 PROFIT 
NEWi,t  12CLEAN 
NEWi,t  
NEWi,t  13 AUDSWITCHi,t 
 14USLISTi,t  15VOLUNi,t  16 REGQi,t  COUNTRY i,t 
 
 
In Equation (3), POST is the variable of interest, capturing the change in the IFRS-related 
audit fee premium over the specified cutoff period. I exclude IFRS_EXP in this model 
because the partition based on audit firm size effectively separates the most experienced 
auditors with the highest market share of IFRS clients (i.e., the Big 4). For treatment 
firms, I predict a negative coefficient on POST and expect differences in the change in 
audit service fees to be greater for Big 4, compared to non-Big 4, audit clients. 
2.3.2 The Change in Audit Service Fees versus Total Fees 
 
Although I employ a control sample to capture any time-varying effect in the 
change in audit service fees, this approach cannot completely rule out the possibility that 
my tests detect such an effect that is not related to changes in the audit market. A major 
concern, for example, is that the years included as POST=1 overlap the global financial 
crisis, which may impact the change in audit fees charged by the auditor regardless of 
audit firm size or client characteristics. 
 
 
 
18 In dividing the sample based on audit firm size for this test, I delete firms that switched from a Big 4 to a 
non-Big 4 auditor, or vice versa. 
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To further address this possibility, I perform an additional test to estimate 
Equations (2) and (3) for treatment firms with the dependent variable ΔTOTFEES, 
measured as the change in the natural log of total fees paid to the auditor.19 I then 
compare the coefficients on the variables of interest in each sample partition between the 
models estimated using ΔAUDFEES and ΔTOTFEES. If there are macroeconomic shocks 
to the audit market over my sample period, then auditors’ fees should be affected at every 
level, ceteris paribus. This approach mitigates concerns that my tests fail to control for 
any time-varying factors that may have resulted in a declining trend in the change in audit 
service fees not associated with IFRS adoption.20 
To the extent that results differ, this also motivates my choice to use audit fee data 
from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, despite the smaller coverage, rather than the 
alternative of using total fees reported in Worldscope. Although Kim et al. (2012) use 
total fees from Worldscope to infer whether or not IFRS adoption impacts audit fees, this 
measure may capture fees paid for services unrelated to adoption of IFRS, and the 
authors acknowledge this data limitation. 
 
 
 
 
19 My measure of total fees is reported in Worldscope and defined as “Total Fees Paid to the Auditor.” 
Because Worldscope has a wider coverage of firms than Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, the sample sizes 
are, in some specifications, significantly different. To draw more comparable inferences, I repeat this 
analysis using only firms that are covered by both Worldscope and Thompson Reuters Fundamentals so 
that the same observations are included in both the tests of the change in audit service fees and the change 
in total fees. Results are qualitatively similar to those reported. 
 
20 An ideal approach would to be compare the model estimated using the change in audit fees against a 
separate test using the change in nonaudit fees. I collect audit service fee data from Thompson Reuters 
Fundamentals and total fee data from Worldscope, rendering the above approach impractical for two 
reasons. First, specific data on nonaudit fees is less available than that of audit service fees for the sample 
used in this study due to various disclosure requirements. Second, since the two types of data are extracted 
from different sources, the sample with coverage in both, which would allow manual computation of 
nonaudit fees, is relatively smaller. 
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2.4 Data and Sample Selection 
 
The sample selection procedures for the tests in this essay are similar to those 
employed in the first essay, with two additional criteria. First, I require auditor fee data 
availability, and delete observations with missing data. Second, observations included in 
the control group must be in at least their fifth year of IFRS reporting; as a result, the 
control sample is much smaller than that used in the first essay. 
I begin by obtaining a sample of publicly-listed firms available in Worldscope 
from 2004 through 2011. The coverage of firms in Worldscope extends to smaller 
companies and those listed in less regulated markets, whereas the alternative of Global 
Vantage contains only the largest and most prominent firms. I form my initial sample 
after coding the year of IFRS adoption for treatment firms based on reported accounting 
standards data. I exclude firms in certain Asian countries (China, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
Malaysia, and Thailand), despite the use of IFRS, for two reasons. First, for firms in 
China, adoption of IFRS was a gradual rather than immediate process; that is, Chinese 
accounting standards converged with IFRS over time. Similarly, while local GAAP in 
Hong Kong are nearly identical to IFRS, the effective implementation dates of individual 
standards differ from the initial reported year of IFRS adoption. Second, the reporting 
environment in these countries is significantly different from other parts of the world. 
Despite a legal system of common law origin, the incentives of managers and auditors 
diverge from the western world due to differences in enforcement, family ownership, and 
government control (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003). 
I delete observations with missing auditor information, since all of my tests require 
this data to code auditor switches, and those with SIC codes 6000-6999 due to the 
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differing operating characteristics of financial institutions. All data other than the firm’s 
auditor and audit fee data are obtained from Worldscope, and I delete observations with 
missing financial data used to construct control variables. Audit firm and audit fee data 
are obtained from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals. 
Panel A of Table 2-1 summarizes the selection procedure for the sample used in 
subsequent analyses. In Panel B, I provide sample distributions by country and by year. 
Overall, the sample distributions are similar to those noted in the first essay, Australia, 
Canada, Korea, and the United Kingdom each contributing more observations to the 
overall sample than other, smaller countries due to fee data availability. For the 
breakdown by year, the control sample is distributed evenly with 10-15% of the total 
observations in each year. For adopting firms, there are larger proportions in 2005 and 
2006 due to the mandatory adoption of IFRS in the E.U. and in 2011 due to the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in Canada and Korea.21 The treatment (control) sample used for the 
change in audit fee test consists of 2,181 (9,015) firm-year observations. 
In Panel A of Table 2-2, I report descriptive statistics for variables used in the 
analysis of the change in audit fees for the full sample. The change in audit service fees 
(ΔAUDFEES) is significantly greater (p < 0.001) for treatment observations. Although 
the difference in the change in size is not significant between treatment and control 
groups, significant differences exist across other dimensions. None of these univariate 
results are troubling, since changes in firms’ operating characteristics may be substantial 
in the year of IFRS adoption. There is also not a significant difference in REGQ between 
 
 
21 Ending the sample period in 2010 and, as a result, excluding Canada and Korea from the treatment 
samples does not impact my results. 
56 
the two samples, suggesting that treatment and control observations are similar in terms 
of this country-level characteristic. In Panel B, I report variable characteristics for the 
change in audit fee analysis for the non-Big 4 and Big 4 client subsamples. Inferences are 
similar compared to the full sample, except that Big 4 clients in the treatment group are 
significantly (p < 0.001) larger than observations in the control group. 
2.5 Empirical Results 
 
2.5.1 Results: The Change in Audit Service Fees 
 
I next provide empirical results for the change in audit fee tests from estimation of 
Equations (2) and (3) separately for the treatment and control samples. Table 2-3 reports 
the results for comparing the trend of the change in audit fees for the full sample of 
treatment and control firms. The overall model is highly significant (F = 50.33 and F = 
77.38 for treatment and control firms, respectively) and the explanatory power is 
appropriate for change-specified audit fee models (R2 = 44.89% and R2 = 23.37% for 
treatment and control firms, respectively). Results suggest that there is a decline in the 
change in audit service fees in the year of IFRS adoption, as the coefficient on POST is 
negative and significant (p < 0.05) for firms that adopt IFRS, but insignificant for control 
firms. For treatment firms, the coefficient on POST of -0.1511 translates into a -14.03% 
difference in the change in audit fees over the specified time period; conversely, the 
effect of non-adopting firms is only -4.59%.22 These results suggest a change of -9.44% 
to the IFRS-related fee premium, computed as the difference between these two effects. 
Thus, I find support for H2 that the IFRS-related fee premium has declined in more 
 
 
 
22 The associated effect of the coefficients can be obtained by applying exp(δ1) – 1. 
57 
recent years. This effect may be at least partially attributable to an increase in 
competition among audit firms due to changes in the market concentration, as reported in 
the previous essay. 
The other variables of interest are IFRS_EXP and POST*IFRS_EXP, capturing 
the effect of the auditor’s experience in auditing IFRS financial statements and changes 
in this effect over time, respectively. As expected, and in support of H3A, the coefficient 
on IFRS_EXP is positive and significant (p < 0.05) for treatment firms, providing 
empirical evidence that audit firms with greater exposure to IFRS financial statements 
charge a premium for their services in the year of IFRS adoption. However, the 
coefficient on POST*IFRS_EXP is negative and marginally significant (p < 0.10). This 
suggests that in more recent years, audit firms with greater experience in auditing IFRS 
financial statements attempt to reduce the change in audit service fees surrounding IFRS 
adoption. This is consistent with H3B that as the audit market becomes less concentrated, 
firms with greater knowledge of IFRS financial statements pass along this benefit to their 
clients in the form of lower fees in order to remain competitive. Both of these variables 
produce insignificant coefficients for the control sample, suggesting that the effect is 
attributable only to firms adopting IFRS. 
For both treatment and control firms, all of the significant control variables are in 
the predicted direction. The annual change in audit service fees is positively associated 
with changes in client size (ΔSIZE) and complexity (ΔINVREC, ΔTOTSEG), loss 
exposure (ΔDEBT), receipt of a qualified audit opinion (QUAL_NEW), switches to a 
larger auditor (BIG_SWITCH), cross-listing in U.S. markets (USLIST), and regulatory 
quality  (REGQ),  while  a  negative  association  is  found  for  changes  in  liquidity 
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(ΔQUICK), changes in profitability (ΔROA, PROFIT_NEW), the receipt of a clean audit 
opinion after receiving a qualified audit opinion (CLEAN_NEW), and switches to  a smaller 
auditor (SMALL_SWITCH). ΔACCRUALS is negatively associated with the change in 
audit fees. In addition, the change in audit fees surrounding IFRS adoption is lower for 
voluntary adopters, as the coefficient on VOLUN is negative and significant (p 
< 0.001) for treatment firms. This could be due to either lower levels of regulatory 
compliance before IFRS is mandated in a particular country or to concurrent changes in 
enforcement surrounding the mandatory adoption of IFRS (e.g., Christensen, Hail, and 
Leuz, 2013). 
Table 2-4, Panel A reports the results of estimating Equation (3) for the Big 4 
client sample partition. Again, the model is highly significant (F = 30.04 and F = 33.71 
for treatment and control firms, respectively) and explanatory power is consistent with 
change-specified audit fee models in prior literature (R2 = 43.83% and R2 = 16.71% for 
treatment and control firms, respectively). For the treatment sample, the coefficient on 
the variable of interest, POST, remains negative and significant (p < 0.05). The same 
variable is not significant at conventional levels for the control sample. The parameter 
estimate on POST of -0.0745 for IFRS adopting firms translates into a -7.18% difference 
in the change in audit fees over the specified time period, while the same coefficient for 
treatment firms of -0.0245 equates to a difference of -2.42%. Thus, the decline in the 
annual change in audit service fees is 4.76% greater for firms that adopt IFRS relative to 
control firms. 
Panel B of Table 2-4 reports results for the non-Big 4 client sample partition. 
Again, the coefficient on POST is negative and significant (p < 0.001). However, this 
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result applies to both treatment and control firms. Thus, there appears to be some time- 
varying factor impacting the change in non-Big 4 auditors’ fees beyond changes in the 
market for IFRS-related audit services. This is also apparent when comparing the 
associated effects of the two parameter estimates. For treatment firms, the coefficient of - 
0.0518 is equal to a decline in the change in audit fees over time of -5.05%. For control 
firms, the coefficient of -0.0394 translates into a -3.87% difference in the change in audit 
fees over time. The difference between the two is only 1.18%, which is smaller than the 
corresponding difference for Big 4 auditors. The differentiated results suggest that H2 
holds only for Big 4 auditors. 
For both treatment and control firms, and for both Big 4 and non-Big 4 clients, 
nearly all of the significant control variables are in the expected direction and inferences 
are similar to those drawn from the reported results for the full sample. The only significant 
control variable which is contrary to expectations is LOSS_NEW for non-Big 4 clients in 
the treatment group, though the coefficient is only marginally significant (p < 0.10). A 
possible explanation is that smaller auditors may be more likely to reduce audit fees for 
clients in times of financial distress in order to secure payment, rather than increasing 
fees due to greater risk as with Big 4 auditors. 
Overall, the results reported in this section support my hypotheses that the fee 
premium related to IFRS adoption has declined over time. Although not unexpected, this 
holds only for Big 4 auditors. I also find evidence that experience in auditing IFRS 
financial statements is positively associated with the change in audit fees in the year of 
IFRS adoption in earlier years, consistent with the argument that the IFRS-related fee 
premium is higher when these services are provided by fewer firms. Conversely, more 
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experienced firms charge a lower fee premium for services in the year of IFRS adoption 
for clients more recently adopting IFRS, which I attribute to an increase in competition 
among auditors. 
2.5.2 Results: The Change in Audit Service Fees versus the Change in Total Fees 
Although I assess the change in audit service fees over time using a control 
sample, there remains the possibility that some other factor influences the change in audit 
fees surrounding IFRS adoption over time that is not controlled for in my tests. As a 
means to mitigate this concern, I compare the results of the model estimated using the 
change in audit service fees, as reported in the previous section, with the alternative 
dependent variable of change in total fees paid to the auditor. 
The results for the full sample are reported in Table 2-5. After changing the 
dependent variable to the change in total fees paid to the auditor, the coefficient on POST 
becomes positive, but insignificant. The associated effect equates to an increase  of 5.08%, 
compared to a decrease of -14.03% for the model estimated using change in audit fees. 
Thus, the trend in the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption appears to be 
restricted specifically to audit service fees, which further supports H2. Similarly, 
IFRS_EXP is not significant at conventional levels, and, interestingly, the interaction 
term IFRS_EXP*POST is positive and marginally significant (p < 0.10). Thus, exposure 
to IFRS financial statements appears to have a positive association with the change in 
total fees paid to the auditor for clients adopting IFRS in more recent years. This may be 
due to changes in fees in the year of IFRS adoption related to nonaudit services (e.g., 
consulting or tax compliance) that require still greater experience and expertise of IFRS 
not shared by all auditors. 
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I also compare results for the subsamples based on auditor size, as reported in 
Table 2-6. For Big 4 clients, the coefficient on POST derived from estimating Equation 
(3) becomes positive and significant (p < 0.001). Again, this may be caused by other 
services provided in the year of IFRS adoption for which the Big 4 audit firms do not 
necessarily compete with smaller auditors, such as consulting or tax compliance. The 
effect translates into an increase of 5.02%, which further supports H2 that the change in 
the IFRS related fee premium is restricted to audit services for Big 4 auditors. For non- 
Big 4 clients, the coefficient on POST remains negative and is marginally significant (p < 
0.10). This implies that the downward trend in the change in audit fees for non-Big 4 
clients is due to some factor other than changes to the market for IFRS-related audit 
services. Similar inferences are drawn when translating the coefficients into their 
respective effects, as there is only a 1.09% difference between the two effects. As with 
tests for the change in audit fees between treatment and control firms, I fail to find 
support for H2 with respect to non-Big 4 auditors. 
Taken together, these results generally support my predictions. The declining 
trend in the change in audit fees surrounding IFRS adoption is restricted to audit fees, and 
this effect is driven primarily by Big 4 auditors. For non-Big 4 auditors, there is also a 
downward trend in the change in total fees in the year of IFRS adoption. Thus, changes in 
the market for IFRS-related audit services seem to have primarily affected Big 4 auditors. 
This is consistent with my predictions that as the market for IFRS-related audit services 
becomes less concentrated, the most experienced firms (i.e., the Big 4) become less able 
to  demand  a  large  fee  premium  for  their  services  and  instead  offer  the  client  a 
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comparably  less  costly  audit  made  possible  by  their  knowledge  of  IFRS  financial 
statements. 
2.5.3 Sensitivity Tests 
 
I repeat my analyses based on defining large auditors as Global 6 (the Big 4, plus 
BDO and Grant Thornton). This makes my results comparable to prior studies (e.g., 
Wieczynska, 2013), and it is also possible that the second tier global auditors were 
similarly affected over the sample period. Untabulated results suggest that there are 
differences in the results for the tests of the change in audit service fees. For the Global 6 
client partition, the coefficient on POST derived from estimating equation (3) for the 
treatment sample is equal to -0.0371 and only marginally significant (p < 0.10). For 
control firms, the coefficient of -0.0182 is also marginally significant (p < 0.10). Thus, 
there appears to be no time-varying difference between adopting and non-adopting client 
firms of the collective Global 6, and the difference of their associated effects is only 
1.84%. Inferences drawn from the non-Global 6 partition are generally consistent with 
the non-Big 4 subsample. The coefficients on POST are more significantly negative (p < 
0.001) for this subsample for both treatment and control firms (compared to the non-Big 
4 partition), and the difference in the associated effects of these coefficients is only 
1.99%. This further supports my initial classification scheme, as the fee impact of BDO 
and Grant Thornton appears to be more similar to other non-Big 4 auditors. 
An additional concern is that my results could be overstated by measuring the 
change in audit service fees from the year before (year t-1) to the year of (year t) IFRS 
adoption. In compliance with IFRS 1: First-Time Adoption of International Financial 
Reporting Standards, the financial statements for the year prior to IFRS adoption must be 
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fully restated to reflect compliance with IFRS, which requires additional audit effort in 
the adoption year. To alleviate this concern, I adjust my tests by examining the change 
from year t-1 to year t+1. Untabulated results yield similar qualitative inferences, 
although the corresponding magnitudes of all effects are reduced. Adjusting the 
parameter estimates to their associated effects, similar procedures to those described in 
the previous section suggest a decline in the IFRS-related fee premium of 7.73% for the 
full sample, 3.81% for the Big 4 client subsample, and 0.89% for the non-Big 4 subsample 
(compared to 9.44%, 4.76%, and 1.18%, respectively, when measured from year t-1 to 
year t). 
2.6 Conclusion 
 
This essay examines how the market for IFRS-related audit services has changed 
over time as a result of a global shift in the accounting regime of individual countries 
from local standards to IFRS. I examine whether there is a change in the fee premium for 
these services over time. Prior studies posit that a concentrated market leads to an expert 
advantage in favor of large, global auditors, and that this leads to greater increases in 
audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption (Lin and Yen, 2010; Kim et al., 2012). However, I 
find a downward trend in the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption. I also 
find that this effect is driven at least partially by a change in the association between the 
auditor’s exposure to IFRS financial statements and the change in audit fees in the year of 
IFRS adoption. These results hold neither for the control sample nor for the change in 
total fees paid to the auditor in the year of IFRS adoption for firms in the treatment group. 
When I partition the sample based on audit firm size, I find that the above results hold 
only for Big 4 clients, suggesting that the largest auditors became less able to charge as 
64 
high a fee premium in the year of IFRS adoption as it becomes more practical for clients 
to utilize a smaller auditor. 
The above results add to the international auditing literature by providing 
evidence on changes to a major cost faced by firms as a result of IFRS adoption, which 
has become a popular topic in current research. The results of this essay suggesting that 
gradual changes in the audit market have potentially reduced part of the financial impact 
associated with IFRS adoption should add to the debate over whether or not the U.S. 
should require publicly-listed companies to adopt IFRS. An important caveat of this 
study is that I draw these inferences based on a global sample not including U.S. firms. 
These results are therefore inconclusive regarding how the U.S. audit market may be 
affected following IFRS adoption, especially given the relatively more stringent reporting 
environment relative to other countries. In addition, I examine only the initial transition 
costs without consideration to subsequent periods. Nevertheless, it is important for 
regulators in the U.S. to consider changes in the global audit market over time in addition 
to the consequences surrounding more concentrated events (e.g., mandatory IFRS 
adoption) in order to draw reliable inferences regarding both positive and negative 
outcomes of IFRS adoption in the U.S. 
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Table 2-1: Sample Selection and Description - Change in Audit Fees 
 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
 
Firm-Year Observations 
Sample Treatment Control   
Initial Sample# 10,052 28,422 
 
Less:  
Mising audit firm data (240) (6,200) 
Financial firms (SIC Code 6000-6999) (1,088) (5,712) 
Missing financial data (710) (1,127) 
Missing fee data  (5,833) (6,368) 
Sample used in change in audit fee regression analysis: 2,181 9,015 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sample distribution by country 
 
Treatment Control 
Australia 271 12.4% 1,366 15.2%
Austria 11 0.5% 256 2.8%
Belgium 12 0.6% 502 5.6%
Brazil 12 0.6% 19 0.2%
Canada 395 18.1% - 0.0%
Chile 9 0.4% 265 2.9%
Denmark 70 3.2% 173 1.9%
Finland 61 2.8% 173 1.9%
France 19 0.9% 659 7.3%
Germany 37 1.7% 716 7.9%
Greece 21 1.0% 52 0.6%
Ireland 47 2.2% 55 0.6%
Israel 35 1.6% 11 0.1%
Italy 21 1.0% 435 4.8%
Korea 257 11.8% - 0.0%
Luxembourg 27 1.2% 23 0.3%
Netherlands 34 1.6% 145 1.6%
New Zealand 67 3.1% 59 0.7%
Norway 72 3.3% 335 3.7%
Phillipines 18 0.8% 155 1.7%
Portugal 19 0.9% 64 0.7%
South Africa 28 1.3% 387 4.3%
Spain 18 0.8% 287 3.2%
Sweden 63 2.9% 542 6.0%
Switzerland 26 1.2% 459 5.1%
United Kingdom    531  24.3%  1,877   
20.8% 2,181 100% 9,015  100% 
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Table 2-1 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Panel C: Sample distribution by year 
 
Treatment Control 
2004 26 1.2% 112 1.2%
2005 493 22.6% 963 10.7%
2006 445 20.4% 925 10.3%
2007 239 11.0% 891 9.9%
2008 182 8.3% 1,095 12.1%
2009 37 1.7% 1,196 13.3%
2010 76 3.5% 1,919 21.3%
2011  683 31.3% 1,914 21.2%
  2,181 100% 9,015 100%
 
 
This table summarizes the procedure to select the sample used in the auditor switching analysis. Panel A 
details the selection criteria for the treatment (IFRS-adopting) and control (non-adopting) firm-year 
observations. 
 
# The initial sample consists of all publicly-listed firms available from Worldscope from 2004 through 2011 
located in the countries listed in Panel B. I first identify treatment (IFRS-adopting) firms based  on 
accounting standards data in Worldscope, and delete remaining observations with missing accounting 
standards data. 
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Table 2-2: Descriptive Statistics - Change in Audit Fees 
Panel A: Full Sample Panel B: Sample Partition based on Auditor Size 
  Non-Big 4 Clients     Big 4 Clients   
Treatment Control Treatment Control Treatment Control 
(n = 2,181) (n = 9,015) (n = 823) (n = 3,225) (n = 1,192) (n = 5,220) 
Std. Std. Std. Std. Std. Std. 
 Variable M e an   De v. M e an De v.  M e an  De v. M e an De v.  M e an  De v. M e an De v.   
Test Variables 
ΔAUDFEES 0.5112  1.0422 0.1789 ***   0.7571 0.4871  0.8869 0.1078 *** 0.6853 0.2485  0.7547 0.1202 ***  0.5539 
POST(%) 0.8767  0.3288 0.8804 0.3160 0.9398  0.2380 0.9347 0.2228 0.8194  0.3848 0.8215 0.3918 
Control Variables 
 ΔSIZE 0.0504 0.9624 0.0431 0.7013 0.0648 1.0070 0.0918 0.8301 0.0995 0.4763 0.0399 *** 0.3575
ΔINVREC -0.0200 0.1376 -0.0089 *** 0.1036 -0.0332 0.1749 -0.0153 ** 0.1412 -0.0082 0.0923 -0.0031 ** 0.0690
ΔQUICK -2.0910 9.5533 -0.7713 *** 7.9782 -4.0795 16.700 -1.9308 *** 14.389 -0.8396 4.0549 -0.2131 *** 3.2898
ΔACCRUAL -0.0752 0.5014 -0.0440 *** 0.4090 -0.2129 1.2484 -0.1423 ** 1.0322 -0.0107 0.1807 -0.0098 0.1650
ΔDEBT -0.0256 0.3450 -0.0140 ** 0.2541 -0.1067 0.7791 -0.0374 *** 0.5709 0.0098 0.1728 -0.0046 *** 0.1366
ΔROA -0.0399 0.5495 -0.0406 0.5526 -0.2778 1.6398 -0.1038 *** 1.3496 -0.0322 0.2455 -0.0352 0.2229
ΔNUMSEG 0.1035 0.3024 0.0318 *** 0.2077 0.0820 0.2540 0.0319 *** 0.1940 0.1155 0.3269 0.0312 *** 0.2040
LOSS_NEW (%) 0.0950 0.2932 0.0958 0.2943 0.0900 0.2863 0.0818 0.2741 0.0919 0.2889 0.0988 0.2984
PROFIT_NEW (%) 0.0932 0.2907 0.1044 ** 0.3059 0.0912 0.2880 0.0911 0.2877 0.0900 0.2863 0.1107 ** 0.3138
QUAL_NEW (%) 0.0938 0.2915 0.0755 *** 0.2643 0.1223 0.3278 0.0940 ** 0.2919 0.0719 0.2584 0.0617 0.2406
CLEAN_NEW (%) 0.1131 0.3167 0.0730 *** 0.2601 0.1334 0.3402 0.0824 *** 0.2749 0.0806 0.2723 0.0624 ** 0.2419
BIG_SWITCH (%) 0.0392 0.1941 0.0253 *** 0.1572 - - - - - - - - 
SMALL_SWITCH (% 0.0308 0.1727 0.0185 *** 0.1349 - - - - - - - - 
AUDSWITCH (%) - - - - 0.1690 0.3749 0.1359 ** 0.3427 0.1690 0.3749 0.0548 ** 0.2275
VOLUN (%) 0.0048 0.0693 0.0446 *** 0.4971 0.0741 0.2720 0.4993 *** 0.5001 0.0741 0.2720 0.3994 *** 0.4898
USLIST (%) 0.0814 0.0899 0.0259 *** 0.0508 0.0820 0.2540 0.0319 *** 0.1940 0.0820 0.2540 0.0399 *** 0.0630
REGQ 1.5038 0.3677 1.5407 0.3570 1.5216 0.5221 1.5687 0.4935 1.5216 0.5221 1.5249 0.4783
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in my analysis of the change in audit fees in the year of IFRS adoption. Treatment observations 
are years in which firms adopt IFRS. Control observations include years in which firms applied IFRS, having adopted at least five years earlier. I provide 
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data for the full sample (Panel A) and clients of non-Big 4 and Big 4 auditors (Panel B). A percentage sign (%) following the name of dichotomous variables 
denotes that that mean value represents the proportion of firms for which the variable is equal to one. The prefix Δ indicates that the variable is measured as 
the change from year t-1 to year t. 
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Table 2-2 (Continued) 
 
 
AUDFEE is equal to the natural log of the sum of audit plus audit-related fees. POST is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-years ending after 
11/30/2006 and zero otherwise. SIZE is measured as the natural log of total assets. INVREC is the sum of inventory and receivables scaled by total assets. 
QUICK is the quick ratio, measured as the sum of current assets less inventory divided by current liabilities. ACCRUAL is total accruals, measured as net 
income less cash flows from operations. DEBT is the debt ratio, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. ROA is equal to net income scaled by 
total assets. NUMSEG is measured as the natural log of one plus the number of total operating segments. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one for 
firms reporting net income in year t-1 and a net loss in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one for firms reporting net income in year t and 
a net loss in year t-1, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one for firms that receive a clean audit opinion in year t-1 and a 
qualified opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is equal to one for firms receiving a clean audit opinion in year t and a qualified audit opinion 
in year t-1. BIG_SWITCH is an indicator variable for firms switching from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor in year t, and zero otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is 
an indicator variable equal to one for firms that switch from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor in year t, and zero otherwise. AUDSWITCH is equal to one for 
firms that switched auditors from year t-1 to year t. VOLUN is an indicator variable for firm-years ending before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's 
country of domicile. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. capital markets. REGQ is an index variable capturing each 
country's regulatory quality, as measured by Kaufmann et al. (2009). 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. 
 
*, **, *** denote statistically significant differences between treatment and control observations at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on two-tailed p- 
value), respectively. 
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Table 2-3: The Change in Audit Fees for Treatment versus Control Groups 
 
 
Dep Var = ΔAUDFEES Treatment Sample Control Sample 
(n = 2,181)  (n = 9,015) 
Variable Exp. Estimate  Sig Estimate Sig 
 
Intercept ? 0.0279 *** 0.4430 *** 
POST - -0.1511 ** -0.0470 
IFRS_EXP + 0.0040 ** -0.0026 
POST*IFRS_EXP - -0.0032 * 0.0035 
ΔLNTA + 0.4984 *** 0.3543 *** 
ΔINVREC + 0.0183 * 0.0003 *** 
ΔQUICK - -0.0012 *** -0.0004 
ΔACCRUAL ? -0.0799 *** -0.0007 *** 
ΔDEBT + 0.0195 ** 0.0002 *** 
ΔROA - -0.0817 *** -0.0012 *** 
ΔTOTSEG + -0.0054 0.1937 *** 
LOSS_NEW + -0.0599 0.0001 
PROFIT_NEW - -0.0711 * -0.0262 * 
QUAL_NEW + 0.0906 ** 0.1017 *** 
CLEAN_NEW - -0.1114 *** -0.0704 *** 
BIG_SWITCH + 0.1946 *** 0.0412 * 
SMALL_SWITCH - -0.3974 *** -0.4557 *** 
US LIST + 0.0321 * 0.0834 ** 
VOLUN ? -0.2594 *** 0.0125 
REGQ + 0.1644 *** 0.0849 *** 
Country Fixed-effects 
Model 
Adjusted R2 
Yes 
F = 50.33 
44.89% 
Yes 
F = 77.38 
23.37% 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (2) to test for the change in audit fees for treatment 
(IFRS adopting) and control (non-adopting) firms. The dependent variable, ΔAUDFEES, is measured as the 
change in the natural log of audit plus audit-related fees. 
 
POST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 11/30/2006, and zero otherwise. IFRS_EXP 
is measured as the auditor's market share of IFRS client assets, computed using an expanded sample. 
ΔLNTA is measured as the annual change in the natural log of total assets. ΔINVREC is measured as the 
annual change in the sum of inventory plus receivables, scaled by total assets. ΔQUICK is measured as the 
annual change in the quick ratio, measured as current assets (less inventory) divided by current liabilities. 
ΔACCRUAL is measured as the annual change in total accruals, measured as net income less cash flows 
from operating activities. ΔDEBT is measured as the annual change in the debt ratio, measured as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. ΔROA is measured as the annual change in net income scaled by total 
assets. ΔTOTSEG is measured as the change in the natural log of one plus the number of total business 
segments. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a profit in year t-1 and a loss 
in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and a profit 
in year t, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a clean 
audit opinion in year t-1 and a qualified audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is equal 
to one if firm i received a qualified audit opinion in year t-1 and a clean audit opinion in year t, and zero 
otherwise. BIG_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, and zero 
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Table 2-3 (Continued) 
 
 
otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor, and zero 
otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. VOLUN is an 
indicator variable equal to one if year t is before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of 
origin. REGQ is an index variable capturing the regulatory quality across countries (Kaufmann et al., 
2009). 
 
All      continuous      variables      are      winsorized      at      the      top      and      bottom      1%      level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on one-tailed p-values), 
respectively. 
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Table 2-4: The Change in Audit Fees for Treatment and Control Groups, Big 4 and non-Big 4 Partitions 
 
 
Panel A: Big 4 Clients Panel A: Non-Big 4 Clients 
Dep Var = ΔAUDFEES  Treatment Sample Control Sample  Treatment Sample Control Sample 
  (n = 1,192) (n = 5,220)       (n = 823)  (n = 3,225)   
 Variable Exp. Estimate Sig Estimate Sig   Estimate Sig Estimate Sig   
Intercept ? -0.2004 ** 0.0763 * 0.6752 *** 1.0725 *** 
POST - -0.0745 ** -0.0245 -0.0518 *** -0.0394 *** 
ΔLNTA + 0.6015 *** 0.4034 *** 0.1399 *** 0.2494 *** 
ΔINVREC + -0.0134 0.0041 ** 0.0085 -0.0022 
ΔQUICK - -0.0015 * -0.0020 *** -0.0012 ** 0.0000 
ΔACCRUAL ? 0.0012 0.0152 *** -0.0231 * -0.0005 ** 
ΔDEBT + -0.0931 -0.0021 ** 0.0021 0.0002 *** 
ΔROA - -0.1888 *** -0.0093 *** -0.0231 * -0.0009 *** 
ΔTOTSEG + -0.0210 0.1085 *** -0.0668 0.1545 *** 
LOSS_NEW + 0.0516 * -0.0007 -0.1794 *** 0.0050 
PROFIT_NEW - 0.0007 -0.0190 -0.0620 -0.0394 
QUAL_NEW + 0.0227 ** 0.0750 *** 0.1395 *** 0.1186 *** 
CLEAN_NEW - -0.0233 -0.0320 * -0.0547 -0.0858 *** 
AUDSWITCH +/- -0.0761 * -0.1922 *** 0.0365 -0.0813 *** 
USLIST + 0.0873 * 0.0565 * 0.1154 * 0.6117 ** 
VOLUN ? -0.1823 *** 0.0087 -0.0709 0.0082 
REGQ + 0.1669 *** -0.0469 0.1581 *** 0.0618 *** 
Country Fixed-Effects 
Model 
Adjusted R2 
Yes 
F = 30.04 
43.83% 
Yes 
F = 33.71 
16.71% 
Yes Yes 
F = 15.29 F = 21.17 
22.35% 16.68% 
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Table 2-4 (Continued) 
 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (3) to test for the change in audit fees for treatment (IFRS adopting) and control (non-adopting) firms 
separately for the Big 4 (Panel A) and non-Big 4 (Panel B) sample partitions. The dependent variable, ΔAUDFEES, is measured as the change in the natural 
log of audit plus audit-related fees. 
 
POST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 11/30/2006, and zero otherwise. ΔLNTA is measured as the annual change in the natural log 
of total assets. ΔINVREC is measured as the annual change in the sum of inventory plus receivables, scaled by total assets. ΔQUICK is measured as the 
annual change in the quick ratio, measured as current assets (less inventory) divided by current liabilities. ΔACCRUAL is measured as the annual change in 
total accruals, measured as net income less cash flows from operating activities. ΔDEBT is measured as the annual change in the debt ratio, measured as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. ΔROA is measured as the annual change in net income scaled by total assets. ΔTOTSEG is measured as the change in the 
natural log of one plus the number of total business segments. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a profit in year t-1 and a 
loss in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and a profit in year t, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is 
an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a clean audit opinion in year t-1 and a qualified audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW 
is equal to one if firm i received a qualified audit opinion in year t-1 and a clean audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. BIG_SWITCH is equal to one for 
switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, and zero otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor, and 
zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. VOLUN is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is 
before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of origin. REGQ is an index variable capturing the regulatory quality across countries (Kaufmann 
et al., 2009). 
 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on one-tailed p-values), respectively. 
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Table 2-5: The Change in Audit Fees versus the Change in Total 
Fees, Treatment Group 
 
   
Dep Var = Δ AUDFEES 
(n = 2,181)
 
Dep Var = ΔTOTFEES 
(n = 2,540)
Variable Exp. Estimate Sig Estimate Sig 
Intercept ? 0.0279 *** 0.3564 ** 
POST - -0.1511 ** 0.0496 
IFRS_EXP + 0.0040 ** 0.0006 
POST*IFRS_EXP - -0.0032 * 0.0028 * 
ΔLNTA + 0.4984 *** 0.3925 *** 
ΔINVREC + 0.0183 * -0.0018 *** 
ΔQUICK - -0.0012 *** -0.0001 * 
ΔACCRUAL ? -0.0799 *** 0.0051 *** 
ΔDEBT + 0.0195 ** -0.0037 *** 
ΔROA - -0.0817 *** -0.0077 *** 
ΔTOTSEG + -0.0054 0.1496 *** 
LOSS_NEW + -0.0599 -0.0326 
PROFIT_NEW - -0.0711 * -0.0950 ** 
QUAL_NEW + 0.0906 ** 0.0400 
CLEAN_NEW - -0.1114 *** -0.0603 
BIG_SWITCH + 0.1946 *** 0.3724 *** 
SMALL_SWITCH - -0.3974 *** -0.3336 *** 
US LIST + 0.0321 * 0.1071 ** 
VOLUN ? -0.2594 *** -0.0994 
REGQ + 0.1644 *** 0.1265 
Country Fixed-effects 
Model 
Adjusted R2 
Yes 
F  = 50.33 
44.89% 
Yes 
F  = 13.25 
14.79% 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (3) to test for the change in audit fees and the change 
in total fees for treatment (IFRS adopting) firms. The dependent variables, ΔAUDFEES and ΔTOTFEES, 
are measured as the change in the natural log of audit plus audit-related fees and the change in the natural 
log of total audit fees, respectively. POST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations after 
11/30/2006, and zero otherwise. IFRS_EXP is measured as the auditor's market share of IFRS client assets, 
computed using an expanded sample. 
 
ΔLNTA is measured as the annual change in the natural log of total assets. ΔINVREC is measured as the 
annual change in the sum of inventory plus receivables, scaled by total assets. ΔQUICK is measured as the 
annual change in the quick ratio, measured as current assets (less inventory) divided by current liabilities. 
ΔACCRUAL is measured as the annual change in total accruals, measured as net income less cash flows 
from operating activities. ΔDEBT is measured as the annual change in the debt ratio, measured as total 
liabilities divided by total assets. ΔROA is measured as the annual change in net income scaled by total 
assets. ΔTOTSEG is measured as the change in the natural log of one plus the number of total business 
segments. LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a profit in year t-1 and a loss 
in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and a profit 
in year t, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a clean 
audit opinion in year t-1 and a qualified audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is equal 
to one if firm i received a qualified audit opinion in year t-1 and a clean audit opinion in year t, and zero 
otherwise. BIG_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, and zero 
otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor, and zero 
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Table 2-5 (Continued) 
 
 
otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. VOLUN is an 
indicator variable equal to one if year t is before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country of 
origin. REGQ is an index variable capturing the regulatory quality across countries (Kaufmann et al., 
2009). 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on one-tailed p-values), 
respectively. 
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Table 2-6: The Change in Audit Fees versus the Change in Total Fees, Treatment Group, Big 4 and non-Big 4 Partitions 
 
 
Panel A: Big 4 Clients 
Dep Var = Δ AUDFEES Dep Var = ΔTOTFEES 
n = 1,192 n = 1,554 
Panel A: Non-Big 4 Clients 
 
Dep Var = Δ AUDFEES Dep Var = ΔTOTFEES 
n = 823 n = 826 
 Variable Exp. Estimate Sig Estimate Sig   Estimate Sig Estimate Sig   
 
Intercept ? -0.2004 ** 0.2960 * 0.6752 *** 0.3402 ** 
POST - -0.0745 ** 0.0490 *** -0.0518 *** -0.0404 * 
CHG_LNTA + 0.6015 *** 0.5296 *** 0.1399 *** 0.1973 ***
CHG_INVREC + -0.0134 0.0019 ** 0.0085 0.0120 ***
CHG_QUICK - -0.0015 * -0.0001 * -0.0012 ** -0.0039 ***
CHG_ACCRUAL ? 0.0012 -0.0034 -0.0231 * 0.0019 
CHG_DEBT + -0.0931 0.0271 0.0021 0.0027 ** 
CHG_ROA - -0.1888 *** -0.0067 -0.0231 * -0.0062 ***
CHG_SEG + -0.0210 0.0222 * -0.0668 0.1993 ***
LOSS_NEW + 0.0516 * 0.0433 -0.1794 *** -0.1811 ** 
PROFIT_NEW - 0.0007 -0.0849 * -0.0620 -0.1940 ***
QUAL_NEW + 0.0227 ** 0.0558 * 0.1395 *** -0.0266 
CLEAN_NEW - -0.0233 0.1548 * -0.0547 -0.2381 ** 
AUDSWITCH +/- -0.0761 * -0.2381 *** 0.0365 -0.1816 ***
USLIST + 0.0873 * -0.0967 0.1154 * 0.3906 
VOLUN ? -0.1823 *** 0.0307 -0.0709 -0.1582 
REGQ + 0.1669 *** 0.2171 * 0.1581 *** 0.2391 
Country Fixed-Effects 
Model 
Adjusted R2 
Yes 
F = 30.04 
43.83% 
Yes 
F = 10.38 
16.20% 
Yes Yes 
F = 15.29 F = 5.81 
22.35% 10.31% 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (3) to test for the change in audit fees and the change in total fees for treatment (IFRS adopting) firms 
separately for the Big 4 (Panel A) and non-Big 4 (Panel B) sample partitions. The dependent variables, ΔAUDFEES and ΔTOTFEES, are measured as the 
change in the natural log of audit plus audit-related fees and the change in the natural log of total audit fees, respectively. POST is an indicator variable equal 
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to one for observations after 11/30/2006, and zero otherwise. IFRS_EXP is measured as the auditor's market share of IFRS client assets, computed using an 
expanded sample. ΔLNTA is measured as the annual change in the natural log of total assets. ΔINVREC is measured as the annual change in the sum of 
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Table 2-6 (Continued) 
 
 
inventory plus receivables, scaled by total assets. ΔQUICK is measured as the annual change in the quick ratio, measured as current assets (less inventory) 
divided by current liabilities. ΔACCRUAL is measured as the annual change in total accruals, measured as net income less cash flows from operating 
activities. ΔDEBT is measured as the annual change in the debt ratio, measured as total liabilities divided by total assets. ΔROA is measured as the annual 
change in net income scaled by total assets. ΔTOTSEG is measured as the change in the natural log of one plus the number of total business segments. 
LOSS_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reported a profit in year t-1 and a loss in year t, and zero otherwise. PROFIT_NEW is equal to one 
if firm i reported a loss in year t-1 and a profit in year t, and zero otherwise. QUAL_NEW is an indicator variable equal to one if firm i received a clean audit 
opinion in year t-1 and a qualified audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. CLEAN_NEW is equal to one if firm i received a qualified audit opinion in 
year t-1 and a clean audit opinion in year t, and zero otherwise. BIG_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a non-Big 4 to a Big 4 auditor, and zero 
otherwise. SMALL_SWITCH is equal to one for switches from a Big 4 to a non-Big 4 auditor, and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to 
one for firms cross-listed in U.S. markets. VOLUN is an indicator variable equal to one if year t is before the mandatory adoption of IFRS in firm i's country 
of origin. REGQ is an index variable capturing the regulatory quality across countries (Kaufmann et al., 2009). 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1% level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (based on one-tailed p-values), respectively. 
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CHAPTER 3: DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE BIG 4 GLOBAL NETWORKS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Contemporary advances in multinational strategies of large corporations have led 
to a response by large audit firms to establish global networks. As summarized by Carson 
(2009, page 358), use of global networks creates several competitive advantages, 
including global expertise, superior brand name image, and robust audit methodologies, 
and these practices attract clients seeking higher quality audits. Such qualities may be of 
greater importance to companies located in emerging markets, where additional emphasis 
is sometimes placed on the monitoring role of external auditors (Michas, 2011). 
However, published reports by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) in the United States (U.S.) raise concerns about the quality of foreign auditors; 
about half of the inspection reports of international audit firms released through 2012 cite 
audit deficiencies, while two-thirds report quality control defects (Bishop, Hermanson, 
and Houston, 2013). Although fewer of these issues arise for clients audited by members 
of the Big 4 global networks, the PCAOB also faces complications in executing 
inspections of foreign auditors due to regulatory disagreements between the U.S. and 
other jurisdictions. As of the end of 2013, 58 foreign audit firms with publicly-listed U.S. 
clients that were not yet inspected, and at least 39 of these were member firms of the Big 
4 global networks (Norris, 2014; PCAOB, 2014). 
While previous studies conclude that clients are willing to pay global auditors a 
premium for their services (Carson, 2009) and that these firms provide higher-quality 
audits relative to smaller, local auditors (Francis and Wang, 2008), the extent to which 
variation exists within these global networks is unclear. These questions have become 
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increasingly important given skepticism by regulators (e.g., PCAOB, 2008). This study 
utilizes newly-available data to classify members of the Big 4 global networks as either 
“Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates, or “Local” affiliates, as described in more detail 
later.23 I first examine if any fee premium exists for these three separate classifications of 
the Big 4 auditors, relative to non-Big 4 firms, based on both audit service fees and total 
fees paid to the auditor.24 Further, I test whether there are any statistically significant 
differences in the premiums of these groups of firms. Second, I examine the extent to 
which these three types of auditors provide services of superior quality relative to non- 
Big 4 auditors, using discretionary accruals to proxy for audit quality. Taken together, the 
results of these tests address questions regarding the effectiveness of knowledge-sharing 
and other benefits derived from membership within global audit firm networks. The 
considerable resources invested by large audit firms to facilitate their international 
operations and claims that such investments lead to of superior audit quality draw 
particular attention to the issues addressed in this study. 
This study is based on a comprehensive sample of publicly-listed companies 
located in 26 countries. The results suggest that Big 4 “Parent” firms command the 
highest premium over non-Big 4 auditors based on both audit service fees and total fees 
paid to the auditor; though premiums exist for both types of affiliate firms, they are lower 
than those charged by the “Parent” firms. Though I do find a statistically significant 
 
 
23 The sample period in this study begins in 2001, before the collapse of Arthur Andersen. Although not 
absent from the sample until 2002, for ease of exposition I refer only to the “Big 4,” except when 
referencing prior studies. 
 
24 Throughout this study, the terms “fees,” “audit fees,” or “auditor fees” denote a general term irrespective 
of data definitions, while “audit service fees” and “total fees paid to the auditor” refer to the respective 
classifications based on the types of services provided. 
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difference in the audit service fee premium between “Brand Name” and “Local” 
affiliates, the premiums based on total fees paid to the auditor are similar. In terms of 
audit quality, I find a significant negative association between absolute discretionary 
accruals and use of any of these types of auditors. The effect is greatest for Big 4 
“Parent” firms, and the results also suggest no difference in levels of discretionary accruals 
reported by clients of “Brand Name” compared to “Local” affiliates, despite the 
significantly higher fee premiums of the former. Partitioning the sample into client firms 
with income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals offers similar 
inferences, although only use of a Big 4 “Parent” firm results in significantly lower levels 
of negative discretionary accruals. In additional analyses I find some evidence that audit 
service fees are positively associated with concurrent levels of audit quality, suggesting 
that premiums are derived from offering services of superior quality. Further tests suggest 
that impaired auditor independence is not a causal explanation for this effect. 
This study offers several contributions to the literature. First, I find that fee 
premium differences exist within the Big 4 global network. While prior research 
investigating fee premiums treats the Big 4 as a homogeneous group, this is the first study 
to dissect and assess differences within the global networks of these firms. In addition, 
using competing data sources, the inferences drawn are somewhat sensitive to the choice 
of fee measures. In light of the data limitations noted in previous international auditing 
studies (e.g., Kim, Liu, and Zheng, 2012), it is particularly important for future research 
in this area to carefully consider how results could differ based on the type of auditor fee 
data employed. Third, I find that while all three classifications of Big 4 network member 
firms provide higher-quality audits than non-Big 4 auditors, differences exist in that 
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clients of “Parent” firms report significantly lower levels of discretionary accruals than 
clients of either type of affiliate. Given the increased globalization of business, 
accounting, and auditing environments, it is important to further our understanding of 
variability within the Big 4 global networks. Moreover, given concerns by the PCAOB 
regarding the quality of foreign auditors, the results of this study may offer inferences 
worthy of further consideration. 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews prior 
research relevant to this study and develops research questions. In Section 3, I detail the 
research design. Section 4 explains the data and sample selection procedures. I 
summarize the empirical results in Sections 5 and 6. I conclude in Section 7 and offer 
implications for future research. 
3.2 Prior Research & Development of Research Questions 
 
The topic of audit fee premiums charged by large audit firms has drawn 
significant attention from researchers throughout the years. In various contexts, prior 
studies report significantly higher auditor fees for “Big N” auditors (Francis, 1984; 
Palmrose, 1986; Francis and Simon, 1987; Ireland and Lennox, 2002). These premiums 
are often explained as resulting from relatively higher quality audits (DeAngelo, 1981). 
One common proxy for audit quality is the magnitude of discretionary accruals reported 
by clients. While managers can use accruals-based earnings to communicate private 
information to outsiders, aggressive reporting of accruals can undermine the intended 
improvement in the informativeness of earnings. Auditors serve an important role in 
mitigating these agency costs by constraining the opportunistic reporting of accruals, and 
prior  research  generally  finds  lower  levels  of  discretionary  accruals  for  companies 
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audited by “Big N” firms (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyan, 1998; Francis, 
Maydew, and Sparks, 1999). Consistent with the viewpoint that the external auditor 
serves an important monitoring role, Krishnan (2003) finds that the association between 
stock returns and discretionary accruals is greater for companies audited by what were at 
that time the “Big 6” accounting firms. 
Another proxy for audit quality that focuses on audit firm characteristics, as 
opposed to clients’ financial reporting behavior, is industry expertise. Whether or not 
industry specialization results in higher levels of audit fees is an issue of contention 
within existing research.25 In a sample of publicly-listed Australian firms, Craswell, 
Francis, and Taylor (1995) find a positive association between Big 8 industry expertise 
and audit service fees, suggesting premiums of 16% over Big 8 non-specialists, although 
the results are sensitive to market share cutoffs used in defining industry specialization. 
Ferguson and Stokes (2002) present evidence that suggests these premiums decreased 
following the subsequent mergers that created the Big 6 and, later, Big 5 audit firms. 
Carson (2009) extends prior research in industry specialization to the global level, 
asserting that specialization by global audit firm networks adds values to clients, 
especially multinational corporations. She finds that significant fee premiums exist for 
industry specialists at the national and global level both compared to smaller auditors and 
within global audit firm networks. The topic of global audit firm networks has drawn 
additional   attention   in   recent   years   as   large   auditors   make   their   differentiated 
 
 
25 Numerous prior studies exist that measure industry specialization using a variety of methods, test the 
association between specialization and audit fees in different time periods and countries, and condition 
industry expertise at the city level as opposed to the national level. In aggregate, the results of these studies 
offer evidence of no association, a positive association, and a negative association between industry 
specialization and auditor fees. 
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specialization strategies plainly available to clients. Each of the Big 4 auditors discloses 
information regarding the benefits of their structure as a global network and, more 
specifically, knowledge-sharing among member firms.26 Given that statutory 
requirements within individual countries often require local member firms within the 
networks to be comprised of domestically-licensed practitioners or restrict the use of 
international brand names, it is difficult for audit firms to expand into the global market 
in the traditional sense. The creation of global networks circumvents this problem by 
permitting each of the member firms to operate as separate and independent legal entities. 
While Carson (2009) notes that such a “loose” structure may be beneficial to the firm as a 
whole due to variable litigation environments in which individual member firms practice, 
it remains unclear if member firms of the Big 4 global networks can be treated as a 
homogeneous group. In fact, practitioners and regulators have become increasingly 
concerned with the international operations of and cooperation within the networks 
(Norris, 2008; PCAOB, 2008). 
As such, this study differentiates individual firms within the Big 4 global 
networks into three categories: “Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates, and “Local” 
affiliates (the details of this coding are explained later). It is important to note that the 
promotion of these global networks may be constrained by the regulations in individual 
countries, where individual audit firms may or may not be permitted to use the parent 
entity’s international brand name. Smaller member firms may retain their own identity 
while marketing themselves as affiliates of a Big 4. For example, “Ernst & Young LLP” 
26 An example of such disclosure is found on Ernst & Young’s website: ‘‘With the development of the 
CBK (Center for Business Knowledge), every Ernst & Young employee now has access to the collective 
global knowledge and intellectual capital of the firm.’’ 
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is the primary presence of Ernst & Young Global in Australia, but there is one affiliate in 
Tasmania operating as “Wise Lord & Ferguson.” Similarly, PricewaterhouseCoopers has 
a large presence in Korea as both “PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP” and “Samil 
Accounting Corp.” In addition, affiliates of the Big 4 global networks may be structured 
at the national or regional level.  
While previous studies offer evidence suggesting that auditor fees are generally 
higher for companies audited by the Big 4, the extent to which variation exists among 
members of the global networks of these firms has not been addressed. There are at least 
two competing hypotheses that lead to this question. If the creation of global networks 
has led to effective knowledge management between individual firms and/or employees, 
then it is reasonable to expect few differences within the network. Although it is not 
possible to directly measure the effectiveness of these systems, clients may perceive the 
advantages of engaging a Big 4 auditor without differentiating between member firms. In 
this case, while a fee premium relative to non-Big 4 auditors may be observed, it is 
unlikely that variation exists within the Big 4 global networks. 
An alternative explanation that would introduce variation within these three 
classifications is that two of the three operate under the Big 4 brand names. Craswell et 
al. (1995) find that Big 8 auditors enjoy a premium of over 30% relative to non-Big 8 
auditors, which they attribute to the costly process of developing and sustaining brand 
name reputations. To the extent that such a result is generalizable, it may be expected that 
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some member firms of the Big 4 global networks enjoy higher premiums than others. 
Given these opposing explanations, I state the following two research questions in lieu of 
directional hypotheses: 
RQ1: Relative to non-Big 4 auditors, do Big 4 “Parent” firms, “Brand Name” 
affiliates, and “Local” affiliates exhibit audit fee premiums? 
RQ2: Are audit fee premiums similar between Big 4 “Parent” firms, “Brand 
Name” affiliates, and “Local” affiliates? 
I address these two research questions with consideration to both audit service fees and 
total fees paid to the auditor. It is possible that the usefulness of information management 
within the Big 4 global networks differs between various types of services. Any 
premiums driven by nonaudit services will not be captured using only audit service fees. 
Similar arguments exist with respect to audit quality. Although uniform standards 
exist within each of the Big 4 global networks with respect to standards of quality aimed 
at governing the operations, services, and competitiveness of each firm within the 
network, each member firm is ultimately responsible for enforcing these network-wide 
policies.27 If one accepts that member firms within the Big 4 global networks operate 
under identical standards, then there should be little-to-no variation in the quality of 
services offered. Again, it is impossible to directly observe these internal processes. And 
as with fee premiums, it is possible that individual firms operating under a reputable 
 
 
 
 
 
27 For example, KPMG’s transparency report (2013) states: “Under agreements with KPMG International, 
member firms are required to comply with KPMG International’s policies and regulations including quality 
standards governing how they operate and how they provide services to entities to compete 
effectively…Each member firm takes responsibility for its management and the quality of its work.” 
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brand name strive to offer services of superior quality, even within their own or similar 
networks. 
Using discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit quality, I assess whether each of 
the three different classifications member firms within the Big 4 global networks provide 
higher-quality audits than non-Big 4 auditors. Specifically, I address the following 
research question: 
RQ3: Relative to non-Big 4 auditors, do Big 4 “Parent” firms, “Brand Name” 
affiliates, and “Local” affiliates provide audits of superior quality? 
Although there is little reason to expect lower audit quality for any of these types of 
auditors relative to non-Big 4 firms, variation may be present. 
RQ4: Are the differences in audit quality between the different classifications of 
Big 4 member firms and non-Big 4 auditors similar? 
3.3 Research Design 
 
3.3.1 Model: Audit Fee Premiums of the Big 4 and Affiliate Firms 
 
To address the first research question and test the audit fee premium of Big 4 
“Parent” firms and affiliates, I pool all observations in the sample and estimate the 
following OLS regression models that control for factors identified in prior research as 
being associated with audit fees or to capture cross-country differences that may affect 
audit pricing. 
ln(FEE )i,t     = 1  2 SIZEi,t  3CATAi,t  4 LOSSi,t  5 DEBTi,t  6 QUALi,t 
 7 ROAi,t  8 AUDSWITCHi,t  9 REGQi,t  10 ACCTSTNDi,t 
 11USLISTi,t  12 Big 4i,t  13 Named _ Affiliate i,t  
14 Local _ Affiliate i,t  COUNTRY YEAR i,t 
(4) 
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In Equation (4) the dependent variable ln(FEE) is defined the natural log of either of 
audit service fees (AUDFEE) or total fees paid to the auditor (TOTFEE) by firm i in 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 Including audit-related fees in the measure of audit service fees has no impact on the reported results. 
period t.28  
SIZE = the natural log of total assets; 
CATA = the ratio of current assets to total assets; 
LOSS = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports a loss in period t,
    and zero otherwise 
DEBT = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
QUAL = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i receives a qualified audit
    opinion in period t, and zero otherwise; 
ROA = net income before extraordinary and preferred dividends divided
    by total assets; 
AUDSWITCH = an indicator variable equal  to  one if firm  i  switches  to  a new
    auditor in period t, and zero otherwise; 
REGQ = an  index  variable  capturing  the  regulatory  quality  of  firm  i’s
    country of domicile (Kaufmann et al., 2009); 
ACCTSTND = an  indicator  variable  equal  to  one  if  firm  i  reports  under
    international  accounting  standards  or  U.S.  GAAP,  and  zero
    otherwise; 
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USLIST = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is cross-listed on a U.S. 
stock exchange, and zero otherwise; 
Big4 = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by one of the 
Big 4 “Parent” auditors, and zero otherwise; 
Named_Affiliate = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a Big 4 
“Brand Name” affiliate firm, and zero otherwise; 
Local_Affiliate = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a Big 4 
“Local” affiliate firm, and zero otherwise; 
COUNTRY =   country fixed-effects; 
 
YEAR =   year fixed-effects. 
 
The variables of interest in the above models are Big4, Named_Affiliate, and 
Local_Affiliate. These variables each capture the fee premium of the various 
classifications of Big 4 auditors relative to non-Big 4 auditors. Positive and statistically 
significant estimates of any of these coefficients suggest a fee premium relative to non- 
Big 4 audit firms.29 
I classify the individual audit firms a Big 4 “Parent” auditor, a “Brand Name” 
 
affiliate, or a “Local” affiliate in the following manner. The data item extracted from the 
database is a code, rather than the name, of the individual audit firm as reported on the 
client firms’ annual reports. To assist in translating this code, I received a spreadsheet 
from Thompson Reuters detailing, for each auditor code, the name of the corresponding 
 
 
 
29 One concern specific to companies in France is the dual audit requirement. The data used in this study 
represents the company’s primary auditor. Thus, I classify observations where a Big 4 member firm is 
secondary as having a non-Big 4 auditor. 
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audit firm and the code of the associated “Parent Auditor”.30 The Big 4 “Parent” firms 
include: Arthur Andersen; Deloitte & Touche LLP; Ernst & Young LLP; KPMG LLP; 
and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. I classify the auditor as a “Brand Name” affiliate if 
Thompson Reuters identifies the individual auditor as an affiliate of any of the Big 4, but 
the name used includes some derivation of the parent firm’s internationally-recognized 
name. Finally, the auditor is classified as a “Local” affiliate if Thompson Reuters identifies 
that the individual auditor is an affiliate of one of the Big 4, but the name used by the 
individual firm is not derived from the name of the parent firm. Examples of the data 
provided by Thompson Reuters are provided in Appendix A. 
I test for the fee premium using both AUDFEE and TOTFEE for several reasons. 
First, to the extent that clients perceive quality differences among the various services 
offered by auditors, they may be more likely to engage a Big 4 auditor for nonaudit 
services. This may affect the pricing of nonaudit services that are not captured by 
AUDFEE. Second, prior research finds conflicting evidence on the associations between 
nonaudit service fees and audit quality (Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 2002; DeFond, 
Raghunandan, and Subramanyan, 2002; Ashbaugh, LaFond, and Mayhew, 2003), which 
is the focus of the second part of this study. Third, these data items are collected from 
different databases, and existing international auditing literature raises the concern that 
results may differ based on the specific type of audit fees analyzed (Kim et al., 2012). 
The control variables included in the model capture differences in auditor fees due to 
client size and complexity (SIZE, CATA) and audit risk (LOSS, DEBT, QUAL, ROA), as 
 
 
30 I am extremely grateful to Jason Hartman, Pedrag Cvetkovski, and David Coluccio of Thompson Reuters 
for providing this additional data. 
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well as the impact of auditor switches on audit fees (AUDSWITCH). I include REGQ, an 
index variable that captures the strength of each country’s regulatory quality as 
determined by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009),31 and USLIST to capture the 
impact of exposure to various regulatory and enforcement regimes and ACCTSTND to 
control for differences that may be present due to application of higher quality accounting 
standards. ACCTSTND also captures any audit fee effect present after firms adopt IFRS 
(Kim et al., 2012). 
It is possible (and to some extent, expected) that the magnitude of the fee premium 
for these different classifications of Big 4 auditors may differ, and the parameter 
estimates derived from the above regressions only offer evidence regarding the differential 
pricing relative to non-Big 4 auditors. To further evaluate differences between Big 4 
“Parent” firms and the two types of affiliates, I perform an F-test for statistically 
significant differences between the three derived regression coefficients. 
3.3.2 Discretionary Accruals as a Proxy for Audit Quality 
 
As in prior research (Becker et al., 1998; Francis et al., 1999; Frankel et al., 2002; 
Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Krishnan, 2003), I use discretionary accruals as a proxy for audit 
quality. To the extent that the Big 4 and their affiliates charge a fee premium relative to 
non-Big 4 auditors, a logical extension is to examine if these premiums may be driven by 
higher-quality audits. I follow Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney (1995) in estimating 
discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones (1991) model. Specifically, I compute 
a predicted value of nondiscretionary accruals as 
 
 
31 The sample period in Kaufmann et al. (2009) ends in 2008. Thus, for subsequent years, I use the value of 
REGQ from 2008. 
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NDAt = 1 (1/ ASSETSt 1 ) 2 (REVt  RECt ) 3 (PPEt ). (5) 
 
In the above equation: 
 
				 = predicted nondiscretionary accruals; 
 
ASSETS = total assets; 
 
ΔREV = annual change in revenue, scaled by prior year total assets; 
 
ΔREC = annual change in receivables, scaled by prior year total assets; 
 
PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment, scaled by prior year total assets, 
and  the  parameter  estimates  β1,  β2,  and  β3   are  obtained  from  the  following  OLS 
regression  model  estimated  by  year,  country,  and  industry  (based  on  two-digit  SIC 
codes).32,33 
TAt = b1 (1/ ASSETSt 1 ) b2 (REVt  RECt ) b3 (PPEt ) t (6) 
 
 
 
As in prior studies (Healy, 1985; Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995), TA in Equation (6) is 
total accruals, measured as 
TAi,t = (CAi,t  CLi,t  Cashi,t  STDi,t  Depi,t ) /( Assetsi,t 1 ), 
 
where: 
 
ΔCA = annual change in current assets; 
ΔCL = annual change in current liabilities; 
ΔCash = annual change in cash and cash equivalents; 
 
 
 
 
 
32 For brevity, subscripts for country and industry are suppressed. 
 
33 I delete observations where there are fewer than ten firms in each year/country/industry combination in 
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order to estimate Equation (4). 
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ΔSTD = annual change in short-term debt; 
Dep = depreciation and amortization expense;
Assets = total assets. 
 
Discretionary accruals (DA) are then calculated by subtracting the predicted value of 
nondiscretionary accruals ( ) obtained in Equation (3) from computed total accruals (TA). 
For the subsequent analysis, I use the absolute value of discretionary accruals 
(Abs_DA) as the primary dependent variable, and I also partition the sample based on 
observations with income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
 
I first perform univariate comparisons of the various types of discretionary 
accruals between clients audited by Big 4, Big 4 “Brand Name” affiliates, Big 4 “Local” 
affiliates, and non-Big 4 auditors. Tests for statistically significant differences in the 
means (medians) are based on t-tests (Wilcoxon two-sample tests). My multivariate 
results are based on the following OLS regression model, 
 
Abs_DAi,t = 1  2 SIZEi,t  3CFOi,t  4 DEBTi,t  5 LOSSi,t  6 ABS _ TAi,t 
 7 CSHARES i,t  8 GROWTHi,t  9 REGQi,t  
10 ACCTSTNDi,t  11USLISTi,t  12 NUMEX i,t  13CLOSEi,t 
(7) 
 14 Big 4i,t  15 Named Affiliate i,t  16 Local Affiliate i,t 
 COUNTRY YEAR i,t , 
 
 
 
where:  
Abs_DA = absolute discretionary accruals; 
SIZE = the natural log of total assets; 
CFO = cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets; 
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DEBT = the ratio of total liabilities to total assets; 
LOSS = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i reports a loss in period
    t, and zero otherwise; 
ABS_TA = the absolute value of total accruals, scaled by total assets; 
ΔCSHARES = the change in the number of shares of common stock outstanding; 
GROWTH = the percentage change in sales; 
REGQ = an  index  variable  capturing  the  regulatory  quality  of  firm  i’s
    country of domicile (Kaufmann et al., 2009); 
ACCSTND = an  indicator  variable  equal  to  one  if  firm  i  reports  under
    international  accounting  standards  or  U.S.  GAAP,  and  zero
    otherwise; 
USLIST = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is cross-listed on a U.S.
    stock exchange, and zero otherwise; 
NUMEX = the number of exchanges on which firm i is listed; 
CLOSE = the percentage of closely-held shares of common stock; 
Big4 = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by one of the
    Big 4 “parent” auditors, and zero otherwise; 
Named_Affiliate = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a Big 4
    affiliate firm that uses the name of the associated parent auditor,
    and zero otherwise; 
Local_Affiliate = an indicator variable equal to one if firm i is audited by a local
    affiliate of one of the Big 4 audit firms, and zero otherwise; 
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COUNTRY = country fixed-effects;
YEAR = year fixed-effects. 
 
Again, the variables of interest are Big4, Named_Affiliate, and Local_Affiliate. Negative 
and significant coefficients on these variables suggest lower levels of discretionary 
accruals, which I interpret as higher audit quality, relative to non-Big 4 auditors. 
 
I control for a number of factors found in prior research to be associated with use 
of accruals and managers’ discretion over financial reporting. SIZE controls for 
differences in reporting of accrual for firms of various sizes and also surrogates for a 
number of potentially omitted variables (Becker et al., 1998). Accruals have also been 
found to be correlated with operating cash flows, CFO. As highly leveraged firms are 
more likely to violate debt covenants and debt covenant violation has been found to be 
associated with accrual choice (DeFond and Jiambalvo, 1994), I include DEBT. LOSS 
captures any incentives to manipulate earnings in periods of financial distress. ABS_TA 
controls for firms with larger absolute total accruals having greater discretionary accruals. 
To capture managers’ incentives related to stock transactions, I include  ΔC_Shares (Teoh, 
Welch, and Wong, 1998). Finally, prior research has found accruals to be associated with 
sales growth (Dechow, Kothari, and Watts, 1998), and GROWTH captures this effect. 
 
The remaining independent variables control for cross-country or firm-specific 
differences related to the international setting of this study. REGQ, USLIST, and NUMEX 
capture differences in regulatory and enforcement regimes, which may constrain or 
otherwise alter managers’ incentives to use discretionary accruals. ACCTSTND controls 
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for the use of higher-quality accounting standards; use of U.S. GAAP (Lang, Raedy, and 
Yetman, 2003) or IFRS (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008) are found to result in relatively 
higher financial reporting quality compared to non-U.S. domestic standards. CLOSE 
captures the differing incentives of firms with greater insider control, and previous studies 
in the international accounting literature find this to be associated with financial reporting 
quality (Lang et al., 2003; Lang, Raedy, and Wilson, 2006; Barth et al., 2008). 
 
3.4 Data and Sample Selection 
 
I begin by obtaining a list of public companies in Worldscope for the period 2001 
through 2011. The coverage of firms in Worldscope extends to smaller companies and 
those listed in less regulated markets. I exclude firms in certain East Asian countries 
(China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand) since firms in these countries 
face significantly different reporting environments and incentives compared to other 
countries, despite similar legal systems (Ball, Robin, and Wu, 2003). All financial data 
and the total fees paid to the auditor are obtained from Worldscope. However, auditor 
data in Worldscope covers only the most recently reported fiscal year. Therefore, data on 
the engaged audit firm is obtained from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, which also 
provides more detailed audit fee data; it is from this source that I obtain data on audit 
service fees. The initial sample consists of 291,982 firm-year observations representing 
33 countries. 
 
As described in Table 3-1, I delete 65,815 observations with missing auditor data 
in Thompson Reuters Fundamentals and 59,149 observations missing financial data used 
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to construct control variables. Due to the differing operating characteristics of financial 
institutions, I further delete 52,225 observations with SIC codes 6000-6999. This results 
in an available sample of 114,793. For the auditor fee analyses, I delete an additional 
65,264 (70,781) observations with missing data for audit service fees (total fees paid to 
the auditor). These exclusions result in a sample size of 49,529 (44,012) used in the audit 
service fee (total audit fee) analysis, which represents 26 countries. For the discretionary 
accruals analysis, I delete 26,435 observations missing financial data needed to estimate 
discretionary accruals or used in the construction of control variables and an additional 
24,729  observations  where  the  estimation  of  discretionary  accruals  is  based  on 
year/country/industry combinations with less than 10 observations. This results in a final 
sample of 63,629 observations in 22 countries.34,35 Table 3-2 presents the sample 
distributions by country for the three primary analyses. Not surprisingly, five countries 
contribute significantly more observations to the overall sample (Australia; Canada; Japan; 
Korea; and the United Kingdom).36 Table 3-3 reports descriptive statistics for variables 
used in each analysis for the full sample and partitioned based on auditor type. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
34 All three classifications of Big 4 auditors (“Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates,” and “Local” 
affiliates) are present in 17 out of 26 countries in the audit fee analyses and 13 out of 22 countries in the 
discretionary accruals analysis. 
 
35 Note that the sample construction is not based on a matching approach. Due to the relatively smaller 
number of observations with auditor affiliates, a one-to-one matched design would produce a sample that 
severely underrepresents the overall population. 
 
36 Inferences are similar if any one of these countries are removed from the sample, mitigating concerns 
that results are driven by some dominating effect within the sample. 
96 
3.5 Empirical Results 
 
3.5.1 Results: Audit Fee Premiums of the Big 4 and Affiliate Firms 
 
Table 3-4 presents the results of the tests for the audit fee premiums of the Big 4 
and their affiliates relative to non-Big 4 firms. Panel A presents the results of estimating 
Equation (4) with the dependent variable based on audit service fees (AUDFEE), which 
tests for the premium related only to audit service fees. The overall model is significant 
(F = 65.29) and has high explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 93.27%). The coefficients on 
the three auditor type indicator variables are all positive and significant (p < 0.001), 
suggesting that Big 4 “Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates, and “Local” affiliates all 
charge a fee premium relative to non-Big 4 auditors. Adjusting each coefficient to its 
respective effect yields a premium of 35.8% for Big 4 “Parent” auditors, 26.7% for 
“Brand Name” affiliates, and 12.3% for “Local” affiliates relative to non-Big 4 
auditors.37 These results suggest that clients face higher audit service fee premiums not 
only when choosing a Big 4 over a non-Big 4 auditor, but that the premium differs 
depending on where the individual firm lies within the Big 4 global network.38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 These effect sizes can be obtained by applying EXP[ ]-1 for Big 4 “Parent” auditors, EXP[ ]-1for “Brand 
Name” affiliates, and EXP[     ]-1 for “Local” affiliates. 
 
38 Caron (2009) investigates the audit fee premiums for global audit firm networks (GAFN) based on global 
and national industry expertise. Results based on her Table 4 suggest a fee premium of GAFN ranging from 
a low of 15.1% (26.2%) for global auditors with no industry expertise to a high of 33.1% (47.1%) for 
global auditors with national industry expertise in 2000 (2004). Although both Carson (2009) and the 
current study examine audit service fees, the differences in our results may be driven by three factors. First, 
my sample spans 2001 through 2011, whereas she examines only two years (2000 and 2004). Second, her 
sample spans many countries not included in this study. Finally, she includes BDO and Grant Thornton in 
her classification of GAFN, whereas this study considers these two firms to be smaller auditors (i.e., non- 
Big 4). 
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Except for ROA, LOSS, and AUDSWITCH, all of the control variables are 
statistically significant. Consistent with prior research, larger clients (SIZE), those with 
greater complexity (CATA), firms receiving a qualified audit opinion (QUAL) face higher 
audit service fees. The positive estimates of REGQ and USLIST suggest that firms listed 
in countries with greater regulatory or enforcement environments also face higher audit 
service fees. The coefficient on ACCTSTND is also positive, which is most likely driven 
by higher audit service fees due to adoption of international accounting standards (Kim et 
al., 2012) or the stricter reporting requirements of U.S. GAAP. 
 
Panel B of Table 3-4 provides the results of estimating Equation (4) using TOTFEE 
as the dependent variable. Again, the model is significant (F = 29.49) and has reasonably 
high explanatory power (adjusted R2 = 86.95%). Again, the coefficients on all three 
auditor type indicator variables are positive and significant, offering somewhat similar 
inferences to the model based on audit service fees. That is, the Big 4 “Parent” auditors 
and both types of affiliates charge a premium over non-Big 4 auditors. However, the 
magnitudes of the coefficients differ; the translated effects yield a premium of 54.2% for 
Big 4 “Parent” auditors, 19.8% for “Brand Name” affiliates, and 19.5% for “Local” 
affiliates. Thus, compared to audit service fees, the Big 4 “Parent” firms command a 
higher premium than their affiliates. Using total fees paid to the auditor, both “Brand 
Name” and “Local” affiliates have lower premiums relative to the premium based on 
audit service fees. In addition, using this measurement, the two affiliates appear to be 
more or less equal, whereas based on audit service fees the “Brand Name” affiliates 
command a higher premium. 
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All of the control variables in this model are statistically significant and 
inferences are similar to those drawn from the audit fee model. The only notable difference 
is the negative and significant (p < 0.001) on the AUDSWITCH variable, suggesting 
that total fees paid to the auditor are lower in the first year after switching auditors. 
This could be driven either by “lowballing” (DeAngelo, 1981) or switches to a smaller 
auditor (citation). 
 
3.5.2 Results: Differences between Regression Coefficients for the Audit Fee Premium 
Model 
The results from estimating Equation (1) offer insight only into the fee premiums 
charged by Big 4 auditors and their affiliates relative to non-Big 4 auditors. With regard 
to the associated effects of the parameter estimates, it seems that the premiums are not 
equal between the Big 4 “Parent” firms and the two types of affiliates. To statistically 
assess this finding, I perform an F-test for differences in the parameter estimates α12, α13, 
and α14. Panel A of Table 3-5 reports the differences of the coefficients from estimating 
Equation (1) using the dependent variable based on audit service fees. All three 
differences are significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the premiums charged by the Big 4 “Parent” auditors and their affiliates, as 
well as between the “Brand Name” and “Local” affiliate firms. Panel B reports similar 
results based on estimating Equation (1) based on total fees paid to the auditor as the 
dependent variable. In this case, the only difference is that there is no statistically 
significant difference in the fee premiums between the two types of affiliates. 
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Taken together, these results offer several implications. First, clients face 
significant premiums regardless of whether they choose a Big 4 “Parent” auditor or an 
affiliate firm over a non-Big 4 auditor. In the next section, I address whether there is a 
difference in audit quality between the Big 4 “Parent” firms, their affiliates, and non-Big 
4 auditors. Second, the premium that clients face when engaging a Big 4 “Parent” auditor 
is highest based on total fees paid to the auditor, though smaller premiums are present for 
affiliate firms. Although the Big 4 global networks are said to provide services of similar 
quality, it remains an empirical question whether or not knowledge-sharing occurs equally 
in all aspects of the services offered by the auditor. Further, it is unclear whether clients 
perceive the Big 4 “Parent” firms as a more desirable choice for consulting and other 
nonaudit services relative to their affiliates. Finally, these results highlight the 
importance of selecting the appropriate data sources to assess empirical questions related 
to audit fees, especially at the international level where significant differences may be 
present among sample firms. 
 
3.5.3 Sensitivity Tests 
 
Note that the results in the previous section are drawn based on audit service fee 
data collected from Thompson Reuters Fundamentals, whereas data on total fees paid to 
the auditor is taken from Worldscope. Thus, while the two samples are similar in size, the 
exact composition may differ. To offer more comparable results between the two fee 
models, I repeat the analysis using a sample of firms covered by both databases. For 
brevity, I discuss only the variables of interest and their implications. 
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The adjusted sample size includes firms with available data that are covered by 
both databases (n = 26,048).39 Table 3-6, Panel A repeats the estimation of Equation (1) 
with the dependent variable AUDFEE. While all of the classifications of a Big 4 auditor 
report a premium over non-Big 4 auditors, some differences arise. The coefficient on 
Big4 of 0.3101 is still significant (p < 0.001) and translates to a premium over non-Big 4 
auditors of 36.4%, which is similar to that derived in the previous section. The gap 
between the Big 4 “Parent” premium and that of “Brand Name” affiliates is slightly 
larger; the coefficient on Named_Affiliate of 0.1857 remains significant (p < 0.001) and 
its   associated   effect   is   20.4%.   However,   the   parameter   estimate   of   0.750   on 
Local_Affiliate is not significant at conventional levels (p > 0.10), suggesting no 
statistically significant premium of “Local” affiliates over non-Big 4 auditors. In Panel B 
of Table 6, I repeat the estimation of Equation (1) for the adjusted sample using the 
dependent variable TOTFEE. Inferences with respect to the premium of Big 4 “Parent” 
firms are virtually identical in that the coefficient is still significant (p < 0.001) and 
translates into a premium of 54.0% compared to non-Big 4 audit firms. However, the 
premium is larger for “Brand Name” affiliates than in the earlier results; the associated 
effect of the coefficient of 0.3089 is 36.2%, and the estimate remains significant (p < 
0.001). In addition, the premium of “Local” affiliates is reduced; the estimate of 
Local_Affiliate of 0.1115 translates into a premium over non-Big 4 auditors of 11.8%, 
and this result is only marginally significant (p < 0.10). The results of an F-test for 
 
 
 
39 In terms of the distrubition by country and year, the adjusted sample from which results in this section 
are drawn is similar to those used in the previous section. However, some differences exist with respect to 
the auditor type classifications. 
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differences in the regression coefficients (untabulated) suggest that all differences are 
statistically significant at conventional levels (p < 0.10 or higher). 
 
Although some differences exist using this stricter sample, the overall conclusion 
remains that the highest premiums, both for audit service fees and total fees paid to the 
auditor, are charged by the Big 4 “Parent” firms, followed by the “Brand Name” affiliates. 
While the results in this section suggest smaller premiums for “Local” affiliates over non-
Big 4 audit firms, this may be driven in part by an underrepresentation of this type of 
audit firm in the adjusted sample. 
 
3.5.4 Univariate Results: Discretionary Accruals 
 
In this section I discuss the results of univariate tests for various measures of 
discretionary accruals, which I consider a proxy for audit quality. Table 3-7 presents 
descriptive statistics for the discretionary accruals measure (Abs_DA) and for the 
alternative sample partitions based on observations with income-increasing and income- 
decreasing discretionary accruals. Both the means and medians of these measures are 
smallest for the Big 4 “Parent” auditors, though firms audited by “Local” affiliates have 
similar results. Interestingly, results suggest that the clients of “Brand Name” affiliates 
have higher levels of discretionary accruals than their “Local” counterparts based on both 
means and medians. As expected, the values for the non-Big 4 partition are highest. 
 
Table 3-8 presents the results of testing for statistically significant differences in 
the means (medians) between various combinations of auditor type based on t-tests 
(Wilcoxon two sample tests). Panel A compares Big 4 “Parent” auditors to both types of 
affiliates and to non-Big 4 auditors. All differences of both means and medians are 
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significant at the 1% level, suggesting that clients of the Big 4 “Parent” firms have lower 
levels of discretionary accruals. Note, however, that there are no significant differences in 
either the means or medians between the Big 4 “Parent” auditors and the “Local” affiliates. 
Compared to non-Big 4 auditors, clients of the Big 4 “Parent” firms report lower 
levels of discretionary accruals based on both means and medians, as all differences 
(except for the difference in the means of signed discretionary accruals) are significant 
at the 1% level. 
 
In Panel B of Table 3-8, I compare the “Brand Name” affiliates with the “Local” 
affiliates and non-Big 4 partitions. Compared to “Local” affiliates all differences in both 
means and medians are statistically significant (p < 0.05 or higher) and suggest that 
clients of “Local” affiliates report lower levels of discretionary accruals. In relation to 
non-Big 4 auditors, clients of “Brand Name” affiliates report lower levels of discretionary 
accruals; except for the difference in the means of signed discretionary accruals, all other 
differences are statistically significant (p < 0.05 or p < 0.001). Finally, in Panel C, I 
compare “Local” affiliates to non-Big 4 auditors, and the results suggest that 
discretionary accruals are lower for clients of “Local” affiliates than non-Big 4 audit 
firms. All differences are statistically significant at the 1% level. Taken together, these 
results suggest that audit quality is higher for Big 4 “Parent” firms and “Local” affiliates 
compared to “Brand Name” affiliates, but that all results in lower levels of discretionary 
accruals than non-Big 4 audit firms. 
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3.5.5 Regression Results: Discretionary Accruals 
 
A limitation of the preceding analysis is that it ignores any firm- or country- 
specific factors that may impact managers’ ability to exercise discretion over the 
reporting of accruals. Therefore, I also perform a multivariate analysis through estimation 
of Equation (4). Table 3-9 reports these results for the primary analysis based on Abs_DA 
and for the samples partitioned based on observations with income-increasing and 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
Significant results arise when discretionary accruals are specified in absolute 
terms (Abs_DA) and when the observations with income-increasing and income- 
decreasing discretionary accruals are partitioned into individual samples. Table 3-9, Panel 
A reports the results for the model estimated with the dependent variable Abs_DA. The 
model is highly significant (F = 12.19) and the parameter estimates of the three variables 
yield significant results. Specifically, the coefficient of -0.0118 on Big4 is statistically 
significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that clients of Big 4 “Parent” auditors report lower 
levels of absolute discretionary accruals relative to non-Big 4 audit firms. The parameter 
estimate of Named_Affiliate also produces a negative and significant (p < 0.05) 
coefficient of -0.0083, suggesting that these “Brand Name” affiliates also provide higher 
audit quality. Although only marginally significant (p < 0.10), the coefficient on 
Local_Affiliate provides similar insights. Interestingly, the magnitude of the coefficient is 
larger for “Local” affiliates relative to “Brand Name” affiliates, although this difference 
is not statistically significant at conventional levels (p > 0.10). An untabulated F-test 
suggests that the relative quality of Big 4 “Parent” firms (i.e., compared to non-Big 4 
auditors) is greater than that of both types of affiliates. 
103 
The results in Panel B of Table 3-9 are derived from estimating Equation (4) for 
firms with income-increasing discretionary accruals (DA). The inferences drawn from 
these results are similar to those when estimating the model using total absolute 
discretionary accruals. Specifically, the coefficient of -0.0193 on Big4 is statistically 
significant (p < 0.001), suggesting higher audit quality relative to non-Big 4 auditors. 
Consistent with the previous results, the parameter estimates of Named_Affiliate and 
Local_Affiliate remain negative and significant (p < 0.05 and p < 0.10, respectively), and 
the coefficient is greater in magnitude for “Local” affiliates, although again, this 
difference is not statistically significant. An untabulated F-test implies that the effect of 
Big4 is significantly (p < 0.05) greater than the effects of both affiliates. Table 3-9, Panel 
C presents the same results for firms with income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Of 
the three variables of interest, only the coefficient on Big4 is significant (p < 0.05). This 
suggests that “Brand Name” and “Local” affiliates of the Big 4 may not scrutinize the use 
income-decreasing discretionary accruals to the same extent as the Big 4 “Parent” firms. 
In summary, based on both absolute discretionary accruals and observations with 
income-increasing discretionary accruals, the results suggest that all three classifications 
of Big 4 auditors—“Parent” firms, “Brand Name” affiliates, and “Local” affiliates— 
provide higher-quality audits than non-Big 4 firms, though the improvement in quality is 
highest for “Parent” firms. In addition, it appears that only Big 4 “Parent” firms are 
associated with significantly lower levels of income-decreasing discretionary accruals. 
However, an interesting finding is that similar levels of audit quality appear to be present 
for “Brand Name” and “Local” affiliates, despite the significantly higher premiums 
charged by the former. This raises the question of whether some affiliates within the Big 
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4 global networks capitalize on brand name reputations without significant benefits to the 
client in terms of the quality of services offered. 
3.6 Additional Analyses 
 
Although the inferences drawn from the preceding sections offer some evidence 
regarding fee premiums and audit quality, the following question remains: are the 
premiums of the Big 4—the “Parent” firms and the two types of affiliates—driven by the 
quality of services offered? To address this question, I perform an additional analysis that 
tests for any statistically significant association between auditor fees and 
contemporaneous absolute discretionary accruals, which proxies for audit quality. I 
modify Equation (4) as follows to execute this test: 
ln(FEE)i,t = 1  2 SIZEi,t  3CATAi,t  4 LOSSi,t  5 DEBTi,t  6 QUALi,t 
 7 ROAi,t  8 AUDSWITCHi,t  9 REGQi,t  10 ACCTSTNDi,t 
 11USLISTi,t  12 Big 4i,t  13 Named _ Affiliate i,t  
14 (Big 4 * Abs _ DA)i,t  15 (Named _ Affiliate * Abs _ DA)i,t 
 16 (Local _ Affiliate * Abs _ DA)i,t  COUNTRY YEAR i,t 
(8) 
 
 
Again, I consider both audit service fees (AUDFEE) and total fees paid to the auditor 
(TOTFEE) as alternative dependent variables. For the purposes of this test, I exclude 
clients of non-Big 4 auditors and interact each of the auditor type indicator variables with 
absolute discretionary accruals, Abs_DA. Negative and significant coefficients on any of 
the interaction terms included in Equation (8) suggest a positive relationship between 
auditor fees and concurrent audit quality.40 In other words, such a result implies that fee 
 
 
 
 
40 In a study of Australian firms, Gul, Chen, and Tsui (2003) find a positive association between audit fees 
and the absolute value of discretionary accruals. The authors attribute this finding to an increase in audit 
effort as a result of greater inherent risk. In the international context of this study, this competing result is 
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increases are driven at least partially by the quality of services offered. As this test 
requires both audit fee data and data items needed to estimate discretionary accruals, the 
adjusted sample size without non-Big 4 clients is 21,760.41 
The results of this analysis are provided in Table 3-10. As seen in Panel A, the 
coefficient on Big4*Abs_DA of -0.0149 is significant (p < 0.001), suggesting that clients 
of Big 4 “Parent” firms face higher fees with increases in audit quality. Similar inferences 
are drawn for “Local” affiliates, though the coefficient on Local_Affiliate*Abs_DA of - 
0.0086 is only marginally significant (p < 0.10). However, there does not appear to be a 
significant association between audit service fees and audit quality for “Brand Name” 
affiliates. In Panel B, the test is repeated with the dependent variable TOTFEE, and no 
significant results are found. 
Though these results imply associations between auditor fees and audit quality, 
the causal relationship remains unclear. It is possible that auditors receive higher fees in 
previous years and permit clients to produce financial information of lower quality in 
subsequent years, which could be a symptom of impaired independence. To draw 
additional inferences, I use the adjusted sample of 21,760 observations that excludes non- 
Big 4 auditors and delete an additional 2,285 observations in which an auditor switch 
occurred.42  I then estimate a modified version of Equation (7), removing the indicator 
 
 
 
relatively unlikely due to the low frequencies of litigation against auditors due to clients’ misrepresentation 
of financial information. 
 
41 The reported results for this test are based on the modified sample with data availability for both audit 
service fee and total fees paid to the auditor. Inferences are similar if I modify the two samples with 
different fee data availability. 
 
42 Failure to delete observations with an auditor switch could result in biased inferences, as audit quality 
would be based on the auditor engaged in year t while the fee variables are based on the auditor in year t-1. 
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variable  Local_Affiliate  and  including  interactions  between  all  three  types  of  Big  4 
auditors and lagged auditor fee variables. 
 
Abs_DAi,t = 1  2 SIZEi,t  3CFOi,t  4 DEBTi,t  5 LOSSi,t  
6 ABS _ TAi,t  7 CSHARES i,t  8 GROWTHi,t  9 REGQi,t 
 10 ACCTSTNDi,t  11USLISTi,t  12 NUMEX i,t  13CLOSEi,t 
 14 Big 4i,t  15 Named _ Affiliate i,t  16 [Big 4i,t  * ln(FEE )i,t 1 ] 
 17 [Named _ Affiliate i,t  * ln(FEE )i,t 1 ] 
18[Local _ Affiliate i,t  * ln(FEE )i,t 1 ] COUNTRY YEAR i,t 
(9) 
 
In equation (9), ln(FEE)i,t-1 denotes the natural log of either audit service fees (AUDFEE) 
or total fees paid to the auditor (TOTFEE) in year t-1. The results of this test, reported in 
Table 3-11, corroborate the previous inferences. For Big 4 “Parent” firms, I find that 
prior-year audit service fees                are negatively associated with current-year absolute 
discretionary accruals. The parameter estimate on the interaction term Big4*(AUDFEEt-
1) of -0.0048 is statistically significant (p < 0.001). In other words, audit service fees in 
the prior year are positively associated with future levels audit quality. I find similar, 
albeit weaker effects for “Local” and “Brand Name” affiliates. The effect size is smaller 
for “Brand Name” affiliates and the coefficient of -0.0020 on the interaction term 
Named_Affiliate*(AUDFEEt-1) is also statistically significant (p < 0.05); though I also 
find a negative effect for “Local” affiliates, the coefficient is not significant at  
conventional  levels  (p  >  0.10).  Using lagged total fees  paid  to  the  auditor 
produces insignificant results for all three auditor type classifications. 
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Thus, it seems unlikely that the positive association between auditor fees  and audit 
quality is a result of impaired auditor independence.43 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This study investigates differences in auditor fee premiums and audit quality 
within the Big 4 global networks. Though prior research has assessed differences between 
Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors, these results are typically drawn on samples within 
individual countries. Expanding the analysis to a global level and utilizing newly available 
data, I differentiate member firms within the Big 4 networks as “Parent” firms, “Brand 
Name” affiliates, or “Local Affiliates.” Results suggest that while all three types of Big 
4 firms command audit fee premiums relative to non-Big 4 auditors, significant 
differences exist. Likewise, with respect to audit quality, though clients of any of these 
three report lower levels of discretionary accruals compared to clients of non-Big 4 audit 
firms, variation exists within the network. 
The results of this study advance our understanding of the international operations 
of the Big 4 and suggest that member firms are not necessarily alike, at least with respect 
to the two aspects examined in this essay—auditor fee premiums and audit quality. Given 
the supposed benefits of knowledge sharing and information management within the Big 
4 global networks, as well as claims that all member firms must meet certain quality 
standards, this study raises several more specific questions that may be addressed by 
future researchers, some of which cannot be examined using available archival data. Do 
affiliate firms make use of the resources provided to them within the global network to 
43 All results reported in this section are insensitive to using indicator variables for the top and bottom 
decile ranks of absolute discretionary accruals or auditor fee variables in place of the continuous variables 
in interaction terms. 
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increase the quality of services offered to clients? What factors, if any, undermine the 
overall effectiveness of quality management systems in place within these global 
networks? Do affiliates using a Big 4 brand name strive to provide higher-quality services, 
or do they simply adopt a label? In light of the troubles faced by the PCAOB, how does 
noncompliance with a regulatory body by a member firm impact the overall image of 
the Big 4’s international brand name? 
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Table 3-1: Sample Selection - Big 4 Global Networks 
 
 
 
Sample selection criteria: Firm-year observations 
 
Initial Sample# 
 
291,982 
Less: missing auditor data (65,815) 
Less: missing financial data used to construct variables (59,149) 
Less: financial service firms (SIC 6000-6999)   (52,225) 
Available sample 114,793 
 
 
Less: missing audit service fee data  (65,264) 
 
Primay sample for audit service fee analysis  49,529   
 
 
 
Less: missing total fee dada (70,781) 
 
Primay sample using total auditor fees analysis 44,012 
 
 
 
Less: missing financial data used to construct additional variables or 
estimate discretionary accruals 
(26,435) 
 
Less: year/country/industry combination contains less than 10 observations  (24,729) 
 
Primary sample for discretionary accruals analysis  63,629   
 
 
 
This table summarizes the selection procedure to create the samples used in various components of this 
study. 
 
# The initial sample consists of publicly-listed companies available in Worldscope from 2001 through 2011 
located in 33 countries. Through application of the sample selection criteria, the number of countries 
represented in the audit fee (discretionary accruals) analysis decreases to 26 (22). 
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Table 3-2: Sample Distribution by Country - Big 4 Global Networks 
 
 
Audit Fee Analyses Discretionary 
Audit Service Fees Total Auditor Fees Accruals Analysis 
 
  Observations % Observations %   Observations %
AUSTRALIA 6,210 12.5% 8,314 18.9% 4,793 7.6%
AUSTRIA 274 0.6% 227 0.5% 230 0.4%
BELGIUM 634 1.3% 622 1.4%   767 1.2%
BRAZIL 39 0.1% 50 0.1% 407 0.6%
CANADA 7,101 14.3% 3,028 6.9%   6,740 10.7%
DENMARK 439 0.9% 749 1.7% 112 0.2%
FINLAND 293 0.6% 319 0.7%   178 0.3%
FRANCE 1,710 3.5% 1,827 4.2% 2,841 4.5%
GERMANY 1,621 3.3% 1,413 3.2%   2,561 4.0%
GREECE 82 0.2% 53 0.1% 607 1.0%
IRELAND 203 0.4% 325 0.7%   - 0.0%
ISRAEL 178 0.4% 186 0.4% 644 1.0%
ITALY 617 1.2% 798 1.8%   541 0.9%
JAPAN 11,153 22.5% 7,067 16.1% 19,512 30.8%
KOREA 6,851 13.8% 754 1.7%   8,718 13.8%
LUXEMBOURG 24 0.0% 16 0.0% - 0.0%
NETHERLANDS 319 0.6% 315 0.7%   232 0.4%
NEW ZEALAND 460 0.9% 488 1.1% - 0.0%
NORWAY 711 1.4% 931 2.1%   1,250 2.0%
PHILLIPINES 297 0.6% 138 0.3% 185 0.3%
PORTUGAL 98 0.2% 149 0.3%   - 0.0%
SOUTH AFRICA 1,100 2.2% 1,163 2.6% 794 1.3%
SPAIN 448 0.9% 761 1.7%   221 0.3%
SWEDEN 1,521 3.1% 1,192 2.7% 2,057 3.3%
SWITZERLAND 425 0.9% 765 1.7%   407 0.6%
 UK 6,721 13.6%   12,362 28.1%   9,472 15.0%
49,529 100% 44,012 100%   63,269 100.0% 
This table presents the distribution by country for the various samples employed in this study. 
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Table 3-3: Descriptive Statistics - Big 4 Global Networks 
Panel A: Audit Service Fee analysis Full Sample Big 4 "Parent" Firms "Brand Name" Affiliates "Local" Affiliates Non-Big 4 
n = 49,529 
    
n = 26,979 n = 3,063 n = 670 n = 18,817 
 
Dependent Variables Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.   
 
AUDFEE 13.97 13.16 3.11 14.85 14.76 2.86 14.04 13.80 1.85 13.98 12.97 2.59 12.83 11.39 3.17 
 
Independent Variables 
 
SIZE 20.59 20.33 3.96 21.82 21.95 3.53 19.93 19.75 2.49 20.91 20.01 3.13 18.90 17.62 4.12
CATA 0.49 0.49 0.26 0.49 0.48 0.24 0.48 0.47 0.24 0.50 0.51 0.24 0.51 0.50 0.28
LOSS (%) 19.4% 12.0% 14.5%   27.9% 21.3% 
DEBT 0.48 0.44 0.43 0.49 0.46 0.35 0.51 0.51 0.33 0.47 0.45 0.36 0.47 0.36 0.55
QUAL (%) 16.3% 13.8% 12.4%   18.8% 20.4% 
ROA (0.11) 0.01 0.49 (0.04) 0.02 0.34 (0.04) 0.02 0.32 (0.02) 0.03 0.29 (0.23) (0.02) 0.64
AUDSWITCH (%) 17.6% 10.3% 17.7%   13.1% 24.6% 
REGQ 1.39 1.46 0.38 1.36 1.25 0.36 1.49 1.66 0.34 0.94 1.11 0.41 1.44 1.66 0.39
ACCTSTND (%) 45.0% 39.0% 89.3%   51.5% 46.3% 
USLIST (%) 1.5% 2.0% 0.5%   2.7% 0.5% 
Big4 (%) 54.5% - -   - - 
Named_Affiliate (%) 6.2% - -   - - 
Local_Affiliate (%) 1.4%     -     -     -     -    
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Table 3-3 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Panel B: Total Auditor Fee analysis Full Sample Big 4 "Parent" Firms "Brand Name" Affiliates "Local" Affiliates Non-Big 4 
n = 44,012  n = 26,857  n = 3,313  n = 693 n = 13,149 
Dependent Variables Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.   
 
TOTFEE 13.43 12.85 2.62 14.42 14.08 2.50 14.03 13.46 2.28 13.19 12.98 2.34 11.88 11.28 2.26 
 
Independent Variables 
 
SIZE 19.85 19.32 3.50 20.62 20.14 3.23 20.52 20.94 3.07 19.47 19.14 3.09 17.74 17.04 3.18
CATA 0.48 0.48 0.25 0.47 0.47 0.25 0.48 0.48 0.24 0.50 0.48 0.25 0.51 0.49 0.27
LOSS (%) 16.5% 11.3% 18.4%   13.1% 21.1% 
DEBT 0.50 0.47 0.37 0.50 0.49 0.32 0.51 0.51 0.30 0.49 0.48 0.35 0.49 0.41 0.48
QUAL (%) 12.2% 10.3% 16.5%   22.5% 14.7% 
ROA (0.08) 0.02 0.41 (0.04) 0.03 0.32 (0.01) 0.03 0.24 0.01 0.03 0.20 (0.19) (0.00) 0.55
AUDSWITCH (%) 15.3% 9.2% 17.3%   11.9% 21.2% 
REGQ 1.51 1.62 0.32 1.49 1.61 0.32 1.40 1.46 0.34 1.09 1.11 0.33 1.59 1.71 0.29
ACCTSTND (%) 45.9% 41.5% 69.2%   38.5% 49.3% 
USLIST (%) 2.0% 2.5% 0.7%   2.2% 1.0% 
Big4 (%) 61.0% - -   - - 
Named_Affiliate (%) 7.5% - -   - - 
Local_Affiliate (%) 1.6%     -     -     -     -    
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Table 3-3 (Continued) 
 
 
 
Panel C: Discretionary Accruals analysis Full Sample Big 4 "Parent" Firms "Brand Name" Affiliates "Local" Affiliates Non-Big 4 
n = 63,629  n = 28,981  n = 9,768  n = 4,739 n = 19,781 
Dependent Variables Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.       Mean   Median St. Dev.   
 
Abs_DA 0.113 0.062 0.179 0.090 0.051 0.147 0.111 0.063 0.197 0.092 0.053 0.127 0.130 0.071 0.219 
 
Independent Variables 
 
SIZE 21.05 21.73 3.41 23.94 23.76 3.16 23.13 23.64 2.32 23.46 23.91 2.09 19.59 18.26 3.65
CFO (2.71) 0.05 19.15 (0.89) 0.06 19.01 (1.26) 0.05 29.37 (1.23) 0.05 21.88 (2.34) 0.03 18.66
DEBT 0.49 0.45 0.63 0.50 0.46 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.43 0.32 0.49 0.43 0.92
LOSS (%) 16.6% 13.5% 19.9%   14.9% 20.3%
ABS_TA 0.14 0.08 0.21 0.14 0.09 0.22 0.10 0.06 0.15 0.10 0.06 0.13 0.16 0.09 0.24
CHG_CSHARES 11.58 9.01 23.51 13.79 9.08 26.38 4.78 3.21 17.47 2.78 1.74 19.11 13.58 10.91 14.56
GROWTH 22.20 21.09 26.86 32.74 19.07 20.01 19.39 1.01 180.16 19.56 7.71 13.84 13.84 6.90 16.50
REGQ 1.34 1.23 0.34 1.42 1.39 0.29 1.15 1.11 0.27 0.97 1.05 0.32 1.39 1.44 0.35
ACCTSTND (%) 43.5% 49.3% 44.4%   37.7% 39.5%
USLIST (%) 1.0% 1.6% 0.3%   2.7% 0.4%
CLOSE 4.61 0.14 12.90 7.50 0.19 17.19 2.90 0.05 8.64 0.88 0.01 6.16 1.78 0.31 7.98
NUMEX 1.29 1.00 0.74 1.30 1.00 0.81 1.35 1.00 0.77 1.31 1.00 0.61 1.25 1.00 0.64
Big4 (%) 45.5% - -   - - 
Named_Affiliate (%) 15.3% - -   - - 
Local_Affiliate (%) 7.5%     -     -     -     -    
This table presents descriptive statistics for variables used in the analyses of this study. Panel A, Panel B, and Panel C report these statistics for the audit 
service fee analysis, total fee analysis, and discretionary accruals analysis, respectively. Separate partitions are provided for the full sample and for each 
auditor type classification. A percentage sign (%) following the name of dichotomous variables indicates that the reported mean is the percentage of 
observations for which that variable is equal to one. 
 
In Panels A and B, AUDFEE is defined as the natural log of audit service fees, and TOTFEE is the natural log of total fees paid to the auditor. SIZE is the 
natural log of total assets. CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets. LOSS is an indicator variable for firm-year observations with negative net 
income, and zero otherwise. DEBT is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year 
obsevations with a qualified (going-concern or other) audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ROA is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. 
AUDSWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year observations in which a switch between parent auditors occurred, and zero otherwise. REGQ 
is an index variable to capture the regulatory quality of each country as computed by Kaufmann et al., 2009. ACCTSTND is an indicator variable equal to    
one for firms that report financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP or international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. 
USLIST is an indicator variable for firm-year observations in which the stock of the company is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and zero otherwise. 
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Table 3-3 (Continued) 
 
 
Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a Big 4 "Parent" firm, and zero otherwise. Named_Affiliate is an indicator 
variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a "Brand Name" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Local_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one 
for observations where the auditor is a "Local" affiliate, and zero otherwise. 
 
The additional variables reported in Panel C are defined as follows. CFO is cash flows from operations, scaled by total assets. ABS_TA is the absolute value 
of total accruals. CHG_CSHARES is the percentage change in the number of common shares of stock outstanding. GROWTH is defined as the percentage 
change in sales. CLOSE is the proportion of closely-held shares of common stock, as reported by Worldscope. NUMEX is the aggregate number of stock 
exchanges on which the firm is listed. 
 
The statistics in this table are based on all continuous variables having been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
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Table 3-4: Audit Fee Premium Models for Big 4 and Affiliates 
 
   
Panel A: Audit Service Fees
   
Panel B: Total Auditor Fees
 
 
Variable 
Dep Var = AUDFEE 
n = 49,529 
Estimate p-value 
  Dep Var = TOTFEE 
n = 44,012 
Estimate p-value 
Intercept 
SIZE 
CATA 
LOSS 
DEBT 
QUAL 
ROA 
6.2156 *** 
0.4228 *** 
0.0002 *** 
-0.0113 
0.0000 *** 
0.1411 *** 
0.0000 
  5.1348 *** 
0.5207 *** 
0.0001 * 
0.0468 *** 
0.0000 ** 
0.0885 *** 
0.0001 ** 
AUDSWITCH 
REGQ 
ACCTSTND 
USLIST 
Big4 
Named_Affiliate 
Local_Affiliate 
-0.0164 
0.4639 *** 
0.2006 *** 
0.6290 *** 
0.3063 *** 
0.2369 *** 
0.1163 *** 
  -0.0588 *** 
0.5135 *** 
0.1982 *** 
0.4159 *** 
0.4330 *** 
0.1809 *** 
0.1784 *** 
COUNTRY  FIXED-EFFECTS 
YEAR  FIXED-EFFECTS 
Included 
Included 
  Included 
Included 
Adjusted R-square 93.27%   86.95% 
F -statistic 65.29   29.49 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1), an OLS regression to model the effect of the type 
of Big 4 auditor on the audit fee premium relative to non-Big 4 auditors for the primary samples. 
AUDFEE is defined as the natural log of audit service fees, and TOTFEE is the natural log of total fees 
paid to the auditor. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets. 
LOSS is an indicator variable for firm-year observations with negative net income, and zero otherwise. 
DEBT is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one 
for firm-year obsevations with a qualified (going-concern or other) audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ROA 
is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. AUDSWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one for 
firm-year observations in which a switch between parent auditors occurred, and zero otherwise. REGQ is 
an index variable to capture the regulatory quality of each country (Kaufmann et al., 2009). ACCTSTND is 
an indicator variable equal to one for firms that report financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP 
or international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable 
for firm-year observations in which the stock of the company is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and 
zero otherwise. Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a Big 4 
"Parent" firm, and zero otherwise. Named_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one for observations 
where the auditor is a "Brand Name" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Local_Affiliate is an indicator variable 
equal   to   one   for   observations   where   the   auditor   is   a   "Local"   affiliate,   and   zero   otherwise. 
 
All       continuous       variables       are       winsorized       at       the       1%       and       99%       level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two- 
tailed p-values. 
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Table 3-5: Differences of Regression Coefficients - Fee Premium Model 
for Big 4 and Affiliates 
Panel A: Audit Service Fees  
Difference Sig. Difference Sig. 
Named_Affiliate Local_Affiliate 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Total Auditor Fees  
Difference Sig. Difference Sig. 
Named_Affiliate Local_Affiliate 
 
 
 
 
This table presents the results of performing an F-test for differences in the regression coefficients derived 
from estimating Equation (1). The parameter estimates α12, α13, and α14 are derived from the variables Big4, 
Named_Affiliate, and Local_Affililate, respectively. All differences in the regression coefficients are 
calculated as shown. 
 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two- 
tailed p-values. 
Big 4 (α12) 
( α12 - α13 ) 
0.0694 ***
( α12 - α14 ) 
0.1900  *** 
Named_Affiliate -
( α13 - α14 ) 
0.1206  *** 
Big 4
( α12 - α13 ) 
0.2521 ***
Named_Affiliate -
( α12 - α14 ) 
0.2546  *** 
 
( α13 - α14 ) 
0.0025 
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Table 3-6: Audit Fee Premium Models for Big 4 and Affiliates (Robust Sample) 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Panel A: Audit Service Fees 
Dep Var = AUDFEE 
n = 26,048 
Estimate p-value 
  Panel B: Total Auditor Fees 
Dep Var = TOTFEE 
n = 26,048 
Estimate p-value 
Intercept 
SIZE 
CATA 
5.2044 *** 
0.4710 *** 
0.0000 
  4.6752 *** 
0.4960 *** 
0.0000 
LOSS 
DEBT 
QUAL 
ROA 
AUDSWITCH 
REGQ 
IAS 
USLIST 
Big4 
Named_Affiliate 
Local_Affiliate 
0.0039 
0.0000 *** 
0.1543 *** 
0.0000 * 
-0.0336 ** 
0.1808 
0.2631 *** 
0.6915 *** 
0.3101 *** 
0.1857 *** 
0.0750 
  0.0109 
0.0000 ** 
0.1064 *** 
0.0001 ** 
-0.0450 *** 
0.3218 ** 
0.3749 *** 
0.5716 *** 
0.4316 *** 
0.3089 *** 
0.1115 * 
COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS 
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS 
Included 
Included 
  Included 
Included 
Adjusted R-square 91.46%   89.39% 
F -statistic 52.57   27.93 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (1), an OLS regression to model the effect of the type 
of Big 4 auditor on the audit fee premium relative to non-Big 4 auditors for the sample of firms with data 
availability for both audit service fees and total fees paid to the auditor. 
 
AUDFEE is defined as the natural log of audit service fees, and TOTFEE is the natural log of total fees 
paid to the auditor. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. CATA is the ratio of current assets to total assets. 
LOSS is an indicator variable for firm-year observations with negative net income, and zero otherwise. 
DEBT is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. QUAL is an indicator variable equal to one 
for firm-year obsevations with a qualified (going-concern or other) audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ROA 
is defined as the ratio of net income to total assets. AUDSWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one for 
firm-year observations in which a switch between parent auditors occurred, and zero otherwise. REGQ is 
an index variable to capture the regulatory quality of each country (Kaufmann et al., 2009). ACCTSTND is 
an indicator variable equal to one for firms that report financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP 
or international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable 
for firm-year observations in which the stock of the company is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and 
zero otherwise. Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a Big 4 
"Parent" firm, and zero otherwise. Named_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one for observations 
where the auditor is a "Brand Name" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Local_Affiliate is an indicator variable 
equal to one for observations where the auditor is a "Local" affiliate, and zero otherwise. 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two- 
tailed p-values. 
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Table 3-7: Univariate Analysis of Discretionary Accruals Based on Auditor Type 
 
   
Big 4 "Parent"Firms
 
"Brand Name" Affiliates 
 
"Local" Affiliates
 
Non-Big 4 Auditors
n = 28,981 n = 9,768 n = 4,739 n = 19,781 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median
Absolute discretionary accruals (Full Sample ) 0.0899 0.0511 0.1112 0.0631 0.0922 0.0534 0.130402 0.0708
 
 
   n = 14,430  n = 4,791    n = 2,314  n = 9,888     Income-
increasing DA sample partition 0.0911 0.0510  0.1083 0.0640  0.0921 0.0521  0.1235 0.0687 
   n = 14,551   n = 4,977   n = 2,425   n = 9,893   Income-
decreasing DA sample partition -0.0886 -0.0512  -0.1142 -0.0622  -0.0924 -0.0544  -0.1380 -0.0732 
This table presents descriptive statistics for absolute discretionary accruals for the full sample and, separately, for subsamples of firms with income- 
increasing and income-decreasing discretionary accruals. The procedures for estimating discretionary accruals consistent with Dechow et al. (1995) are 
described in Section 3.1, Equations (2) and (3). The means and medians are reported for the four sample partitions based on auditor type. The Big 4 "Parent" 
firms include: Arthur Andersen; Deloitte & Touche LLP; Ernst & Young LLP; KPMG LLP; and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. "Brand Name" affiliates 
include auditors that are members of the Big 4 global networks and use the international brand name. "Local" affiliates include member firms of the Big 4 
global networks that use individual, non-brand names. 
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Table 3-8: Univariate Analysis of Differences in Discretionary Accruals Based on Auditor Type 
 
 
Versus: "Brand Name" Affiliates Versus: Big 4 "Local" Affiliates Versus: Non-Big 4 Auditors 
Difference in  Difference in  Difference in 
  Mean Median  Mean Median  Mean Median   
 
Panel A: Big 4 "Parent" Firms 
Absolute discretionary accruals (Full Sample ) 
 
0.0214 *** 
 
0.0120 ### 
 
0.0024 
 
0.0023 
 
0.0405 *** 
 
0.0197 ### 
Income-increasing DA  sample partition 0.0172 *** 0.0130 ### 0.0010 0.0011 0.0324 *** 0.0177 ### 
Income-decreasing DA  sample partition -0.0256 *** 0.1133 ### -0.0038 -0.0033 -0.0494 *** -0.0221 ### 
Panel B: "Brand Name" Affiliates 
Absolute discretionary accruals (Full Sample ) - - -0.0190 *** -0.0097 ### 0.0192 *** 0.0077 ### 
Income-increasing DA  sample partition - - -0.0162 *** -0.0119 ### 0.0152 *** 0.0047 ### 
Income-decreasing DA  sample partition - - 0.0218 *** 0.0078 ## -0.0238 *** -0.0110 ## 
Panel C: "Local" Affiliates 
 
Absolute discretionary accruals (Full Sample ) - - - - 0.0382 *** 0.0174 ### 
Income-increasing DA  sample partition - - - - 0.0314 *** 0.0166 ### 
Income-decreasing DA  sample partition - - - - -0.0456 *** -0.0188 ### 
This table reports differences in discretionary accruals between the sample partitions based on auditor type. All differences are computed as the value of the 
"smaller" auditor type less the corresponding "larger" auditor type. For the full sample comparing absolute discretionary accruals and for the income- 
increasing discretionary accrual sample partition, positive (negative) differences signify lower (higher) levels of discretionary accruals for the "larger" 
auditor type. For the income-decreasing discretionary accruals sample partition, negative (positive) differences signify lower (higher) levels of discretionary 
accruals for the "larger" auditor type. The procedures for estimating discretionary accruals consistent with Dechow et al. (1995) are described in Section 3.1, 
Equations (2) and (3). The Big 4 "Parent" firms include: Arthur Andersen; Deloitte & Touche LLP; Ernst & Young LLP; KPMG LLP; and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP. "Brand Name" affiliates include auditors that are members of the Big 4 global networks and use the international brand name. 
"Local" affiliates include member firms of the Big 4 global networks that use individual, non-brand names. 
 
Tests         of         differences         in         means         (medians)         are         based         on          t-tests         (Wilcoxon         two-sample         tests). 
*,    **,    and    ***    denote    statistical    significance    at    the    10%,    5%,    and    1%    levels,    respectively,    based    on    two-tailed    p-values. 
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Table 3-9: Multivariate Analysis - Discretionary Accruals Regression Model 
 
   
Panel A: Full Sample 
Dep Var = Abs_DA 
n = 63,269
   
Panel B: Income-Increasing DA 
Dep Var = DA 
n = 31,423 
   
Panel C: Income-Decreasing DA
Dep Var = DA 
n = 31,846
Variable   Estimate p -value   Estimate p -value   Estimate p -value 
Intercept   0.1503 ***   0.1732 ***   0.1246 *** 
SIZE   -0.0068 ***   -0.0064 ***   -0.0072 *** 
CFO   0.0001 *   0.0000   0.0001 *** 
DEBT   0.0889 ***   0.0759 ***   0.0946 *** 
LOSS   0.0267 ***   0.0098 **   0.0409 *** 
ABS_TA   -0.0168 ***   0.0016   0.0129 ** 
ΔCSHARES   0.0000 *   0.0000 **   0.0000 
GROWTH   0.0000   0.0000 ***   0.0000 
REGQ   -0.0379 ***   -0.0267 *   -0.0526 ** 
ACCTSTND   -0.0091 **   -0.0035   -0.0164 *** 
USLIST   0.0131   -0.0150   0.0061 
CLOSE   -0.0003   0.0027   -0.0027 
NUMEX   0.0000   0.0000   0.0000 
BIG4   -0.0118 ***   -0.0193 ***   -0.0092 ** 
NAMED_AFFILIATE   -0.0083 **   -0.0112 **   -0.0043 
LOCAL_AFFILIATE   -0.0095 *   -0.0160 *   -0.0079 
COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS 
 
Included 
 
Included 
 
Included 
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS   Included   Included   Included 
Adjusted R-square 
 
9.23% 
 
6.27% 
 
13.14% 
Model   F  = 15.19   F = 11.85   F = 19.14 
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Table 3-9 (Continued) 
 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (4), the regression model for the multivariate analysis of discretionary accruals. Panel A reports results 
for the full sample, while Panels B and C report the results for sample partitions of firms with income-increasing and income-decreasing discretionary 
accruals, respectively. 
 
Abs_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals and DA is signed discretionary accruals. The procedures for estimating discretionary accruals 
consistent with Dechow et al. (1995) are described in Section 3.1, Equations (2) and (3). SIZE is defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. CFO is cash 
flows from operations, scaled by total assets. DEBT is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets. LOSS is an indicator variable equal to one for 
observations with negative net income, and zero otherwise. ABS_TA is absolute total accruals. CHG_CSHARES is the percentage change in the number of 
shares of common stock outstanding. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales. REGQ is an index variable to capture the regulatory quality of each 
country as computed by Kaufmann et al., 2009. ACCTSTND is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the firm reports under U.S. GAAP 
or international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the firm is 
cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and zero otherwise. CLOSE is the proportion of closely-held shares of common stock, as reported in Worldscope. 
NUMEX is the aggregate number of stock exchanges on which the firm is listed. 
 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. 
*,    **,    and    ***    denote    statistical    significance    at    the    10%,    5%,    and    1%    levels,    respectively,    based    on    two-tailed    p-values. 
122 
 
 
Table 3-10: Audit Fee Regression Models with Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
Interaction Terms 
 
 
 
 
Variable 
Panel A: Audit Service Fees 
Dep Var = AUDFEE 
n = 21,760 
Estimate p-value 
  Panel B: Total Auditor Fees 
Dep Var = TOTFEE 
n = 21,760 
Estimate p-value 
Intercept 
SIZE 
CATA 
LOSS 
DEBT 
QUAL 
6.3234 *** 
0.4350 *** 
0.0034 *** 
-0.0124 ** 
-0.0006 ** 
0.0761 *** 
  5.6470 *** 
0.5299 *** 
0.0017 *** 
0.0395 *** 
-0.0030 *** 
0.0087 
ROA 
AUDSWITCH 
REGQ 
IAS 
USLIST 
Big4 
Named_Affiliate 
-0.0130 *** 
-0.0289 *** 
0.3506 ** 
0.1857 *** 
0.6911 *** 
0.1425 *** 
0.1516 *** 
  -0.0009 
-0.1217 *** 
0.8530 *** 
0.2063 *** 
0.4727 *** 
0.2626 *** 
0.0032 
Big4*Abs_DA -0.0149 *** -0.0021 
Named_Affiliate*Abs_DA -0.0024 -0.0115 
Local_Affiliate*Abs_DA -0.0086 *   -0.0062 
COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS 
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS 
Included 
Included 
  Included 
Included 
Adjusted R-square 93.52%   88.25% 
F -statistic 67.35   32.64 
This table presents the results of Equation (5), a modified version of Equation (1) that includes interaction 
terms between auditor type and absolute discretionary accruals. The sample for this test excludes non-Big 4 
auditors. AUDFEE is defined as the natural log of audit service fees, and TOTFEE is the natural log of total 
fees paid to the auditor. SIZE is the natural log of total assets. CATA is the ratio of current assets to total 
assets. LOSS is an indicator variable for firm-year observations with negative net income, and zero 
otherwise. DEBT is defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. QUAL is an indicator variable 
equal to one for firm-year obsevations with a qualified audit opinion, and zero otherwise. ROA is defined as 
the ratio of net income to total assets. AUDSWITCH is an indicator variable equal to one for firm-year 
observations in which a switch between parent auditors occurred, and zero otherwise. REGQ is an index 
variable to capture the regulatory quality of each country (Kaufmann et al., 2009). ACCTSTND is an 
indicator variable equal to one for firms that report financial statements in accordance with U.S. GAAP or 
international accounting standards (IAS or IFRS), and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable for 
firm-year observations in which the stock of the company is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and zero 
otherwise. Big4 is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the auditor is a Big 4 "Parent" 
firm, and zero otherwise. Named_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the 
auditor is a "Brand Name" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Local_Affiliate is an indicator variable equal to one 
for observations where the auditor is a "Local" affiliate, and zero otherwise. Abs_DA is the absolute value 
of discretionary accruals, and the procedures for estimating discretionary accruals consistent with Dechow 
et al. (1995) are described in Section 3.1, Equations (2) and (3). 
 
All       continuous       variables       are       winsorized       at       the       1%       and       99%       level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two- 
tailed p-values. 
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Table 3-11: Discretionary Accrual Regression Models with Lagged Audit Fee 
Interaction Terms 
 
Panel A: Audit Service Fees Panel B: Total Auditor Fees 
Dep Var = Abs_DA Dep Var = Abs_DA 
n = 19,475 n = 19,475 
Variable Estimate p-value Estimate p-value 
  
Intercept 0.4837 *** 0.3968 *** 
SIZE -0.0132 *** -0.0088 *** 
CFO 0.0000 0.0000 
DEBT 0.0000 * 0.0000 
LOSS 0.0377 *** 0.0301 *** 
ABS_TA 0.0000 * -0.0001 
ΔCSHARES 0.0000 0.0000 
GROWTH 0.0000 *** 0.0000 
REGQ -0.1133 *** 0.0814 ** 
IAS 0.0290 ** 0.0168 ** 
USLIST -0.0151 * -0.0064 
CLOSE 0.0044 ** 0.0029 * 
NUMEX 0.0000 0.0000 
Big4 -0.1133 ** -0.1179 ** 
Named_Affiliate -0.0997 * -0.1162 * 
Big4* (AUDFEE t-1) -0.0048 *** - 
Named_Affiliate* (AUDFEE t-1) -0.0020 ** - 
Local_Affiliate* (AUDFEE t-1) -0.0008 - 
Big4* (TOTFEE t-1) - -0.0006 
Named_Affiliate* (TOTFEE t-1) - 0.0001 
Local_Affiliate* (TOTFEE t-1) - 0.0017 
 
COUNTRY FIXED-EFFECTS 
YEAR FIXED-EFFECTS 
Adjusted R-square 
F -statistic 
Included Included 
Included Included 
9.43% 9.06% 
48.63 43.07 
 
 
This table presents the results of estimating Equation (6), a modified version of Equation (4) that includes 
interaction terms between auditor type and lagged auditor fee variables. The sample for this test excludes 
non-Big 4 auditors. Abs_DA is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, estimated as described in 
Section 3.1, Equations (2) and (3). SIZE is defined as the natural log of total assets. CFO is cash flows from 
operations scaled by total assets. DEBT is defined as total liabilities divided by total assets. LOSS is an 
indicator variable equal to one for observations with negative net income, and zero otherwise. Abs_TA is 
absolute total accruals. CHG_CSHARES is the percentage change in the number of shares of common stock 
outstanding. GROWTH is the percentage change in sales. REGQ is an index variable to capture the 
regulatory quality of each country as computed by Kaufmann et al. (2009). ACCTSTND is an indicator 
variable equal to one for observations where the firm reports under U.S. GAAP or international accounting 
standards, and zero otherwise. USLIST is an indicator variable equal to one for observations where the firm 
is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange, and zero otherwise. CLOSE is the proportion of closely-held 
shares of common stock. NUMEX is the number of stock exchanges on which the firm is listed. AUDFEEt-1 
(TOTFEEt-1)  is  the  natural  log  of  prior-year  audit  service  fees  (total  fees  paid  to  the  auditor). 
 
All       continuous       variables       are       winsorized       at       the       1%       and       99%       level. 
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on two- 
tailed p-values. 
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Auditor  AuditorName 
 
YMMU
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PVND
PVND
 
Notes: (i) The "auditor code" described in the paper is the column "Auditor"; (ii) The above includes ten random
audit firms provided by Thompson Reuters; (iii) PVND in the "AuditorParent" column indicates that the parent
auditor is "Not Disclosed." Any observations in the sample with an undisclosed auditor parent are coded as non-
Big 4; (iv) Many audit firms, based on "AuditorName," are no longer represented in the database as a result of
mergers and acquisitions or closures. 
Panel B: Data provided by Thompson Reuters for Big 4 "Parent" Firms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (i) In the AuditorParent column, "NULL" denotes that either the associated auditor is the "coordinating
entity" or is not an affiliate of any other firm; (ii) the codes PVAN, PVDT, PVEY, PVKP, and PVPW are the internal
codes used by Thompson Reuters to classify members of the respective Big 4 networks. 
 
 
Appendix A: Samples of Auditor Data Provided by Thompson Reuters 
 
 
Panel A: General Example of Data Provided 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditor  AuditorName  AuditorParent 
AA  Arthur Andersen LLP  PVAN 
PVAN  Arthur  Andersen  NULL 
DHS  Deloitte & Touche LLP  PVDT 
PVDT  Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu International  NULL 
EY  Ernst & Young LLP  PVEY 
PVEY  Ernst & Young Global  NULL 
KPMG  KPMG LLP  PVKP 
PVKP  KPMG  International  NULL 
PWCL  PricewaterhouseCoopers  LLP  PVPW 
PVPW  PricewaterhouseCoopers   International  NULL 
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Notes: (i) This presents a random selection of the Big 4's "Brand Name" affiliates based on the data provided by
Thompson Retuers. These firms may not be represented in the sample included in this study. 
 
Panel D: Example of data provided by Thompson Reuters for Big 4 "Local" Affiliates 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: (i) This presents a random selection of each of the Big 4's "Local" affiliates based on the data provided by
Thompson Retuers. These firms may not be represented in the sample included in this study; (ii) note that some of
these firms may be "affiliated" with one of the Big 4 auditors without being the primary name used in the country or
region in which they operate. 
Panel C: Example of data provided by Thompson Reuters for Big 4 "Brand Name" Affiliates 
Auditor  AuditorName  AuditorParent 
KAFS  KPMG Al Fozan & Al Sadhan  PVKP 
FPTC  KPMG Ford Rhodes Thornton & Company  PVKP 
OPAW  Ohrlings  PricewaterhouseCoopers  AB  PVPW 
PWCO  PwC  Oberoesterreich  PVPW 
DAYC  Deloitte Auditores y Consultores Ltda  PVDT 
 
 
 
 
 
Auditor  AuditorName  AuditorParent 
PLUK  Auditorska Palata Ukraina  PVAN 
CLMC  C.L. Manabat & Co.  PVDT 
OTA  Century Ota Showa & Co.  PVEY 
JAA  Joao Augusto & Associados, SROC  PVKP 
SAML  Samil Accounting Corp.  PVPW 
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